The Germans banked on a quick end to the war, as per 1871, captured in the Schlieffen plan. Food shortages caused by a blockage wouldn't be an issue because the war was supposed to be over before they could take effect.
The need for a quick win against France was driven by the need to pivot troops to fight Russia, and avoid a two-front war, not the need to avoid a blockade. The Germans seem to have thought the British might not even enter a war with France, and indeed they did so quite unwillingly (by my reading of "The Guns of August" by B. Tuchman.)
The German violation of Belgian neutrality was the core of the Schlieffen plan, which opted for a wide flanking maneuver. This was deemed essential to a quick victory. And yet violating Belgian neutrality is what brought Britain into the war and brought on the blockade. I can't imagine their main concern was a blockade given they did the one thing committed to paper that would bring the British into the war and bring on a blockade.
Indeed, the German Navy did not feature in the Schlieffen plan at all, and was kept in port with the exception of battle cruisers and other fleet elements based in the Mediterranean and Pacific. Fleet movements required the approval of the Kaiser himself, who didn't want to risk his prestige Navy and opted for the Mahan doctrine of a "fleet in being". Submarine warfare was only adopted later in response to stalemate on land.
I think it is more plausible that the German fleet was a prestige fleet, and not one intended to protect maritime supply lines.
Though I would say that the agrarian view definitely applies to Britain. Their reliance on maritime routes for supply must have been a factor. Prestige would have played a part, but given the very real, material need as described in this agrarian view, I can't imagine it to be a primary driver.
It would explain why German attempts at a prestige Navy would be so destabilising, and were likely a factor behind staff level Franco-British joint planning efforts in the years prior to the war, which sort-of-de-facto committed Britain to war (but not formally and not on paper).
Generally, I would be skeptical of any theory that claims to explain the causes of the war in a single factor (though I am being very ungenerous in assuming that to be the aim here).
Though I should thank you for writing about this - very very very interesting and not a theory I had come across. Thanks!
Thanks for your comment. I am not a military specialist, but I think that Germans at first tried to "reciprocate" by going after shipments of food to the UK, but their Navy was found not up to the task (i.e. was weaker than the British). This is why they then opted entirely for the submarine warfare (which eventually brought the US into the war). Also, geography was on the British side, as Germany's fleet could be "bottled up" in the North Sea ports.
Nicholas: You add a refreshing twist (perspective) to how we might read modern history turning on the revolutions of the Great War era - in this review. I like too, the return to The mid-19th century Corn Laws - and later competition between the cousins - England/Britain and Germany.
The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations (Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920-1930) Palgrave Macmillan 2016 - by Misuzu Hanihara CHOW (former Dept Head at UoMacquarie) and Kiyofuku CHUMA (first edition in Japanese 2011 - the revised/expanded version in English by 2016 - an examination of the anti-Asian (Chinese/Japanese) mood of Woodrow WILSON (including how both the UK and the US stood back allowing Billy HUGHES to take the opprobrium for his anti-Japanese stance at the Versailles Peace Treaty while giving him off-stage encouragement... CHOW's grand-father was a Japanese Embassy secretary pre-War - later post-war Ambassador to Washington D.C. Adds something, I think...
100,000 soldiers means nothing on the Ukraine border, professor. It was only an opening move by Putin. Gen Macgregor has come out recently and said we can't even put 60,000 to counter. At least my reading of him was no one wants to fight anymore, That, plus the fact that he finds it hard for the US to conjure up a reason to unite the troops to fight. The internet has helped transparentize relationships, so you can't hide things as easily anymore. Hence the damage from any war, aside from being internecine, may also in fact be psychologically devastating. One will have to believe what the power wants them to believe. For the time being, my guess is inflation is here to stay, let everyone get poorer and see if it changes their minds but I'm not smart enough to see what comes next. Хвала вам
The Germans banked on a quick end to the war, as per 1871, captured in the Schlieffen plan. Food shortages caused by a blockage wouldn't be an issue because the war was supposed to be over before they could take effect.
The need for a quick win against France was driven by the need to pivot troops to fight Russia, and avoid a two-front war, not the need to avoid a blockade. The Germans seem to have thought the British might not even enter a war with France, and indeed they did so quite unwillingly (by my reading of "The Guns of August" by B. Tuchman.)
The German violation of Belgian neutrality was the core of the Schlieffen plan, which opted for a wide flanking maneuver. This was deemed essential to a quick victory. And yet violating Belgian neutrality is what brought Britain into the war and brought on the blockade. I can't imagine their main concern was a blockade given they did the one thing committed to paper that would bring the British into the war and bring on a blockade.
Indeed, the German Navy did not feature in the Schlieffen plan at all, and was kept in port with the exception of battle cruisers and other fleet elements based in the Mediterranean and Pacific. Fleet movements required the approval of the Kaiser himself, who didn't want to risk his prestige Navy and opted for the Mahan doctrine of a "fleet in being". Submarine warfare was only adopted later in response to stalemate on land.
I think it is more plausible that the German fleet was a prestige fleet, and not one intended to protect maritime supply lines.
Though I would say that the agrarian view definitely applies to Britain. Their reliance on maritime routes for supply must have been a factor. Prestige would have played a part, but given the very real, material need as described in this agrarian view, I can't imagine it to be a primary driver.
It would explain why German attempts at a prestige Navy would be so destabilising, and were likely a factor behind staff level Franco-British joint planning efforts in the years prior to the war, which sort-of-de-facto committed Britain to war (but not formally and not on paper).
Generally, I would be skeptical of any theory that claims to explain the causes of the war in a single factor (though I am being very ungenerous in assuming that to be the aim here).
Though I should thank you for writing about this - very very very interesting and not a theory I had come across. Thanks!
Thanks for your comment. I am not a military specialist, but I think that Germans at first tried to "reciprocate" by going after shipments of food to the UK, but their Navy was found not up to the task (i.e. was weaker than the British). This is why they then opted entirely for the submarine warfare (which eventually brought the US into the war). Also, geography was on the British side, as Germany's fleet could be "bottled up" in the North Sea ports.
Nicholas: You add a refreshing twist (perspective) to how we might read modern history turning on the revolutions of the Great War era - in this review. I like too, the return to The mid-19th century Corn Laws - and later competition between the cousins - England/Britain and Germany.
The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations (Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920-1930) Palgrave Macmillan 2016 - by Misuzu Hanihara CHOW (former Dept Head at UoMacquarie) and Kiyofuku CHUMA (first edition in Japanese 2011 - the revised/expanded version in English by 2016 - an examination of the anti-Asian (Chinese/Japanese) mood of Woodrow WILSON (including how both the UK and the US stood back allowing Billy HUGHES to take the opprobrium for his anti-Japanese stance at the Versailles Peace Treaty while giving him off-stage encouragement... CHOW's grand-father was a Japanese Embassy secretary pre-War - later post-war Ambassador to Washington D.C. Adds something, I think...
The straits of malacca isn't same as food supplies! China and US have plenty of food.if u r talking abt chips, then they r moving to self sufficiency
Why does England not want Germany to have food supplies. Seems this explains English navy but not why war broke out.
100,000 soldiers means nothing on the Ukraine border, professor. It was only an opening move by Putin. Gen Macgregor has come out recently and said we can't even put 60,000 to counter. At least my reading of him was no one wants to fight anymore, That, plus the fact that he finds it hard for the US to conjure up a reason to unite the troops to fight. The internet has helped transparentize relationships, so you can't hide things as easily anymore. Hence the damage from any war, aside from being internecine, may also in fact be psychologically devastating. One will have to believe what the power wants them to believe. For the time being, my guess is inflation is here to stay, let everyone get poorer and see if it changes their minds but I'm not smart enough to see what comes next. Хвала вам
Hi! The link to your new book does not work, or comes up to a "Cannot Find" page from Harvard publishing...