In today’s Financial Times Ruchir Sharma has a very nice article about the recent readjustments in China’s policies: discontinuation of zero-covid restrictions, stronger support for globalization, and a nod toward the private sector. As the title (“The Xi nobody saw coming”) says, Sharma sees them as a sudden and unexpected volte-face of Xi.
The FT's China coverage is simultaneously simplistic and thematically consistent, and when readers read the same projections/insinuations, its hard to pop the bubble. Interesting reference to the 09 crash!
An excellent comment. Unique ability to put communist policies into perspective, understand their real life, logical, historical, cultural, economic i.e. Leninist foundation.
Xi is a normal politician, communism is alive. New Cold War is logical. Decoupling might not work perfectly, exactly as expected by the US, because both sides in the new Decoupling War are capitalist. More like Chinese Leninist global capitalism against US liberal global capitalism.
A time may come when Communist Party of China will realize its economic and development goals. Will it be a time to give up ruling billion people in order to guide them to a post that is unachievable by any other method, and having confidence in letting China be ruled by a more spontaneous, democratic structure.
No. Letting go of communism before US is contained as global Empire would be dangerous.
Do you think China will attack/invade Taiwan? And do you think The West should respond to the invasion/attack the same way it has towards Russia's attack and invasion of Ukraine?
Frank, when the issue of Taiwan comes forward, one is inevitably drawn to evaluate One China policy. In 1972, when US approached Mao, Chou En Lai, China was populous, but extremely undeveloped and poor country. China demanded that US accepts One China policy before any progress in defrosting relations between US and China.
One China policy meant that US recognizes communist China as the only real China, withdraws ambassador from Taipei and sends one to Beijing, and accepts that Taiwan is a part of (communist) China. Ambiguity was built into this arrangement, and US kept the right to assist Taiwan to defend itself against a possible communist China attempt at forceful reunification. China never relinquished it's right to use of force in the case Taiwan proclaimes independence.
One China policy was a diplomatic masterpiece, signed by Kissinger and Nixon and it worked perfectly, China opened borders and economy, developing enormously, US become a global giant producing stuff in China, Taiwan developed economically even without official recognition as a state.
Ambiguity made OneChina policy possible, and One China policy was a basis for globalization, and enormous success of China as well as US, and many other players in global ecenomy.
Every US president after Nixon, reiterated and publicly accepted One China policy. (Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush jr, Obama, Trump, Biden ...)
Removing ambiguity from OneChina policy would mean starting a war. It is a question worth pondering, is US contemplating on giving up One China policy?
Except for it's enormous economic success, One China policy probably made it much more difficult for US to start a war with China.
And one wonders what should have happened if Gorbachev asked for something similar from US & NATO before withdrawing Soviet forces from Berlin, and Eastern Europe?
Nice article that briefly and eloquently summarizes the strategic objectives of Chinese leadership tics) (reflecting the desires of the population) and the operational approach (tactics) to achieve them.
Ultimately it is a fundamental Asiatic/Chinese approach reflecting basic philosophy: world is dynamic, in a constant move with changes due to the ying and yang interactions and to be successful, one has to follow the dao / tao.
When you mentioned a bird in the cage, I first thought you will use a canary in the mine reference so was intrigued. Nice commentary Branko - happy new year!
Thanks for a great reading. Do you mind if I translate this piece to Chinese, so that I can share your opinion among my friends who cannot read English?
Market Leninism in its Chinese version can still bear fruit. This decade will bear witness to this. It is strategic for China to break the G7 high-tech oligopoly this decade. If they succeed, they will be unstoppable for the rest of the century.
Which policies did Deng introduce in his three leftist years, only to reverse in the following rightist years? And were these reverals as significant as Xi's several non-COVID reversals?
Thanks for liking my comment but I was kinda wondering what Branko thinks of China invading Taiwan. I don't think it is likely but it is more probable now than a few years ago...
Interesting discussion. One thing I wonder about is what role “public opinion” or at least popular dissatisfaction may play in motivating policy shifts in China / necessitating course corrections as regimes try to balance the interests described here. Even in tightly controlled regimes there does appear to be some form of social contract and a successful regime must have some legitimacy beyond its monopoly on the use of force.
Most people with a basic understanding of both Communist ideals and the New Economic Policy can probably infer that Lenin was tactically flexible, even if they haven't read about him as a political thinker.
That is true. But the set of people who know about the above two topics almost perfectly matches the set of people who read Lenin or at least summaries of his books :)
You're of course correct, but you didn't need to go through advanced political theory to debunk that guy from FT.
A quick search for the term “zero covid” on the CPC's extraofficial tabloid, The Global Times, points to overwhelming evidence that Zero Covid was always flexible and meant to be constantly adjusted considering not only purely medical/healthcare factors, but also social and economic.
Not to bother you all, I'll just quote two sources. Out of the bat, from June 5th 2020 (i.e. just a little over four months after the then still an epidemic ignited in Wuhan), there's a piece of news titled “Beijing to significantly lift COVID-19 measures, adjust emergency response to lowest” (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1190689.shtml). That is, Zero Covid was adjusted.
If you dear reader don't think this is enough evidence, let me go straight up to the first white paper by the CPC, published at June 2020 (official date in the paper itself; the data from The Global Times itself points to June 7th, which means the paper may well have been produced in May), titled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1190779.shtml?id=11).
In this paper, we have:
“Covid-19 is changing the form but not the general trend of economic globalization. Decoupling, erecting walls and deglobalization may divide the world, but will not do any good to those who themselves are engaged in these acts. China believes that the international community should proceed with globalization, safeguard the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, cut tariffs, remove barriers, facilitate the flow of trade, and keep international industrial and supply chains secure and smooth. Countries also need to implement strong and effective fiscal and monetary policies, better coordinate financial regulation to keep global financial markets stable, and thus prevent a global financial crisis that may consequently plunge the world economy into a massive, protracted recession. China will continue to supply the international market with anti-epidemic materials, pharmaceutical ingredients, daily necessities, and other supplies. At the same time, China will continue to advance reform and opening up, expand imports and outbound investment, and thereby contribute further to other countries’ fight against the virus and to a stable world economy.”
Therefore, it would always consider economic factors when enforcing Zero Covid. When the paper was published, keeping the supply chains of “anti-epidemic materials, pharmaceutical ingredients, daily necessities, and other supplies” was the most urgent factor, but the principle is the same.
But if one doesn't think this is enough evidence, there's more. From the same source:
“(4) February 23: President Xi spoke to 170,000 officials nationwide by video link, at a meeting on coordinating epidemic control with economic and social development. He emphasized that this epidemic, given the speed and scope of its spread, represented the most challenging public health emergency in China since the founding of the People’s Republic, and that it was both a serious crisis and a major test.
He acknowledged the arduous efforts of all involved, welcoming the fact that control measures were producing increasingly positive results, but noting that the overall situation remained complex and serious, and this stage would be crucial in curbing the spread. The people must maintain their faith in ultimate victory and make unremitting efforts in all of their prevention and control work. He encouraged the nation to turn pressure into strength and adversity into opportunities, and steadily resume normal work and daily life. He demanded a redoubled effort to stabilize the six fronts -- employment, finance, foreign trade, inbound investment, domestic investment, and market expectations, called for stronger policies to unleash the full potential and maintain the strong momentum of China’s development, and urged the nation to achieve the goals and tasks set for this year’s economic and social development.”
Note that this log is from February 23rd, i.e. less than one month after COVID-19 rampaged through Wuhan. Xi Jinping talked about not one, but “six fronts”, which are: “employment, finance, foreign trade, inbound investment, domestic investment, and market expectations”. He clearly spoke about overcoming the healthcare crisis as a necessary first step to proceed on the economic. Which is smart, in my opinion, since dead people don't produce wealth.
But ok, someone could still claim that Xi Jinping is a dictator, albeit a very smart one. According to this theory, China simply lucked out with Xi Jinping's purely individual decision. He could screw up the next crisis, after all.
Well, no. From the same source:
“(41)February 17: Through its Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism, the State Council issued Guidelines on Taking Science-based, Targeted, Region-specific, and Tiered Measures for Covid-19 Prevention and Control. Local authorities and government departments were required to take measures matching the corresponding levels of emergency response and ensure an orderly return to work and normal life.”
So there you have it. Xi Jinping didn't got it right: he simply followed the advise of the experts. He turned those advises into public policy on a national level -- which is literally his job. The State Council created a Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism, which, through the experts it had at its disposal (probably the best of the best of China, if I had to guess), decided everything on the macro-management level. The local authorities and government departments (probably, the city/village and province administrations, respectively), did the rest. There was never a Xi Jinping dictatorship.
Xi is positive as politician not because he is not a dictator. Xi is a communist CEO. Like Lenin, Xi can be described by some as a dictator, and defending Xi as not being a dictator makes the whole discussion at the same time attracting attention, a part of a smearing campaign and significantly off course. Xi is a CEO of China, he is a captain of the aircraft, of the ship. Xi is communist, and being a communist has been shown to be something good, definitely good for China, and possibly, at least in theory, also for other countries, all over the globe.
Excellent et très nécessaire face à tous ces commentaires simplistes sur XI et les « dangers » que présenterait une Chine instable et incertaine donc imprévisible ! Mais quelle est l’utilité réelle d’un dirigeant « prévisible » ?
"China had come close to the promised land. Its modern economy was on an extraordinary trajectory. The rebalancing agenda promised more to come. But Xi broke that promise."
This view is consistent with liberal Western thinking. Except that the Communists allowed China's liberal economic thinking not out of liberal conviction, but to create good conditions for China's productive forces to develop and thus set the stage for socialism. Economic liberalism was therefore not an end in itself, but merely a means to achieve a level of social and economic development. The reason why this was not understood by the West is, in my opinion, arrogance, hubris.
The FT's China coverage is simultaneously simplistic and thematically consistent, and when readers read the same projections/insinuations, its hard to pop the bubble. Interesting reference to the 09 crash!
An excellent comment. Unique ability to put communist policies into perspective, understand their real life, logical, historical, cultural, economic i.e. Leninist foundation.
Xi is a normal politician, communism is alive. New Cold War is logical. Decoupling might not work perfectly, exactly as expected by the US, because both sides in the new Decoupling War are capitalist. More like Chinese Leninist global capitalism against US liberal global capitalism.
A time may come when Communist Party of China will realize its economic and development goals. Will it be a time to give up ruling billion people in order to guide them to a post that is unachievable by any other method, and having confidence in letting China be ruled by a more spontaneous, democratic structure.
No. Letting go of communism before US is contained as global Empire would be dangerous.
As proven by Gorbachev. And Russia.
Do you think China will attack/invade Taiwan? And do you think The West should respond to the invasion/attack the same way it has towards Russia's attack and invasion of Ukraine?
Frank, when the issue of Taiwan comes forward, one is inevitably drawn to evaluate One China policy. In 1972, when US approached Mao, Chou En Lai, China was populous, but extremely undeveloped and poor country. China demanded that US accepts One China policy before any progress in defrosting relations between US and China.
One China policy meant that US recognizes communist China as the only real China, withdraws ambassador from Taipei and sends one to Beijing, and accepts that Taiwan is a part of (communist) China. Ambiguity was built into this arrangement, and US kept the right to assist Taiwan to defend itself against a possible communist China attempt at forceful reunification. China never relinquished it's right to use of force in the case Taiwan proclaimes independence.
One China policy was a diplomatic masterpiece, signed by Kissinger and Nixon and it worked perfectly, China opened borders and economy, developing enormously, US become a global giant producing stuff in China, Taiwan developed economically even without official recognition as a state.
Ambiguity made OneChina policy possible, and One China policy was a basis for globalization, and enormous success of China as well as US, and many other players in global ecenomy.
Every US president after Nixon, reiterated and publicly accepted One China policy. (Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush jr, Obama, Trump, Biden ...)
Removing ambiguity from OneChina policy would mean starting a war. It is a question worth pondering, is US contemplating on giving up One China policy?
Except for it's enormous economic success, One China policy probably made it much more difficult for US to start a war with China.
And one wonders what should have happened if Gorbachev asked for something similar from US & NATO before withdrawing Soviet forces from Berlin, and Eastern Europe?
Nice article that briefly and eloquently summarizes the strategic objectives of Chinese leadership tics) (reflecting the desires of the population) and the operational approach (tactics) to achieve them.
Ultimately it is a fundamental Asiatic/Chinese approach reflecting basic philosophy: world is dynamic, in a constant move with changes due to the ying and yang interactions and to be successful, one has to follow the dao / tao.
When you mentioned a bird in the cage, I first thought you will use a canary in the mine reference so was intrigued. Nice commentary Branko - happy new year!
Thanks for a great reading. Do you mind if I translate this piece to Chinese, so that I can share your opinion among my friends who cannot read English?
Market Leninism in its Chinese version can still bear fruit. This decade will bear witness to this. It is strategic for China to break the G7 high-tech oligopoly this decade. If they succeed, they will be unstoppable for the rest of the century.
Which policies did Deng introduce in his three leftist years, only to reverse in the following rightist years? And were these reverals as significant as Xi's several non-COVID reversals?
Thanks for liking my comment but I was kinda wondering what Branko thinks of China invading Taiwan. I don't think it is likely but it is more probable now than a few years ago...
Is this a dialectic?
Interesting discussion. One thing I wonder about is what role “public opinion” or at least popular dissatisfaction may play in motivating policy shifts in China / necessitating course corrections as regimes try to balance the interests described here. Even in tightly controlled regimes there does appear to be some form of social contract and a successful regime must have some legitimacy beyond its monopoly on the use of force.
I think it's generational. I doubt Sharma has read anything of Lenin, while an older generation is at least familiar with main thoughts and features.
Most people with a basic understanding of both Communist ideals and the New Economic Policy can probably infer that Lenin was tactically flexible, even if they haven't read about him as a political thinker.
That is true. But the set of people who know about the above two topics almost perfectly matches the set of people who read Lenin or at least summaries of his books :)
You're of course correct, but you didn't need to go through advanced political theory to debunk that guy from FT.
A quick search for the term “zero covid” on the CPC's extraofficial tabloid, The Global Times, points to overwhelming evidence that Zero Covid was always flexible and meant to be constantly adjusted considering not only purely medical/healthcare factors, but also social and economic.
Not to bother you all, I'll just quote two sources. Out of the bat, from June 5th 2020 (i.e. just a little over four months after the then still an epidemic ignited in Wuhan), there's a piece of news titled “Beijing to significantly lift COVID-19 measures, adjust emergency response to lowest” (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1190689.shtml). That is, Zero Covid was adjusted.
If you dear reader don't think this is enough evidence, let me go straight up to the first white paper by the CPC, published at June 2020 (official date in the paper itself; the data from The Global Times itself points to June 7th, which means the paper may well have been produced in May), titled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1190779.shtml?id=11).
In this paper, we have:
“Covid-19 is changing the form but not the general trend of economic globalization. Decoupling, erecting walls and deglobalization may divide the world, but will not do any good to those who themselves are engaged in these acts. China believes that the international community should proceed with globalization, safeguard the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, cut tariffs, remove barriers, facilitate the flow of trade, and keep international industrial and supply chains secure and smooth. Countries also need to implement strong and effective fiscal and monetary policies, better coordinate financial regulation to keep global financial markets stable, and thus prevent a global financial crisis that may consequently plunge the world economy into a massive, protracted recession. China will continue to supply the international market with anti-epidemic materials, pharmaceutical ingredients, daily necessities, and other supplies. At the same time, China will continue to advance reform and opening up, expand imports and outbound investment, and thereby contribute further to other countries’ fight against the virus and to a stable world economy.”
Therefore, it would always consider economic factors when enforcing Zero Covid. When the paper was published, keeping the supply chains of “anti-epidemic materials, pharmaceutical ingredients, daily necessities, and other supplies” was the most urgent factor, but the principle is the same.
But if one doesn't think this is enough evidence, there's more. From the same source:
“(4) February 23: President Xi spoke to 170,000 officials nationwide by video link, at a meeting on coordinating epidemic control with economic and social development. He emphasized that this epidemic, given the speed and scope of its spread, represented the most challenging public health emergency in China since the founding of the People’s Republic, and that it was both a serious crisis and a major test.
He acknowledged the arduous efforts of all involved, welcoming the fact that control measures were producing increasingly positive results, but noting that the overall situation remained complex and serious, and this stage would be crucial in curbing the spread. The people must maintain their faith in ultimate victory and make unremitting efforts in all of their prevention and control work. He encouraged the nation to turn pressure into strength and adversity into opportunities, and steadily resume normal work and daily life. He demanded a redoubled effort to stabilize the six fronts -- employment, finance, foreign trade, inbound investment, domestic investment, and market expectations, called for stronger policies to unleash the full potential and maintain the strong momentum of China’s development, and urged the nation to achieve the goals and tasks set for this year’s economic and social development.”
Note that this log is from February 23rd, i.e. less than one month after COVID-19 rampaged through Wuhan. Xi Jinping talked about not one, but “six fronts”, which are: “employment, finance, foreign trade, inbound investment, domestic investment, and market expectations”. He clearly spoke about overcoming the healthcare crisis as a necessary first step to proceed on the economic. Which is smart, in my opinion, since dead people don't produce wealth.
But ok, someone could still claim that Xi Jinping is a dictator, albeit a very smart one. According to this theory, China simply lucked out with Xi Jinping's purely individual decision. He could screw up the next crisis, after all.
Well, no. From the same source:
“(41)February 17: Through its Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism, the State Council issued Guidelines on Taking Science-based, Targeted, Region-specific, and Tiered Measures for Covid-19 Prevention and Control. Local authorities and government departments were required to take measures matching the corresponding levels of emergency response and ensure an orderly return to work and normal life.”
So there you have it. Xi Jinping didn't got it right: he simply followed the advise of the experts. He turned those advises into public policy on a national level -- which is literally his job. The State Council created a Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism, which, through the experts it had at its disposal (probably the best of the best of China, if I had to guess), decided everything on the macro-management level. The local authorities and government departments (probably, the city/village and province administrations, respectively), did the rest. There was never a Xi Jinping dictatorship.
Xi is positive as politician not because he is not a dictator. Xi is a communist CEO. Like Lenin, Xi can be described by some as a dictator, and defending Xi as not being a dictator makes the whole discussion at the same time attracting attention, a part of a smearing campaign and significantly off course. Xi is a CEO of China, he is a captain of the aircraft, of the ship. Xi is communist, and being a communist has been shown to be something good, definitely good for China, and possibly, at least in theory, also for other countries, all over the globe.
Excellent et très nécessaire face à tous ces commentaires simplistes sur XI et les « dangers » que présenterait une Chine instable et incertaine donc imprévisible ! Mais quelle est l’utilité réelle d’un dirigeant « prévisible » ?
Autre son de cloche : https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-jinping-spoiled-china-growth-story-by-stephen-s-roach-2022-12
"China had come close to the promised land. Its modern economy was on an extraordinary trajectory. The rebalancing agenda promised more to come. But Xi broke that promise."
This view is consistent with liberal Western thinking. Except that the Communists allowed China's liberal economic thinking not out of liberal conviction, but to create good conditions for China's productive forces to develop and thus set the stage for socialism. Economic liberalism was therefore not an end in itself, but merely a means to achieve a level of social and economic development. The reason why this was not understood by the West is, in my opinion, arrogance, hubris.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)