Very good analysis, thank you! As for Russian elites - yes, they are in a funk, but you are missing a two major difference to EE elites. A) they aren’t parochial b) they are pragmatic, I e don’t have any ideology whatsoever, opposite to EE elites that are limited by their nationalism. Thus Russian elites are very opportunistic, which in current set isn’t a bad thing and gives some hope to the rest of us that we won’t end up deep fried .
Let's hope so. But I see them in a deep trouble. When they try to be as liberal as possible, they are derided and not believed. I agree that pragmatism is what is needed. Otherwise...
They are now basically throwing everything at the wall, observing what sticks. Oh, and it’s. It for the west, it’s for internal audience. So far it’s a weird mix, what definitely pleases people are anti corruption processes (1937 was widely popular , except for those in the receiving end), social spending, social conservatism (Russia is not lgbt tolerant from the ground up) , efficiency.
The result is a very curious mix of liberalism in one end (in the form of leaving people alone for the most part) and social conservatism on the other. Liberal conservatism :)
It’s all work in progress really, very interssting to observe. Oh, and no chance to read anything about it in the west, here only the party line is allowed
We should also consider that nationalism in Eastern Europe was also fostered by the US, quasi as a counter design to a Soviet internationalism. This aided not only in the breakup of the Soviet Union, but also of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia - and led to more recent developments in Ukraine. Thus, the outcome of Washington's "Better Printing for a Great American Comeback" project may also play a role in future. Western Europe's economies seem to b e already entering a hardly controllable sinking pattern, and caravans seem to bee gravitating towards oases.
On top of this come considerable demographic problems caused by low birthrates (check median ages! Poland youngest with 42.), and nationalism makes the concept of mass immigration quite unpopular in Eastern Europe. Migration patterns might favour an increasingly Asian outlook of Russia
Very illuminating. Of course, Eastern European share many characteristics of nationalisms everywhere. The shrill supremacist rhetoric is always accompanied by abject subordination to whatever great power the nationalists end up choosing as their protector. Consider the current neo-fascist government of Italy, in its total submission to NATO and the neoliberal order. In this sense, the European Union is a natural haven for Eastern European newcomers: there they can strut their feathers as needed for their domestic audiences, while underwriting the austerity program that will keep them in business as guardians. Even Putin had Europe and the West as his first choice; and it was only the truly astonishing stupidity of the neoconservatives that sent Russia into the orbit of Eurasianism. Small-nation nationalism becomes truly dangerous when great powers use it for their own ends; this is as true of the outbreak of World War I as it is of the war in Ukraine. After the ignition, however, history unfolds according to its dynamics, usually contrary to any plan. We will never know what an alliance between Russia and the West would have produced. Russia as the enemy of the West has rekindled Russophobia (not that it needed much stimulation) and fascisms of all kinds and there lies the danger of a truly disastrous outcome.
I pulled off the shelf Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations ...' to find I'd (long ago) trawled through it for mentions of "enemy". So, on p20 "For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential ..." and on p130 "It is human to hate."
So, without a well-formed enemy it hardly seems likely that Russian elites can conjure a kernel of belief that provides a well-spring of potent opposition to Putinism, especially if it has to build on a "fiction of Euro-Asianism". Even less hopeful is a "universal civilisation" (or culture) based on Love as the antidote to Hate.
Huntington anticipated & at least partially explains SO MUCH of what's happened internationally & even within counties: culture has become way more salient politically than economics. Specifically: old 1-dimensional "left-right" economic axis now becomes 2-dimensional with a new "traditional-inclusivist" axis
EE elites are so dangerous they threaten the existence of the world. They lack clear ethnic inclusion criteria, their language often doesn’t even dominate the land they live in (Riga), and they lack an inspiring history or native high culture… so they claim to belong to “the west” while antagonising their east. Same goes for Finland, where nationalism is not liberal at all
Indeed a good analysis, that only a honest intelligence with healthy distance and insight can do. True in aspects for its 19th and 20th century formation, to post communist explosion and its neofascist/neonazi presence, which is a bit sad for e.g. Slavs.
Supporting facts is that e g. Balkan nationalisms share sane feats in its own etnos, but clash so much over "blood and soil". But sometimes, like in balkan war 2, they can unite against common enemy, abeit temporary. Reminds me of Marcus Garvey and KKK agreeing on Back to Africa movement for short :)
I can testify that since many pro western Russians fled to Serbia, they are indeed on no mans land. Seen as traitors back home, shunnee by Putinism here, rejected by west for having Russian papers.
But as with Yugoslavs in immigration, Ukrainians and Russians quite get along here, when away from propaganda and conflict.
I greatly appreciate your contributions on Substack, but I believe that, at least regarding Serbia, a more nuanced approach is needed, particularly when it comes to relying on Western powers (there was also reliance on Austria and Russia, and later on France and partly England, then Germany, etc.). It is also not true that all national elites were inclined towards fascism: for Serbia and Greece, this can only be partially true for some segments of the elite, but generally not. I also think that you do not highlight the very important role of religion in shaping and influencing the behavior of national elites.
Not all elites, but etnofascism exist e.g. Ljotic and small neonazi groups in Serbia. Not a true elite, but someone could argue that Seselj was in power and was bordering most elements of fascism/nazin on Greater Serbia iredentism ground, in theory and more in practice
I join others here hoping that you write more on this topic. It is such an interesting theme and hardly anyone writes on it.
Nationalist dogma got established in all these countries, and it is easy to forget how iffy the roots of nationalist ideologies are. History, poetry, legends and narratives got augmented, sometimes even invented from scratch, and then glorified and beaten into school curricula...
You didn't mention the first and probably the most significant such movement, the Hungarian. You could see even then how iffy the idea of ethnic homogeneity is. Kosuth - the ideologue who argued for Hungarian purity - was half Slovak. The legendary nationalist poet, Sandor Petofi, was half-Slovak half-Serb, born Alexander Petrovics...
From a strictly historical point of view, the origin of what we know and feel today as nationalism is very clear-cut: Napoleon Bonaparte.
Napoleon did some reforms in the French Army that initiated a cascade effect that transformed French society as a whole, but, long story short, France had no money left after the French Revolution and was besieged from all sides by the recently founded (July 1707) British Empire. Without money to pay for the soldiers, Napoleon did a number of reforms that essentially converted the French Army from an army of de facto mercenaries (as was the rule in the history of humanity up to then) to an army of patriots (which is what we perceive armies as they are today). So, for example, the invention of medals for feats on the battlefield is a Napoleonic invention.
Such reforms required people in France to be educated centrally, according to a single narrative woven by the State. One thing was that everyone (male) was a potential soldier, so they had to speak the same language: French (which was not the most spoken language in France by then, there were a lot of dialects). Another thing was the universal teaching of a single French History, and so on.
In Eastern Europe, the pattern is even clearer because the process was late. Edward H. Carr was decisive when he correctly identified that the most likely nations to not enter the newly founded Soviet Union were the ones that had the strongest bourgeoisie, therefore the ones with the strongest nationalist feeling among their peoples. That's why the USSR's western nations (relative to Russia, the cradle of the Revolution) were more problematic than its eastern nations, and, the more western, the more problematic, because the strongest the national bourgeoisie (e.g. Finland and Poland).
But yes, the origin of nationalism is very clear: it is an invention of the bourgeoisie when it finally took political (it already had the economic) power.
Very interesting thanks! I'm actually reading Barrington Moore's classic "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" at the moment and was just wondering what Moore would say about Eastern Europe had he lived to see the fall of the iron curtain.
I think he would say something like this- the initial conditions for a reactionary conservative path to capitalist development were there in Eastern Europe, but this was aborted by the Soviet occupation. Is history now getting back on track?
"I greatly appreciate your contributions on Substack, but I believe that, at least regarding Serbia, a more nuanced approach is needed, particularly when it comes to relying on Western powers (there was also reliance on Austria and Russia, and later on France and partly England, then Germany, etc.). It is also not true that all national elites were inclined towards fascism: for Serbia and Greece, this can only be partially true for some segments of the elite, but generally not."
So much parochialism in the world. West European, US and Canadian elites seem awfully parochial as well. At least with East European elites, their parochialism is limited to their own countries, whereas the West Europeans and N Americans want to impose their parochial attitudes on others.
There are honourable exceptions - eg Jeff Sachs. Why can’t we try to look at the world through the eyes of other societies?
Nearing the end of soviet union, Russian elites were disillusioned by idea to rediscover themselves like America. Russian elites were impressed by capitalistic achievements and its material prosperity which was in contrast to Soviet scarcity of goods. Russian elites were inclined towards liberal freedoms, popular democracy and freedom of expression which they saw in America which was in contrast to soviet purges and oppression. The end of USSR was coming and Russian elites, just like eastern European elites, wanted to rediscover or reinvent their national identities for stability. America and Eurogarchs invited eastern European states into their vision. Russians were left astray and they didn't expect that America have no place for them even after the decisive end of cold war & dissolution of soviet empire.
Interesting to note that, China was not disillusioned by American stereotypical models. China charted it's own course with great pragmatism and political & economic experiments for reformation.
It is undoubtedly a horrible time for Russian Federation society, given that so many hundreds of thousands are being killed, and more maimed. But, it reminds me a bit of the Vietnam War period here in the US. Admittedly, we only lost 50,000 killed and several hundred thousand damaged, but to those of us in the 60s generation it was a pretty heavy drain. The response of course was the anti-war movement, whose opposition was eventually successful; but not without considerable degradation being imposed on the outspoken. Luckily, few of us had to flee to Canada.
The parallel is clear however due to a second influx, primarily of Eastern European elites, who came here to NYC during the waning days of the 1980s. Their nations, mostly Poland, were hopeless to reconstitute, so, after some immigrant low wage starts, they integrated into a larger economy they came to find compatible. It is sad that the Russian exiles are sad, but "normal".
Also, Branco, I think you are right. Americans are the only Pan-Europeans. Come to think of it, those Russian exiles are also by definition pan-Europeans
In several instances you refer to liberal pro-Western elite in Eastern Europe and specifically Russia; yet you describe nationalism as a driving political force of intellectual elites writ large - and ways this development was misread by the West as an emancipatory project. Is your take that all elites - even the pro-Western liberals are at the core nationalists of their little project, and thus need someone to put down to get sympathies of the West? Why then refer to them as the pro-Western liberals, what is the difference between them and the rest of the intellectual elite?
Very good analysis, thank you! As for Russian elites - yes, they are in a funk, but you are missing a two major difference to EE elites. A) they aren’t parochial b) they are pragmatic, I e don’t have any ideology whatsoever, opposite to EE elites that are limited by their nationalism. Thus Russian elites are very opportunistic, which in current set isn’t a bad thing and gives some hope to the rest of us that we won’t end up deep fried .
Let's hope so. But I see them in a deep trouble. When they try to be as liberal as possible, they are derided and not believed. I agree that pragmatism is what is needed. Otherwise...
They are now basically throwing everything at the wall, observing what sticks. Oh, and it’s. It for the west, it’s for internal audience. So far it’s a weird mix, what definitely pleases people are anti corruption processes (1937 was widely popular , except for those in the receiving end), social spending, social conservatism (Russia is not lgbt tolerant from the ground up) , efficiency.
The result is a very curious mix of liberalism in one end (in the form of leaving people alone for the most part) and social conservatism on the other. Liberal conservatism :)
It’s all work in progress really, very interssting to observe. Oh, and no chance to read anything about it in the west, here only the party line is allowed
We should also consider that nationalism in Eastern Europe was also fostered by the US, quasi as a counter design to a Soviet internationalism. This aided not only in the breakup of the Soviet Union, but also of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia - and led to more recent developments in Ukraine. Thus, the outcome of Washington's "Better Printing for a Great American Comeback" project may also play a role in future. Western Europe's economies seem to b e already entering a hardly controllable sinking pattern, and caravans seem to bee gravitating towards oases.
On top of this come considerable demographic problems caused by low birthrates (check median ages! Poland youngest with 42.), and nationalism makes the concept of mass immigration quite unpopular in Eastern Europe. Migration patterns might favour an increasingly Asian outlook of Russia
Very illuminating. Of course, Eastern European share many characteristics of nationalisms everywhere. The shrill supremacist rhetoric is always accompanied by abject subordination to whatever great power the nationalists end up choosing as their protector. Consider the current neo-fascist government of Italy, in its total submission to NATO and the neoliberal order. In this sense, the European Union is a natural haven for Eastern European newcomers: there they can strut their feathers as needed for their domestic audiences, while underwriting the austerity program that will keep them in business as guardians. Even Putin had Europe and the West as his first choice; and it was only the truly astonishing stupidity of the neoconservatives that sent Russia into the orbit of Eurasianism. Small-nation nationalism becomes truly dangerous when great powers use it for their own ends; this is as true of the outbreak of World War I as it is of the war in Ukraine. After the ignition, however, history unfolds according to its dynamics, usually contrary to any plan. We will never know what an alliance between Russia and the West would have produced. Russia as the enemy of the West has rekindled Russophobia (not that it needed much stimulation) and fascisms of all kinds and there lies the danger of a truly disastrous outcome.
I pulled off the shelf Huntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations ...' to find I'd (long ago) trawled through it for mentions of "enemy". So, on p20 "For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential ..." and on p130 "It is human to hate."
So, without a well-formed enemy it hardly seems likely that Russian elites can conjure a kernel of belief that provides a well-spring of potent opposition to Putinism, especially if it has to build on a "fiction of Euro-Asianism". Even less hopeful is a "universal civilisation" (or culture) based on Love as the antidote to Hate.
Huntington anticipated & at least partially explains SO MUCH of what's happened internationally & even within counties: culture has become way more salient politically than economics. Specifically: old 1-dimensional "left-right" economic axis now becomes 2-dimensional with a new "traditional-inclusivist" axis
EE elites are so dangerous they threaten the existence of the world. They lack clear ethnic inclusion criteria, their language often doesn’t even dominate the land they live in (Riga), and they lack an inspiring history or native high culture… so they claim to belong to “the west” while antagonising their east. Same goes for Finland, where nationalism is not liberal at all
That article reminded me of Milan Kundera's pamphlet "A Kidnapped West: The Tragedy of Central Europe".
Indeed a good analysis, that only a honest intelligence with healthy distance and insight can do. True in aspects for its 19th and 20th century formation, to post communist explosion and its neofascist/neonazi presence, which is a bit sad for e.g. Slavs.
Supporting facts is that e g. Balkan nationalisms share sane feats in its own etnos, but clash so much over "blood and soil". But sometimes, like in balkan war 2, they can unite against common enemy, abeit temporary. Reminds me of Marcus Garvey and KKK agreeing on Back to Africa movement for short :)
I can testify that since many pro western Russians fled to Serbia, they are indeed on no mans land. Seen as traitors back home, shunnee by Putinism here, rejected by west for having Russian papers.
But as with Yugoslavs in immigration, Ukrainians and Russians quite get along here, when away from propaganda and conflict.
I greatly appreciate your contributions on Substack, but I believe that, at least regarding Serbia, a more nuanced approach is needed, particularly when it comes to relying on Western powers (there was also reliance on Austria and Russia, and later on France and partly England, then Germany, etc.). It is also not true that all national elites were inclined towards fascism: for Serbia and Greece, this can only be partially true for some segments of the elite, but generally not. I also think that you do not highlight the very important role of religion in shaping and influencing the behavior of national elites.
Not all elites, but etnofascism exist e.g. Ljotic and small neonazi groups in Serbia. Not a true elite, but someone could argue that Seselj was in power and was bordering most elements of fascism/nazin on Greater Serbia iredentism ground, in theory and more in practice
Prof. Milanovic,
I join others here hoping that you write more on this topic. It is such an interesting theme and hardly anyone writes on it.
Nationalist dogma got established in all these countries, and it is easy to forget how iffy the roots of nationalist ideologies are. History, poetry, legends and narratives got augmented, sometimes even invented from scratch, and then glorified and beaten into school curricula...
You didn't mention the first and probably the most significant such movement, the Hungarian. You could see even then how iffy the idea of ethnic homogeneity is. Kosuth - the ideologue who argued for Hungarian purity - was half Slovak. The legendary nationalist poet, Sandor Petofi, was half-Slovak half-Serb, born Alexander Petrovics...
From a strictly historical point of view, the origin of what we know and feel today as nationalism is very clear-cut: Napoleon Bonaparte.
Napoleon did some reforms in the French Army that initiated a cascade effect that transformed French society as a whole, but, long story short, France had no money left after the French Revolution and was besieged from all sides by the recently founded (July 1707) British Empire. Without money to pay for the soldiers, Napoleon did a number of reforms that essentially converted the French Army from an army of de facto mercenaries (as was the rule in the history of humanity up to then) to an army of patriots (which is what we perceive armies as they are today). So, for example, the invention of medals for feats on the battlefield is a Napoleonic invention.
Such reforms required people in France to be educated centrally, according to a single narrative woven by the State. One thing was that everyone (male) was a potential soldier, so they had to speak the same language: French (which was not the most spoken language in France by then, there were a lot of dialects). Another thing was the universal teaching of a single French History, and so on.
In Eastern Europe, the pattern is even clearer because the process was late. Edward H. Carr was decisive when he correctly identified that the most likely nations to not enter the newly founded Soviet Union were the ones that had the strongest bourgeoisie, therefore the ones with the strongest nationalist feeling among their peoples. That's why the USSR's western nations (relative to Russia, the cradle of the Revolution) were more problematic than its eastern nations, and, the more western, the more problematic, because the strongest the national bourgeoisie (e.g. Finland and Poland).
But yes, the origin of nationalism is very clear: it is an invention of the bourgeoisie when it finally took political (it already had the economic) power.
Finland was created by Russia after napoleonic defeat, entirely artificial nation
Very interesting thanks! I'm actually reading Barrington Moore's classic "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" at the moment and was just wondering what Moore would say about Eastern Europe had he lived to see the fall of the iron curtain.
I think he would say something like this- the initial conditions for a reactionary conservative path to capitalist development were there in Eastern Europe, but this was aborted by the Soviet occupation. Is history now getting back on track?
"I greatly appreciate your contributions on Substack, but I believe that, at least regarding Serbia, a more nuanced approach is needed, particularly when it comes to relying on Western powers (there was also reliance on Austria and Russia, and later on France and partly England, then Germany, etc.). It is also not true that all national elites were inclined towards fascism: for Serbia and Greece, this can only be partially true for some segments of the elite, but generally not."
So much parochialism in the world. West European, US and Canadian elites seem awfully parochial as well. At least with East European elites, their parochialism is limited to their own countries, whereas the West Europeans and N Americans want to impose their parochial attitudes on others.
There are honourable exceptions - eg Jeff Sachs. Why can’t we try to look at the world through the eyes of other societies?
Nearing the end of soviet union, Russian elites were disillusioned by idea to rediscover themselves like America. Russian elites were impressed by capitalistic achievements and its material prosperity which was in contrast to Soviet scarcity of goods. Russian elites were inclined towards liberal freedoms, popular democracy and freedom of expression which they saw in America which was in contrast to soviet purges and oppression. The end of USSR was coming and Russian elites, just like eastern European elites, wanted to rediscover or reinvent their national identities for stability. America and Eurogarchs invited eastern European states into their vision. Russians were left astray and they didn't expect that America have no place for them even after the decisive end of cold war & dissolution of soviet empire.
Interesting to note that, China was not disillusioned by American stereotypical models. China charted it's own course with great pragmatism and political & economic experiments for reformation.
It is undoubtedly a horrible time for Russian Federation society, given that so many hundreds of thousands are being killed, and more maimed. But, it reminds me a bit of the Vietnam War period here in the US. Admittedly, we only lost 50,000 killed and several hundred thousand damaged, but to those of us in the 60s generation it was a pretty heavy drain. The response of course was the anti-war movement, whose opposition was eventually successful; but not without considerable degradation being imposed on the outspoken. Luckily, few of us had to flee to Canada.
The parallel is clear however due to a second influx, primarily of Eastern European elites, who came here to NYC during the waning days of the 1980s. Their nations, mostly Poland, were hopeless to reconstitute, so, after some immigrant low wage starts, they integrated into a larger economy they came to find compatible. It is sad that the Russian exiles are sad, but "normal".
Also, Branco, I think you are right. Americans are the only Pan-Europeans. Come to think of it, those Russian exiles are also by definition pan-Europeans
In several instances you refer to liberal pro-Western elite in Eastern Europe and specifically Russia; yet you describe nationalism as a driving political force of intellectual elites writ large - and ways this development was misread by the West as an emancipatory project. Is your take that all elites - even the pro-Western liberals are at the core nationalists of their little project, and thus need someone to put down to get sympathies of the West? Why then refer to them as the pro-Western liberals, what is the difference between them and the rest of the intellectual elite?