As a Yugoslav, I am familiar with your family’s story. You have written it beautifully, and I found it very touching.
As a leftist myself, I have always felt ashamed of that part of Tito’s legacy—Goli Otok. In the West, Goli Otok, along with the Soviet gulags, was often used as a powerful example in anti-communist arguments, presented as evidence of an inherent lack of democracy and respect for human rights under communism.
For a long time, I didn’t know how to reconcile this with my own political beliefs.
Then I emigrated to Canada and learned more about McCarthyism in the United States. I realized that it was happening during roughly the same historical period. In a strange way, that helped me put things into perspective—not to excuse Goli Otok or what happened there, but to understand that communism was not alone in having dark chapters in its history, or in failing to live up to its own ideals.
If the postwar dark chapter for Tito's government was Goli Otok and the dark chapter for the US Government (at least domestically) was McCarthyism, it seems reasonable to conclude that the US for all its manifold faults treated its dissidents much less harshly than Yugoslavia did. Being a dissident is always rough, but wasn't it much worse in Yugoslavia?
Less harsh on internal dissidents if they were white, it's true. Black Leftist leaders were beaten, imprisoned, assassinated.
But aside from that, I would say the true dark period for the US was the millions we killed abroad (not talking about wars, but CIA coups, school of the Americas, etc etc)
My grandfather was also on Goli Otok. Like your uncle, he was a staunch communist, participated in WW2 as an "illegal", smuggling people (including some jews) out of Sarajevo to the woods and partisans, and in 1948 was asked by someone whether he liked Stalin (which he said he did, not knowing of the Informbiro and the change of sentiment at all). Ended up on Goli Otok for 2 or 3 years, missed the birth of my mother, and had half of the apartment his family lived taken and given to another family.
He did survive. When he came back they say he could barely walk, and he credited eating tons of bell peppers every day for his recovery. Later on, the communist party apologized to him, told him they made a mistake, and invited him to join the party again, which he never did. But, he never spoke ill of Tito or the communists, remained an out of party communist all his life, and less then a year before he died made himself somehow (sick with cancer) walk to those first 1990 elections and vote for communists. He did witness the start of the unraveling of the country but luckily he died before the full on war started, that destroyed everything he believe in.
Well, it could be argued that your cousin never betrayed his oath to the king. After all, King Petar at some time ordered all armed resistance groups in Yugoslavia to place themselves under Tito's command. Being a Partisan, your cousin did just that.
It was actually the Četniks who betrayed their oaths. With a few exceptions, they disobeyed King Petar's orders - not just on that occasion, as it were. Strangely, this has been almost totally forgotten today. In today's national(ist) discourse, the Četniks are portrayed as loyalist militia, not as the traitors they were.
Not that the latter directly relates to your text. It just crossed my mind when I read it. To put it generously, Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav history has particularly many nuances to offer, and your text is one of sadly relatively few that does that justice.
I am noy so sure. The Yugoslav govt in exile changed his mind. Mihailovic became Minister of Defense or some such position in one if the govt reshuffles. He was named the head of the Homeland Army (vojska u otadzbini). So, the officers who stayed with him technically stayed with the Royals too.
I am not so sure. The Yugoslav govt in exile changed its mind. Mihailovic became Minister of Defense or some such position in one if the govt reshuffles; in January 1942. He was named the head of the Homeland Army (vojska u otadzbini). So, the officers who stayed with him technically stayed with the Royals too.
Thanks for sharing this; it’s an excellent read. The extra thing I’d add is that silence itself too often becomes part of the inheritance. Not just under dictatorships, either.
Families, workplaces, churches, parties, institutions learn what gets you punished, excluded or marked as trouble, then pass that lesson on without anyone needing to write it down or even say it out loud. That’s the bit I find most unsettling here. Repression doesn’t always announce itself with uniforms and prison gates. Sometimes it just survives as good manners or “common sense”.
Thank you for sharing this story. I first appreciated the strange reversal you refer to (Stalinists are the jailers in late 30s Soviet Union, putative Stalinists are the prisoners in late 40s-early 50s Yugoslavia) when I listened to the excellent Remembering Yugoslavia podcast episode on Goli Otok, called Island, Bared in August 2022. Sharing a link in case others want to listen https://yugoblok.com/goli-otok/ How sad that the regime’s decision to punish your uncle led to his un-personing even in your family :-(
Ukraine Is Attacking What Keeps the Russian Offensive Moving
An interesting analysis by Jason Jay Smart and Chuck Pfarrer on Substack highlights something that is easily overlooked when we follow the front line kilometre by kilometre: Ukraine is increasingly trying to strike the system behind Russian troops, not just the soldiers at the front.
Russia has adapted to drone warfare. Large armoured columns are extremely vulnerable, so Russian forces increasingly rely on small infantry groups, motorcycles, ATVs and other light vehicles. This provides speed and makes troops harder to detect.
But it comes at a cost.
A motorcycle can get a soldier forward quickly. It cannot carry artillery, large quantities of ammunition, fuel or armoured support. Nor does it solve the problem of evacuating the wounded.
This is the vulnerability Ukraine is trying to exploit.
Near Polohy in Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian forces have struck bridges supporting the Russian advance towards Orikhiv. ISW has also documented Ukrainian attacks on Russian logistics and drone infrastructure. A Ukrainian officer says his forces are striking six to eight Russian drone-control points per day in their area of operations, including positions associated with the highly capable Rubikon unit. That last figure is a Ukrainian claim and should be treated as such.
We are seeing a similar dynamic around Kupiansk, where ISW describes Russian difficulties consolidating positions following infiltration operations. Ukrainian counterattacks and extensive drone activity are simultaneously making resupply and further advances more difficult.
And north of Lyman, through Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine has sought to combine counterattacks at the front with strikes against Russian logistics, command posts, communications and supply lines farther behind the front.
Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported after the first two phases that 125 square kilometres had been brought back under Ukrainian control, of which 50 square kilometres had been liberated from Russian occupation. That distinction matters: Smart and Pfarrer describe 125 km² as “liberated”, while Ukraine’s own account distinguishes between territory brought under control and territory actually retaken from Russian forces.
The militarily interesting point is the difference between infiltration and control.
It is possible to send small groups through gaps in the front. But if they are going to hold the ground, they still need ammunition, food, water, communications, reinforcements, fire support and medical evacuation.
If Ukraine can strike the bridges, transport networks, drone operators and supply routes behind them, a Russian tactical advance can leave isolated troops unable to consolidate their gains.
Smart and Pfarrer go too far, in my view, when they portray Russian motorcycle assaults as almost automatic “one-way traps”. Russia can repair bridges, establish alternative crossings and reroute its supply lines.
But that is precisely why the central question becomes:
Can Russia repair and reroute its logistics faster than Ukraine can identify and strike them again?
Russia may have substantial manpower reserves. But more soldiers do not automatically solve a logistics problem. Every additional soldier requires more ammunition, food, water, transport and medical support.
That may be the most important observation in Smart and Pfarrer’s analysis:
Getting soldiers to the front is one thing. Keeping them supplied long enough to turn infiltration into lasting control is something else entirely.
Gracias por compartir una historia familiar tan personal y significativa. Me ha impresionado especialmente cómo muestra que la represión política puede seguir actuando mucho después de que hayan terminado los acontecimientos: a través del silencio, la autocensura y de aquello que una familia acaba aprendiendo a no mencionar.
Tu relato me recordó, en varios aspectos, a *Aniversario*, de Jan Komasa y Lori Rosene-Gambino, una película sobre la que precisamente había escrito hace poco en mi blog: https://ramonocampo.com/pelicula-aniversario-democracia/
Las circunstancias históricas son, naturalmente, muy distintas, pero encontré una coincidencia interesante: en ambos casos, la política y la ideología dejan de ser algo abstracto y penetran en la vida privada, transformando las relaciones familiares y hasta lo que las personas sienten que pueden decir abiertamente.
Me ha resultado especialmente llamativo encontrar tu texto tan poco tiempo después de haber reflexionado sobre esos mismos temas a partir de la película. Felicidades por el artículo y gracias, de nuevo, por compartir esta historia.
phewww all that for refusing to declare against Stalin. Confusing times in parts of the world I think, everything was shifting around and what was good would be turned on its head the next day. Thanks for sharing, I felt like I was there
A partisan. Who refused to declare for Stalin. Millions ended up just like him. Patriots. Partisans. Anti fascists. Pro democracy. Socialists maybe. Our loss.
He refused to declare against Stalin. The times were highly confusing. Stalin became an enemy from a big brother literally overnight. A tragic story of individuals caught in the brutal whirlwind of history.
As a Yugoslav, I am familiar with your family’s story. You have written it beautifully, and I found it very touching.
As a leftist myself, I have always felt ashamed of that part of Tito’s legacy—Goli Otok. In the West, Goli Otok, along with the Soviet gulags, was often used as a powerful example in anti-communist arguments, presented as evidence of an inherent lack of democracy and respect for human rights under communism.
For a long time, I didn’t know how to reconcile this with my own political beliefs.
Then I emigrated to Canada and learned more about McCarthyism in the United States. I realized that it was happening during roughly the same historical period. In a strange way, that helped me put things into perspective—not to excuse Goli Otok or what happened there, but to understand that communism was not alone in having dark chapters in its history, or in failing to live up to its own ideals.
If the postwar dark chapter for Tito's government was Goli Otok and the dark chapter for the US Government (at least domestically) was McCarthyism, it seems reasonable to conclude that the US for all its manifold faults treated its dissidents much less harshly than Yugoslavia did. Being a dissident is always rough, but wasn't it much worse in Yugoslavia?
Less harsh on internal dissidents if they were white, it's true. Black Leftist leaders were beaten, imprisoned, assassinated.
But aside from that, I would say the true dark period for the US was the millions we killed abroad (not talking about wars, but CIA coups, school of the Americas, etc etc)
100%
Same
Beautifully written. Thanks, Branko. Almost a century on, it hurts to read.
Beautiful and sad Branko.
My grandfather was also on Goli Otok. Like your uncle, he was a staunch communist, participated in WW2 as an "illegal", smuggling people (including some jews) out of Sarajevo to the woods and partisans, and in 1948 was asked by someone whether he liked Stalin (which he said he did, not knowing of the Informbiro and the change of sentiment at all). Ended up on Goli Otok for 2 or 3 years, missed the birth of my mother, and had half of the apartment his family lived taken and given to another family.
He did survive. When he came back they say he could barely walk, and he credited eating tons of bell peppers every day for his recovery. Later on, the communist party apologized to him, told him they made a mistake, and invited him to join the party again, which he never did. But, he never spoke ill of Tito or the communists, remained an out of party communist all his life, and less then a year before he died made himself somehow (sick with cancer) walk to those first 1990 elections and vote for communists. He did witness the start of the unraveling of the country but luckily he died before the full on war started, that destroyed everything he believe in.
The line “Like all young kids I took the dead as having been dead forever; in other words of never having existed” is touching.
Interesting talk today …
That personal story transported me to another place and I found it very moving.
Well, it could be argued that your cousin never betrayed his oath to the king. After all, King Petar at some time ordered all armed resistance groups in Yugoslavia to place themselves under Tito's command. Being a Partisan, your cousin did just that.
It was actually the Četniks who betrayed their oaths. With a few exceptions, they disobeyed King Petar's orders - not just on that occasion, as it were. Strangely, this has been almost totally forgotten today. In today's national(ist) discourse, the Četniks are portrayed as loyalist militia, not as the traitors they were.
Not that the latter directly relates to your text. It just crossed my mind when I read it. To put it generously, Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav history has particularly many nuances to offer, and your text is one of sadly relatively few that does that justice.
I am noy so sure. The Yugoslav govt in exile changed his mind. Mihailovic became Minister of Defense or some such position in one if the govt reshuffles. He was named the head of the Homeland Army (vojska u otadzbini). So, the officers who stayed with him technically stayed with the Royals too.
corrected.
I am not so sure. The Yugoslav govt in exile changed its mind. Mihailovic became Minister of Defense or some such position in one if the govt reshuffles; in January 1942. He was named the head of the Homeland Army (vojska u otadzbini). So, the officers who stayed with him technically stayed with the Royals too.
Thanks for sharing this; it’s an excellent read. The extra thing I’d add is that silence itself too often becomes part of the inheritance. Not just under dictatorships, either.
Families, workplaces, churches, parties, institutions learn what gets you punished, excluded or marked as trouble, then pass that lesson on without anyone needing to write it down or even say it out loud. That’s the bit I find most unsettling here. Repression doesn’t always announce itself with uniforms and prison gates. Sometimes it just survives as good manners or “common sense”.
Thank you for sharing this story. I first appreciated the strange reversal you refer to (Stalinists are the jailers in late 30s Soviet Union, putative Stalinists are the prisoners in late 40s-early 50s Yugoslavia) when I listened to the excellent Remembering Yugoslavia podcast episode on Goli Otok, called Island, Bared in August 2022. Sharing a link in case others want to listen https://yugoblok.com/goli-otok/ How sad that the regime’s decision to punish your uncle led to his un-personing even in your family :-(
Racconto interessante e di piacevole lettura; triste. Grazie
Ukraine Is Attacking What Keeps the Russian Offensive Moving
An interesting analysis by Jason Jay Smart and Chuck Pfarrer on Substack highlights something that is easily overlooked when we follow the front line kilometre by kilometre: Ukraine is increasingly trying to strike the system behind Russian troops, not just the soldiers at the front.
Russia has adapted to drone warfare. Large armoured columns are extremely vulnerable, so Russian forces increasingly rely on small infantry groups, motorcycles, ATVs and other light vehicles. This provides speed and makes troops harder to detect.
But it comes at a cost.
A motorcycle can get a soldier forward quickly. It cannot carry artillery, large quantities of ammunition, fuel or armoured support. Nor does it solve the problem of evacuating the wounded.
This is the vulnerability Ukraine is trying to exploit.
Near Polohy in Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian forces have struck bridges supporting the Russian advance towards Orikhiv. ISW has also documented Ukrainian attacks on Russian logistics and drone infrastructure. A Ukrainian officer says his forces are striking six to eight Russian drone-control points per day in their area of operations, including positions associated with the highly capable Rubikon unit. That last figure is a Ukrainian claim and should be treated as such.
We are seeing a similar dynamic around Kupiansk, where ISW describes Russian difficulties consolidating positions following infiltration operations. Ukrainian counterattacks and extensive drone activity are simultaneously making resupply and further advances more difficult.
And north of Lyman, through Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine has sought to combine counterattacks at the front with strikes against Russian logistics, command posts, communications and supply lines farther behind the front.
Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported after the first two phases that 125 square kilometres had been brought back under Ukrainian control, of which 50 square kilometres had been liberated from Russian occupation. That distinction matters: Smart and Pfarrer describe 125 km² as “liberated”, while Ukraine’s own account distinguishes between territory brought under control and territory actually retaken from Russian forces.
The militarily interesting point is the difference between infiltration and control.
It is possible to send small groups through gaps in the front. But if they are going to hold the ground, they still need ammunition, food, water, communications, reinforcements, fire support and medical evacuation.
If Ukraine can strike the bridges, transport networks, drone operators and supply routes behind them, a Russian tactical advance can leave isolated troops unable to consolidate their gains.
Smart and Pfarrer go too far, in my view, when they portray Russian motorcycle assaults as almost automatic “one-way traps”. Russia can repair bridges, establish alternative crossings and reroute its supply lines.
But that is precisely why the central question becomes:
Can Russia repair and reroute its logistics faster than Ukraine can identify and strike them again?
Russia may have substantial manpower reserves. But more soldiers do not automatically solve a logistics problem. Every additional soldier requires more ammunition, food, water, transport and medical support.
That may be the most important observation in Smart and Pfarrer’s analysis:
Getting soldiers to the front is one thing. Keeping them supplied long enough to turn infiltration into lasting control is something else entirely.
What is this doing here? 😕
Gracias por compartir una historia familiar tan personal y significativa. Me ha impresionado especialmente cómo muestra que la represión política puede seguir actuando mucho después de que hayan terminado los acontecimientos: a través del silencio, la autocensura y de aquello que una familia acaba aprendiendo a no mencionar.
Tu relato me recordó, en varios aspectos, a *Aniversario*, de Jan Komasa y Lori Rosene-Gambino, una película sobre la que precisamente había escrito hace poco en mi blog: https://ramonocampo.com/pelicula-aniversario-democracia/
Las circunstancias históricas son, naturalmente, muy distintas, pero encontré una coincidencia interesante: en ambos casos, la política y la ideología dejan de ser algo abstracto y penetran en la vida privada, transformando las relaciones familiares y hasta lo que las personas sienten que pueden decir abiertamente.
Me ha resultado especialmente llamativo encontrar tu texto tan poco tiempo después de haber reflexionado sobre esos mismos temas a partir de la película. Felicidades por el artículo y gracias, de nuevo, por compartir esta historia.
Slop
phewww all that for refusing to declare against Stalin. Confusing times in parts of the world I think, everything was shifting around and what was good would be turned on its head the next day. Thanks for sharing, I felt like I was there
Amazing story. Thank you.
A partisan. Who refused to declare for Stalin. Millions ended up just like him. Patriots. Partisans. Anti fascists. Pro democracy. Socialists maybe. Our loss.
He refused to declare against Stalin. The times were highly confusing. Stalin became an enemy from a big brother literally overnight. A tragic story of individuals caught in the brutal whirlwind of history.