The compromise with post-Cold War Russia would have been to let that Russia re-take the countries it considered to have been traditionally part of the Czarist and Soviet Empires. Those countries objected and asked - ASKED - to join NATO. The world's choice seems to have been either the reconstitution of the Czarist and Soviet Empires or the present Russia which can't accommodate itself to post-imperial status such as the Brits, French, Dutch and Portuguese have done . . . howsoever grudgingly but nonviolently.
It's ridiculous. Russia has singlehandedly freed all its dependancies. Without Gorbachev and Yeltsin none of EE countries would be deoccupied for decades after 1985. Compromise with Russia after this first virtually nonviolent dissolution of an imperial body in world history could have been done in three ways: reciprocal dissolution of nato, inclusion of russia into nato, creation of a wide zone of neutral countries between russia and nato. In the latter case if in 1991 elites of Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia etc - even Poland or Latvia for that matter - would be given a firm sign that they woulf never be included in nato, their whole policy towards russia (and russian minorities in some cases) would be completely different, peaceful and out of neccessity conciliatory. In such Europe the economic globalization could indeed provide the lasting peace. In our own historical scenario geopolitical realities of security imbalance were always bound to win out. Your comparisons with western european countries are completely misplaced - those were drawn into a military alliance (lets call it so) with the superpower simultaneously with shedding their imperial status. Thats option #2 out of the three listed above, which didn't happen.
Thanks for you gracious reply, panie. Vilnius events came in January 1991, they were rather small-scale and local, and most importantly were far downstream from huge Moscow demos of 1989-90 with far more lithuanian flags than russian ones (I was there myself aged 15-16, as well as in front of Moscow's White house in Aug 1991 aged 17). Fate of empires is decided in capitals. Grozny was in 1994, it was a postimperial conflict, part of a completely different story (the one that continues to this day, alas).
You can categorize and qualify the events all you can, but it takes only a single counterexample to disprove your thesis that Soviet Union's dissolution was "non-violent" and "single-handed". And I only counted the most egregious examples of direct intervention, but what about Transnistria, Ossetia and arguably even Karabakh? What was that, if not violent interventions to maintain pieces of the empire?
You can flatter yourself that it was your participation in the demonstrations that gave us our freedom, but as we can see it daily - most recently in Georgia - the thugs who have ruled Russia continuously since Stalin (and yes, I'm including Gorbachev and Yeltsin among them) do not care about demonstrations.
The Soviet Union didn't give us our freedom "single-handedly" and "non-violently" thanks to your demonstrations. It just went bankrupt and couldn't maintain its full empire any more. Then Russia needed money and a semblance of legitimacy from the West to hold on to as much of it as it could. And now the veneer is off.
You are mixing up pre-91and post-91 history again (or having or not having much to do with Russia, as in NK). The moment for a bold compromise was in the winter of 91/92, and it was squandered. We all live with consequences.
Also speaking of post-1991, 1994 was the year when Partnership for Peace was created -- of which Russia is still technically a member! It was created specifically to address Russia ever feeling “threatened” by NATO, they could simply use Partnership For Peace to check what’s going on in any NATO base.
Be honest. Russia didn't invade Lithuania in 1991 because you felt threatened by Lithuania. Russia invaded because it could. And the best outcome - for Russia as well - after Ukraine is that Russia will never be able to invade anybody ever again.
Your "bold compromise" possibility is a counterfactual hypothesis at best. Even in August 1993 when Yeltsin visited Warsaw, he signed a declaration with Lech Walesa stating that Russia understands that Poland's aspiration to join NATO does not go against Russian interests. (Then of course it was claimed he was out-drunk by Walesa).
You're minimizing the importance of the Vilnius intervention. 15 unarmed civilians massacred and several hundred injured may not be a lot by Soviet standards, but taking into account the respective size of countries, it was comparable to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. This is what shook up all the Eastern Europeans and made us double down on joining NATO.
How did you come up with Croatia as a part of former Soviet / Warsaw Pact members ? Yugoslavia ( Croatia was part of it until ‘91) was never WP member and from ‘48 moved out of Soviet zone of influence
French non-violently in Indo-China and Algeria? British non-violently in the US, Burma, Cyprus and Kenya? Portuguese non-violently in Angola and Mozambique?
The problem is this book is half forgotten. Realism in international politics (Carr is one of founding fathers) is out of fashion, replaced by ideology, in this case US exceptionalism. Which makes the situation doubly dangerous, as decisions aren’t grounded in reality.
Yeah, I thought about those post-WW2 attempts to hang onto overseas empires. The most recent colonialists' departures were 50 years ago. Those former colonialists haven't tried to retake their former colonies since then. Soviet decolonization of its Eastern European subjects occurred nearly 35 years ago, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc haven't expressed regrets. More recently, they've expressed nervousness, if that's the right choice of words, about Russian intentions regarding their sovereignty. I'm aware of the intricate history of the territory within the internationally accepted borders of present-day Ukraine . . . partly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, partly within the Czarist Empire into World War 1 . . . fully incorporated, howsoever unhappily, into the emergent Soviet Empire in the early 1920s. But the points remain that the nations released by the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be very wary of their Russian neighbor, and that they sought protection from what they perceived as a potentially revanchist Russia under the umbrella of NATO. NATO didn't go out on a new membership drive. Those countries asked.
Thank you very much for this great summary. I just started reading the book. In the preface written by Michael Cox in 2016 he summarizes the central idea of the book as follows: „ As anybody familiar with Carr’s work knows, his discussion on what he termed ‘peaceful change’, or more precisely of how to ‘effect necessary and desirable changes’ without this leading to, or being brought about through, war, forms a central part of The Twenty Years’ Crisis.“ He also mentions China: „ In fact, China’s own contribution to the contemporary IR debate borrows heavily from history, and based upon their reading of what happened before when in the twentieth century other great powers rose with ultimately disastrous consequences, they have come to the not-illogical conclusion that the only way forward for them was by rising ‘peacefully’.“ I hope the people making decisions now about war and peace are considering these ideas and trying to avoid war, not for ideological reasons but for reasons of realpolitik. Perhaps hope itself has become obsolete.
The Germans resented their material conditions, caused by the need to pay huge reparations and subsequent hyperinflation. These were justified resentments - the German population was no more guilty of causing the war than the population of victor countries.
Russia, quoting from the text, is "resentful of one aspect of the victors’ policies: the extension of their military alliance to Russia’s borders". In other words, resentful of not being able to reconquer its neighbours. Resentful, in other words, that it's no longer the biggest thug on the block.
Somehow this is a perfect analogy in Branko Milanovic's text.
In other words? Since NATO/ EU are imperialist, russia wanted their weapons far away from its borders. Ofcourse the empire is relentless in its expansion.
Putin already said" we never needed you" about the five countries which you think were being enslaved. They are already enjoying fruits of capitalism like de population, inequalities etc.,
"Since NATO/EU are imperialist"... congratulations, you discovered that you can prove a thesis by assuming its conclusion!
We observe daily whose army is invading and bombarding other countries, but of course it's NATO/EU that's the imperialist entity. That's how it always was and how it will ever be. And never ask questions about how exactly Russia got so big. It must be the famous non-aligned/Third World school of thinking that Branko is so fond of... oh I'm sorry, you're called Global South now.
There is a big difference. In 1939 Germany was a state applying for world hegemony. Russia is not, China is, and China has no need for a war. It does fine without.
This time it seems as it is the outgoing hegemon that wants war, as Britain didn't in 1939.
Remind us, whose army crossed whose border in February 2022?
And if China has no need for a war, why is it arming itself in an effort that is comparable in scale – toutes proportions gardées – with the German re-armament effort in 1930s? Why does it support Russia, in word and in deed?
Russia has behaved aggressively against Ukraine, true. But not China. It seems that China takes the same line as practically every country – not wanting to be mixed up in the frail but if possible try to calm it down. Only the Nato countries seem to prefer meeting violence with violence, not even accepting the peace process that was under way spring 2022.
Historically, says Dale Copeland in Economic Interdependence and War, 2015, countries that think they are losing the economic competition are prone to violence while countries that see economic prospect open want peace. I believe (as do Copeland) that pattern continues.
The "peace process" was always a sham. The only people who use this term are clueless, still under the impression that there was a real people's uprising in Donbas and Crimea, when it's crystal-clear by now that all it ever was, was Putin's "little green men". History has shown that Putin never had any intention of respecting any Minsk agreements. It takes a special kind of blindness not to recognize the fact that there comes a moment when violence must be met with violence.
PS As to China "arming" it is ridiculous to tear up heaven and earth about its paltry arms collection. They have a lot of soldiers, certainly, as it has always had. But only for example 24 deployed nuclear warheads compared to the US's 1770, and no carrier group compared to the US's 24, all according to wikipedia. It has a long way to go before even being equal.
Which it probably has to be, since the US government has declared China an enemy. China has not declared US an enemy, however, so there is no question about who is the aggressive party here.
Again, the world has changed under your feet. It's way more than that currently, and according to this NYT article China is currently on track to build more than 1000 by the end of decade.
They don't need any to fight in the near-Pacific. Instead, they are building a vast armada of missiles, missile cruisers and drones. It already has more navy ships than the US. It has just placed an order for 1 million drones.
"the US government has declared China an enemy. China has not declared US an enemy, however, so there is no question about who is the aggressive party here."
Because it's the declarations that count, not the actions and preparations.
And PS counting declarations: If one side (China) has on the whole been exrtemely successful in making business in the world, knitting up nations with together more than half of the world's GDP and much bigger proportion of the population than that, and if the other part (US) says that it wouldn't tolerate it and would do everything to thwart China's success – then of course the Chinese are scared.
As Copeland says: countries that are commecially successful want peace, countries that are not are liable to appeal to violence. That is a principle that has ruled at least for the 200 years Copeland has studied. And I'm sure the Chinese have done so too.
According to Kishore Mahbubani they invest heavily in coastal artillery – which is something of the least offensive there is. You can't go out conquering with it.
It's not te Chinese that patrol US coasts, remember.
Yeah, I thought about those post-WW2 attempts to hang onto overseas empires. The most recent colonialists' departures were 50 years ago. Those former colonialists haven't tried to retake their former colonies since then. Soviet decolonization of its Eastern European subjects occurred nearly 35 years ago, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc haven't expressed regrets. More recently, they've expressed nervousness, if that's the right choice of words, about Russian intentions regarding their sovereignty. I'm aware of the intricate history of the territory within the internationally accepted borders of present-day Ukraine . . . partly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, partly within the Czarist Empire into World War 1 . . . fully incorporated, howsoever unhappily, into the emergent Soviet Empire in the early 1920s. But the points remain that the nations released by the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be very wary of their Russian neighbor, and that they sought protection from what they perceived as a potentially revanchist Russia under the umbrella of NATO. NATO didn't go out on a new membership drive. Those countries asked.
The interesting thing is that the comparison between post-Versailles Germany and post-Cold War Russia started to appear only in the last few years. In the 1990's such comparison would appear non-sensical.
In a similar vein, the discussion about "Anschluss" of DDR into Germany became viral only in the last two years. While there are sad reasons for the discussion, I find it a bit exaggerated: Was the German Unification really a process between the victor and the defeated? The "defeated" party had at the moment of "punishment" full sovereignty and political agency. Who is to blame?
Another comparison can serve for double-check: after WWII, Germany and Italy were severely punished, ceased huge territory, more than 10 million Germans and some 300k Italians were dispossessed and expelled. To my knowledge, the geopolitical revenge of Italy and any of two German republics was very limited if it existed at all.
Totally agree, but Carr would say that it was because Germany and Italy were integrated into the new system. So was Japan. But Russia (like Germany post WW1), was not.
This is then even more interesting. It seems to me that this story goes beyond the foreign policy, it is a psychological question of acknowledgment and respect, a question of belonging and rejection. Same dynamics that moves the nations in the third world or any groups on the periphery of a society.
The problem might be that after 1989 the Cold War rules remained in place, with NATO mutating into a World policeman. In 1990s Vaclav Havel wrote an interesting speech questioning a need and existence of NATO. But the other theory, that Cold War never ended seems now also plausible.
Are you saying Russia today is like Germany pre-WW2? If so, I am surprised. Just think about it more! I am sure that is not your intention. Perhaps you can clarify this in a future post.
The compromise with post-Cold War Russia would have been to let that Russia re-take the countries it considered to have been traditionally part of the Czarist and Soviet Empires. Those countries objected and asked - ASKED - to join NATO. The world's choice seems to have been either the reconstitution of the Czarist and Soviet Empires or the present Russia which can't accommodate itself to post-imperial status such as the Brits, French, Dutch and Portuguese have done . . . howsoever grudgingly but nonviolently.
It's ridiculous. Russia has singlehandedly freed all its dependancies. Without Gorbachev and Yeltsin none of EE countries would be deoccupied for decades after 1985. Compromise with Russia after this first virtually nonviolent dissolution of an imperial body in world history could have been done in three ways: reciprocal dissolution of nato, inclusion of russia into nato, creation of a wide zone of neutral countries between russia and nato. In the latter case if in 1991 elites of Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia etc - even Poland or Latvia for that matter - would be given a firm sign that they woulf never be included in nato, their whole policy towards russia (and russian minorities in some cases) would be completely different, peaceful and out of neccessity conciliatory. In such Europe the economic globalization could indeed provide the lasting peace. In our own historical scenario geopolitical realities of security imbalance were always bound to win out. Your comparisons with western european countries are completely misplaced - those were drawn into a military alliance (lets call it so) with the superpower simultaneously with shedding their imperial status. Thats option #2 out of the three listed above, which didn't happen.
Singlehandedly?
Nonviolent?
I seem to recall an intervention in Vilnius, was that a single-handed freeing or nonviolent dissolution?
I seem to recall Grozny flattened and burned to the ground, was that the nonviolent dissolution of the imperial body you're talking about?
F you and the T-34 you rode on in.
Lolz.supporting actual imperialism much
Thanks for you gracious reply, panie. Vilnius events came in January 1991, they were rather small-scale and local, and most importantly were far downstream from huge Moscow demos of 1989-90 with far more lithuanian flags than russian ones (I was there myself aged 15-16, as well as in front of Moscow's White house in Aug 1991 aged 17). Fate of empires is decided in capitals. Grozny was in 1994, it was a postimperial conflict, part of a completely different story (the one that continues to this day, alas).
You can categorize and qualify the events all you can, but it takes only a single counterexample to disprove your thesis that Soviet Union's dissolution was "non-violent" and "single-handed". And I only counted the most egregious examples of direct intervention, but what about Transnistria, Ossetia and arguably even Karabakh? What was that, if not violent interventions to maintain pieces of the empire?
You can flatter yourself that it was your participation in the demonstrations that gave us our freedom, but as we can see it daily - most recently in Georgia - the thugs who have ruled Russia continuously since Stalin (and yes, I'm including Gorbachev and Yeltsin among them) do not care about demonstrations.
The Soviet Union didn't give us our freedom "single-handedly" and "non-violently" thanks to your demonstrations. It just went bankrupt and couldn't maintain its full empire any more. Then Russia needed money and a semblance of legitimacy from the West to hold on to as much of it as it could. And now the veneer is off.
You are mixing up pre-91and post-91 history again (or having or not having much to do with Russia, as in NK). The moment for a bold compromise was in the winter of 91/92, and it was squandered. We all live with consequences.
Also speaking of post-1991, 1994 was the year when Partnership for Peace was created -- of which Russia is still technically a member! It was created specifically to address Russia ever feeling “threatened” by NATO, they could simply use Partnership For Peace to check what’s going on in any NATO base.
Be honest. Russia didn't invade Lithuania in 1991 because you felt threatened by Lithuania. Russia invaded because it could. And the best outcome - for Russia as well - after Ukraine is that Russia will never be able to invade anybody ever again.
Your "bold compromise" possibility is a counterfactual hypothesis at best. Even in August 1993 when Yeltsin visited Warsaw, he signed a declaration with Lech Walesa stating that Russia understands that Poland's aspiration to join NATO does not go against Russian interests. (Then of course it was claimed he was out-drunk by Walesa).
You're minimizing the importance of the Vilnius intervention. 15 unarmed civilians massacred and several hundred injured may not be a lot by Soviet standards, but taking into account the respective size of countries, it was comparable to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. This is what shook up all the Eastern Europeans and made us double down on joining NATO.
How did you come up with Croatia as a part of former Soviet / Warsaw Pact members ? Yugoslavia ( Croatia was part of it until ‘91) was never WP member and from ‘48 moved out of Soviet zone of influence
Sure. But what's relevant here is that it was admitted into NATO after 1991. I could have mentiined Sweden or Albania instead, for example.
Recidivism.
Oh well, you won then. PS we can all die because of it.
French non-violently in Indo-China and Algeria? British non-violently in the US, Burma, Cyprus and Kenya? Portuguese non-violently in Angola and Mozambique?
Yeah because these countries are so afraid that they now talk so much about defeating russia , ofcourse on masters orders
The problem is this book is half forgotten. Realism in international politics (Carr is one of founding fathers) is out of fashion, replaced by ideology, in this case US exceptionalism. Which makes the situation doubly dangerous, as decisions aren’t grounded in reality.
Yeah, I thought about those post-WW2 attempts to hang onto overseas empires. The most recent colonialists' departures were 50 years ago. Those former colonialists haven't tried to retake their former colonies since then. Soviet decolonization of its Eastern European subjects occurred nearly 35 years ago, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc haven't expressed regrets. More recently, they've expressed nervousness, if that's the right choice of words, about Russian intentions regarding their sovereignty. I'm aware of the intricate history of the territory within the internationally accepted borders of present-day Ukraine . . . partly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, partly within the Czarist Empire into World War 1 . . . fully incorporated, howsoever unhappily, into the emergent Soviet Empire in the early 1920s. But the points remain that the nations released by the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be very wary of their Russian neighbor, and that they sought protection from what they perceived as a potentially revanchist Russia under the umbrella of NATO. NATO didn't go out on a new membership drive. Those countries asked.
Thank you very much for this great summary. I just started reading the book. In the preface written by Michael Cox in 2016 he summarizes the central idea of the book as follows: „ As anybody familiar with Carr’s work knows, his discussion on what he termed ‘peaceful change’, or more precisely of how to ‘effect necessary and desirable changes’ without this leading to, or being brought about through, war, forms a central part of The Twenty Years’ Crisis.“ He also mentions China: „ In fact, China’s own contribution to the contemporary IR debate borrows heavily from history, and based upon their reading of what happened before when in the twentieth century other great powers rose with ultimately disastrous consequences, they have come to the not-illogical conclusion that the only way forward for them was by rising ‘peacefully’.“ I hope the people making decisions now about war and peace are considering these ideas and trying to avoid war, not for ideological reasons but for reasons of realpolitik. Perhaps hope itself has become obsolete.
The Germans resented their material conditions, caused by the need to pay huge reparations and subsequent hyperinflation. These were justified resentments - the German population was no more guilty of causing the war than the population of victor countries.
Russia, quoting from the text, is "resentful of one aspect of the victors’ policies: the extension of their military alliance to Russia’s borders". In other words, resentful of not being able to reconquer its neighbours. Resentful, in other words, that it's no longer the biggest thug on the block.
Somehow this is a perfect analogy in Branko Milanovic's text.
In other words? Since NATO/ EU are imperialist, russia wanted their weapons far away from its borders. Ofcourse the empire is relentless in its expansion.
Putin already said" we never needed you" about the five countries which you think were being enslaved. They are already enjoying fruits of capitalism like de population, inequalities etc.,
"Since NATO/EU are imperialist"... congratulations, you discovered that you can prove a thesis by assuming its conclusion!
We observe daily whose army is invading and bombarding other countries, but of course it's NATO/EU that's the imperialist entity. That's how it always was and how it will ever be. And never ask questions about how exactly Russia got so big. It must be the famous non-aligned/Third World school of thinking that Branko is so fond of... oh I'm sorry, you're called Global South now.
Oh please.we also observe daily whose navy has centcom,pacom etc., then there is the NATO/ EU logic guy
There is a big difference. In 1939 Germany was a state applying for world hegemony. Russia is not, China is, and China has no need for a war. It does fine without.
This time it seems as it is the outgoing hegemon that wants war, as Britain didn't in 1939.
Remind us, whose army crossed whose border in February 2022?
And if China has no need for a war, why is it arming itself in an effort that is comparable in scale – toutes proportions gardées – with the German re-armament effort in 1930s? Why does it support Russia, in word and in deed?
Russia has behaved aggressively against Ukraine, true. But not China. It seems that China takes the same line as practically every country – not wanting to be mixed up in the frail but if possible try to calm it down. Only the Nato countries seem to prefer meeting violence with violence, not even accepting the peace process that was under way spring 2022.
Historically, says Dale Copeland in Economic Interdependence and War, 2015, countries that think they are losing the economic competition are prone to violence while countries that see economic prospect open want peace. I believe (as do Copeland) that pattern continues.
"Behaved aggressively," what a nice euphemism.
The "peace process" was always a sham. The only people who use this term are clueless, still under the impression that there was a real people's uprising in Donbas and Crimea, when it's crystal-clear by now that all it ever was, was Putin's "little green men". History has shown that Putin never had any intention of respecting any Minsk agreements. It takes a special kind of blindness not to recognize the fact that there comes a moment when violence must be met with violence.
PS As to China "arming" it is ridiculous to tear up heaven and earth about its paltry arms collection. They have a lot of soldiers, certainly, as it has always had. But only for example 24 deployed nuclear warheads compared to the US's 1770, and no carrier group compared to the US's 24, all according to wikipedia. It has a long way to go before even being equal.
Which it probably has to be, since the US government has declared China an enemy. China has not declared US an enemy, however, so there is no question about who is the aggressive party here.
"24 deployed nuclear warheads"
Again, the world has changed under your feet. It's way more than that currently, and according to this NYT article China is currently on track to build more than 1000 by the end of decade.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/18/world/asia/china-nuclear-buildup.html
"no carrier group"
They don't need any to fight in the near-Pacific. Instead, they are building a vast armada of missiles, missile cruisers and drones. It already has more navy ships than the US. It has just placed an order for 1 million drones.
"the US government has declared China an enemy. China has not declared US an enemy, however, so there is no question about who is the aggressive party here."
Because it's the declarations that count, not the actions and preparations.
And PS counting declarations: If one side (China) has on the whole been exrtemely successful in making business in the world, knitting up nations with together more than half of the world's GDP and much bigger proportion of the population than that, and if the other part (US) says that it wouldn't tolerate it and would do everything to thwart China's success – then of course the Chinese are scared.
As Copeland says: countries that are commecially successful want peace, countries that are not are liable to appeal to violence. That is a principle that has ruled at least for the 200 years Copeland has studied. And I'm sure the Chinese have done so too.
According to Kishore Mahbubani they invest heavily in coastal artillery – which is something of the least offensive there is. You can't go out conquering with it.
It's not te Chinese that patrol US coasts, remember.
Yeah, I thought about those post-WW2 attempts to hang onto overseas empires. The most recent colonialists' departures were 50 years ago. Those former colonialists haven't tried to retake their former colonies since then. Soviet decolonization of its Eastern European subjects occurred nearly 35 years ago, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc haven't expressed regrets. More recently, they've expressed nervousness, if that's the right choice of words, about Russian intentions regarding their sovereignty. I'm aware of the intricate history of the territory within the internationally accepted borders of present-day Ukraine . . . partly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, partly within the Czarist Empire into World War 1 . . . fully incorporated, howsoever unhappily, into the emergent Soviet Empire in the early 1920s. But the points remain that the nations released by the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be very wary of their Russian neighbor, and that they sought protection from what they perceived as a potentially revanchist Russia under the umbrella of NATO. NATO didn't go out on a new membership drive. Those countries asked.
The interesting thing is that the comparison between post-Versailles Germany and post-Cold War Russia started to appear only in the last few years. In the 1990's such comparison would appear non-sensical.
In a similar vein, the discussion about "Anschluss" of DDR into Germany became viral only in the last two years. While there are sad reasons for the discussion, I find it a bit exaggerated: Was the German Unification really a process between the victor and the defeated? The "defeated" party had at the moment of "punishment" full sovereignty and political agency. Who is to blame?
Another comparison can serve for double-check: after WWII, Germany and Italy were severely punished, ceased huge territory, more than 10 million Germans and some 300k Italians were dispossessed and expelled. To my knowledge, the geopolitical revenge of Italy and any of two German republics was very limited if it existed at all.
Totally agree, but Carr would say that it was because Germany and Italy were integrated into the new system. So was Japan. But Russia (like Germany post WW1), was not.
This is then even more interesting. It seems to me that this story goes beyond the foreign policy, it is a psychological question of acknowledgment and respect, a question of belonging and rejection. Same dynamics that moves the nations in the third world or any groups on the periphery of a society.
The problem might be that after 1989 the Cold War rules remained in place, with NATO mutating into a World policeman. In 1990s Vaclav Havel wrote an interesting speech questioning a need and existence of NATO. But the other theory, that Cold War never ended seems now also plausible.
Bro you are being ridiculous.NATO/ EU is the war party not russia.
Perhaps one difference now is the rather larger number of nations "dissatisfied" with current arrangements -- think an expanding BRICS here.
...including dissatisfied USA
Are you saying Russia today is like Germany pre-WW2? If so, I am surprised. Just think about it more! I am sure that is not your intention. Perhaps you can clarify this in a future post.
No, he is saying Russia after the Cold War is like Germany after WWI