The ideological history of equality (“Equality: The History of an Elusive Idea”) is an ambitious, erudite and well-written book by Darrin M. McMahon. In eleven chronological chapters McMahon shows how societies as diverse as hunter-gatherers, Greeks and Romans, early and medieval Western Christians, French revolutionaries etc. and ultimately the partisans of identity politics have thought of equality. (Not inequality, the term that has, as McMahon reminds us, become ubiquitous, but equality.) Not all chapters are equal though. In my opinion, the best are on the American and French revolutions, and the concluding chapter on US civil rights movements and today’s politics of identity. The concluding chapter is indeed about the United States only, and as it stands for today’s world in general, it could be thought as somewhat reductonist. However, the two big themes faced by the American society in the past half-century, the rights of Black population or “people of color” and identity politics, transcend US limits, as the French riots attest for the former and Putin’s vociferous attacks on sexually-based identities on the latter.
The motif of the book is, I think, best expressed in the phraseology of (not popular, but recently much more quoted) Carl Schmitt: every ideology of equality among the “brothers” or “peers” is predicated on the exclusion of others from that equality. This is a fundamental contradiction in the idea of equality as we know it historically. Athens and Sparta insisted on equality among their citizens, but excluded enslaved people, metecs (resident foreigners) and women. It was an equality that, at most, encompassed a third of the population. Christians, like all monotheistic co-religionaires excluded from the application of their equality members of other religions. The American revolutionaries wrote that all men are created equal, but they really meant men only, and defined that equality in the opposition to the enslaved people. In percentage terms, the reach of the American equality was not greater than the Athenian. The French revolutionaries were more universal in their approach, but gave only a grudging recognition of equality to the colonized. Marxism is keen on equality among proletarians, but excludes “bourgeoisie”, and in its Maoist variant during the Cultural Revolution, created the most radical reversal by openly discriminating people from the “bad” social classes, and promoting (including in the access to education) those from the formally oppressed classes.
As this review shows, equality went together with exclusion. Often, the more equality among one group was emphasized, the stronger was the implied chasm with the excluded. Before I move to discuss two, in my opinion, most interesting issues raised by McMahon, let me mention that McMahon’s several comments on Marxism’s lack of concern with equality (as opposed to its interest in abolition of classes) is not a controversial point. McMahon at times seems to believe so, but his interpretation is accurate, non-controversial, and shared by most who have read Marx and Engels. Similarly, I think that few people who know Fascist ideology would be surprised by its emphasis on national equality. It was supposed to solve the class conflict, to unify national labor and national capital, to divide one nation from another, and thus its within-national calls to equality are not surprising.
The two most interesting aspects, in my opinion, are identity politics and (what is missing in McMahon’s book almost entirely) the contrast between national and global equality. Both are present-day issues.
Identify politics in McMahon telling comes at the heels of the civil rights movement in the United States. That movement too, in its extreme version propagated by Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X and “Black Power”, as they outflanked Martin Luther King, could be seen within the same motif as the rest of the ideologies discussed in the book: the Whites were now excluded from the application of the equality principle, thus creating a reverse racism or (in Sartre’s words) “anti-racial racism”. But the civil rights movement also opened the gap with Black women who saw some of the movement’s leaders as imbued with machismo and “male chauvinism”. White women themselves have had a historically fraught relationship with Blacks’ emancipation; as McMahon mentions, Susan B. Anthony thought it was much more important that (White) women be enfranchised than that the rights be extended to Blacks. But men/women, Blacks/Whites are not homogeneous among themselves once sexual differences are brought into the play. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the movement for equality not only led to the fragmentation of society into many groups, working at times at cross-purposes, but to the emphasis on differences. “To insist at difference as the very meaning of equality [is] in the long-run of egalitarian reflection a novel claim”, as McMahon discreetly observes. The struggle for equality that does not underscore some fundamental equality, or even sameness, among people but rather their differences is not common, to say the least. One can paper over this by arguing that all current movements just ask for recognition of specificity and equal treatment. But at what point does the insistence on differences, and even incommunicability of experiences, becomes exactly what we have seen before: insistence on equality within by creating an ever-greater divide from the rest?
My second comment has to do with what is, with a few exceptions, absent in McMahon’s book. It is the change in perspective when one moves from claims for national to claims for global equality. McMahon mentions how the two were linked in the US civil rights movement, and how the New International Economic Order tried (and failed) to equalize the power of rich and poor nations. But it might have been worth discussing a bit more the change in perspective brought about by globalization. Consider equality of opportunity. There is probably no ideology today that would be against equality of opportunity within a nation-state. But extend that call for equality of opportunity to the global level and the problems immediately arise. If the “same” persons in Sweden and Zimbabwe face entirely different life prospects (in terms of income, wealth accumulation, housing, life expectancy etc.), and if the main reason for this lack of equality is the difference in mean incomes between the nations, there are two obvious ways to remedy this state of affairs: transfer more money from rich to poor countries (a global welfare approach as envisaged by Gunnar Myrdal) or open borders to migration. Neither enjoys a majoritarian support in rich countries. It then becomes interesting to ask on what grounds people who often strongly support equality of opportunity, exclude from its application people who do not reside in their country? We see there the same mechanism as many times in history: the greater the desire for equality amongst the peers, the greater the need to exclude others. It then becomes fully understandable why countries with the most developed welfare states (Sweden, Denmark Norway, the Netherlands) are the most notable examples of the ideological U-turn on international migration.
I have taken the last topic to show how McMahon motif plays well in contemporary situations even in cases where ideologically the issue has not been fully developed. McMahon’s (or Carl Schmitt’s) approach thus shows its obvious advantages, but it also leads us to a less upbeat conclusion: unlike the oft-quoted “long arc of history” that allegedly bends toward “justice” (meaning equality), the outcome may be greater equalities in some areas and greater chasms between people in other areas. This is what history seems to teach us.
Author Othniel Smith wrote "An aspiration which you fight for becomes a right, which you stoutly defend...and a privilege, which you are happy to deny to others".
This powerfully captures the core contradiction of human economic growth - that great wealth is created through social co-operation (there are no billionaires made on a dessert island). but can be aquired through selfish extraxtion. Thats why a stable government (one where the state holds a, monopoly over violence) is a pre-requisite for economic development, as it limits the opportunity for economic extraction by "thugs" who use power or violence to simply steal the wealth created by others.
Because we are so dependant on the modern state for our personal security, our nationality becomes a key dividing line. We accept the need for wealth re-distribution within our national borders to benefit "us" but reject immigration or foreign aid, designed to help "them".
This is why trans-national structures that seek to promote international co-operation over mercantilist competition, are so important. The EU is the most powerful example of this strategy, as it creates a framework that replacesd competition between nations (two World wars fought in Europe! ) with economic co-operation.
Ironically, it is now the EU border that defines exclusivity, restricting membership and freedom of movement across its own borders (A powerful scare tactic in the Brexit fiasco was to warn voters that Turkey would soon be granted EU membership!).
Whats needed today is a more powerful "Global Economic Union" which finally recognises that we are all better off when we are ALL better off. We need to learn that in The Global Race there really is only one "Us". Whether such Global co-operation can emerge from the UN, or through greater regional trade structures like the EU that converge to work together is not clear. What is self evident us that tackling Global inequality only becomes possible if we learn to build political structures that will encourage peace and Global co-operation, over competition.between nations.
Sounds very interesting and I'm looking forward to picking this one up. Regarding your point about identity politics, Olufemi O. Taiwo wrote an incisive and nuanced piece on the failings of one aspect of identity politics as co-opted and practiced by elites. He focuses on standpoint epistemology and deference to identity, and argues that because of the huge barriers to get into decision-making rooms, when people in power defer to someone of a specific racial identity because of their lived experience, they are flattening that identity and implicitly assuming that this elite (in the decision-making room) person of that race has the same experience and perspective as the average person of their race.
The whole essay is well-worth reading, but I think this section is key:
"It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.
But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted."
https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/post/being-in-the-room-privilege-elite-capture-and-epistemic-deference
Regarding the differences in global equality vs. national, at least from a US perspective I think that calling for global equality has become very difficult because of the rabid anticommunism. Anyone who suggests solidarity with the poor people of other countries is targeted, and more so if they suggest real policy change.
You've given me lots of food for thought.