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Elias Rutten's avatar

Forgive me for the length of this comment, but this is a highly complex issue that deserves proper dissection.

My feeling, having studied both sides of this debate carefully, is that you two are largely talking past each other. Not because either of you is wrong. On the contrary, both of you are right, from different perspectives. But because you're each coming at it from a different theoretical framework, it looks like a disagreement on mechanism, when you're actually arguing about the nature of global capitalism itself.

Pettis approaches this from a diagnostic, mostly post-Keynesian macroeconomic lens, one built on ceteris paribus assumptions and an economic logic of what the "correct" policy should be, fixable by addressing global trade institutions. This is what Robert Cox would call problem-solving theory.

You, Mr. Milanovic, are approaching the issue from a historical and critical-theoretical perspective, one that points to the world-systems element of modern trade.

I don't think Pettis would actually disagree with your point on profits. His argument is more concerned with the political-economic institutions that allow an economy to manage its external account, and you correctly point out that China's centralized capitalism handles this more effectively.

The central disagreement, then, touches on the very nature of the global capitalist system.

Here, I believe you hold the stronger theoretical position. While Pettis's framework offers excellent diagnostics for why imbalances are bad and generate conflict, it somehow manages to depoliticize the class element behind how they arise in the first place.

I think this relates to a broader lack of knowledge for why the dollar system was actually put into place, namely the weaponization of capital flows. This analysis is only found within certain critical political economy literature and therefore makes the global imbalances debate rather unproductive. See for example Peter Gowan. We see the same cycle repeating now with stablecoins and the GENIUS Act.

In essence, this is a debate over whether imperialism is an inevitable outcome of the capitalist system, whether perfect liberal competition is even possible, or whether imperialism tends to win out regardless. Unfortunately, history has so far only offered empirical proof for the latter.

Aleksandra Posarac's avatar

It seems to me that you are missing Branko’s point about capital gobbling up most of returns and labor getting smaller and smaller share and no public discourse about that. All started with Reagan and neocon/neoliberal policies that attacked from all sides and dismantled the role of the government. What does that tell us about “problem-solving” perspective?

Elias Rutten's avatar

No, I'm not missing that. Capital & labour dynamics are inherently connected to theories of underconsumption and imperialism. The question is one of international relations: is imperialism a policy choice or a structural necessity?

I will write a substack on this soon.

Aleksandra Posarac's avatar

Capital and labor dynamics are about limitless greed and power and capital having the upper hand because the power decided so. The rest is semantics.

Owen Paine's avatar

Forex rate

Strong dollar policy

For capital export

Weak rmb

For strong trade policy

Recall how west clobbered east

In consolidated Germany

Why

The over valued

eastern currency in the merge

Aleksandra Posarac's avatar

Brilliant. Love it when double standards and blatant hypocrisy are dressed as “economics” or care for “poor” Chinese workers. But, thanks goodness, the times when western narrative was sold out as “truth” are long gone.

Owen Paine's avatar

And you thank yourself

for

Pointing out the collaboration between exporters of capital

One the one side

and exporters of products

On the other

Joanne's avatar

As always incredibly on point, it does seem deeply hypocritical for the West to cry foul at being out competed by capitalists who are simply better capitalists and have 'built a better mousetrap' instead of funneling profits into dividends to shareholders at the expense of capex and innovation.

Graham Webster's avatar

There's a Substack waiting to be written that expands on that last sentence. It's like those movies where the last scene sets the stage for the sequel!

The Freeze-Frame Revolution's avatar

Nice one. It kind of aligns well with my comment on Adam Tooze and Barnaby Raine debate: https://squirrelbrain77.substack.com/p/the-shard-in-the-eye

Marcos Godoi's avatar

We need a labor Bretton Woods. The post-war consensus made it very difficult to be protectionist, and the free movement of capital that characterized neoliberalism turned competition into a race to the bottom for workers and wages. Neomercantilism is not the answer, as it could be inferred from Pettis argument. We need some kind of universal labor rights, or we'll be back to the situation that led to the former world wars.

Sam Mitchell's avatar

Agreed. But consider the decades of struggle it took to organise a politically effective working class at the national level. Then imagine what it would take to organise the international working class.

Cikorije's avatar

Well done Mr Milanović. Izvrstan tekst, čestitke

Leon Liao's avatar

This is an exceptionally sharp response to Michael Pettis’s long-running argument about China’s trade surplus, wage suppression, and industrial competitiveness.

Labor’s share of national income in the United States has fallen to a historic low, while China’s labor-compensation share has remained broadly stable over the past two decades.

So I strongly agree with Professor Milanovic’s central challenge. When France and Germany outcompeted developing countries through better machinery, higher productivity, and stronger industrial capabilities, they called it efficiency and technological progress. Now that China can manufacture better products at lower cost, the same outcome is increasingly described as “unfair competition.”

Professor Milanovic’s most important contribution is to shift the discussion from supposedly low Chinese wages to unusually high Western corporate profits. For decades, institutions such as the Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal supported labor-market flexibility, wage restraint, weaker unions, and higher returns to capital. Their sudden concern for Chinese workers’ wages and welfare is difficult to regard as sincere.

If Western companies are losing competitiveness, why is reducing profit margins almost never discussed? Why must China raise wages and social spending to protect Western corporate profitability?

China’s industrial strength also cannot be reduced to low wages. It rests on the combination of the world’s most complete industrial system, its largest market for industrial and consumer goods, and its deepest concentration of engineering and manufacturing talent.

China’s competitive advantage is increasingly structural, technological, and organizational. The wage-suppression argument explains far less than its advocates assume.

Novak Jankovic's avatar

There is also a claim that China ("centralized capitalist" - excellent term) is keeping its currency artificially low in order to make its goods cheaper. But up until recently, mainstream economics and Western media claimed that manipulating a country's currency is impossible in an open trade environment. It appears it is impossible only until the wrong guys win.

Scenarica's avatar

The Adam Smith quote is the critical sentence and it's 250 years old. Western capitalists complain about Chinese wages and never mention their own margins. But the Pettis framing has a gap too. He treats wage compression as a policy choice that China makes and Europe doesn't. Your African example dismantles that completely. The structural advantage is the structural advantage. Machines in 1970, centralised wage setting in 2026. The complainant changes, the complaint doesn't.

The part neither of you touches is what happens when AI enters this. If AI compresses production costs, Western firms could theoretically compete without cutting wages. Instead they're capturing the productivity gain as margin, which is exactly the behaviour you're describing: never mention the profits. The technology that was supposed to level the field is being absorbed by the same profit share that created the imbalance.

Jiao's avatar

Another stark support for this crucial argument is that billionaire wealth has exploded relative to public wealth, which is slowly destabilizing our society and future generations.

Frank's avatar

It is interesting that the real-world example you cite, autos in the US, is generally not very high margin. High margins more or less exist in industries that Marx couldn't really imagine: entertainment, healthcare, information technology, education, and to a lesser extent finance. And these industries are largely non-traceable.

Frank's avatar

Non-tradeable.

Gabriel U.'s avatar

Very nice.

A historical antecedent I wasn't really aware of until reading @ewanrowe1's post below is public debate in the United Kingdom regarding "ruinous competition" from the United States at the turn of the previous century. (Cf discussion of "involution" in China.)

'The structural read of late-Victorian Britain was that this was unsustainable. American manufacturers, the British financial establishment said, were operating below cost, fueled by debt, propped up by ruinous competition that would inevitably collapse the entire American industrial economy under its own contradictions. The structural read was wrong. It was wrong every year for forty years. The British political establishment never recognized it was wrong until the First World War, when the sheer volumetric superiority of American industrial output became the determining factor in global survival, and by then it was too late.

The Americans were running what economic historians later named productive deflation. The U.S. was in the middle of a sustained deflationary period (1873–1896). The deflation was not destructive. It was driving capital accumulation. American industrial firms in the high-fixed-cost sectors (steel, rail, oil refining) kept their plants running at full capacity even when prices fell, because shutting down meant defaulting on debt payments and losing the plant. Running at full capacity drove unit costs down. Unit costs falling drove prices down further. American producers captured market share by being structurally cheaper at scale than anyone else. Bankruptcies happened. Equity holders got wiped out. The plants stayed open. New owners bought the physical capital for pennies on the dollar and kept producing. By 1900, the U.S. had passed Britain as the largest industrial economy in the world. By 1913, U.S. manufacturing productivity was 2.13 times the British level.

The British “ruinous competition” diagnosis was loud, sustained, and constant throughout this entire period.

. . .

The 1886 Royal Commission dwelled at length on these “signs of depression.” It interpreted American railroad bankruptcies, the frequent corporate failures of the deflationary panics of 1873 and 1893, and the rate wars between American railroads as evidence that the American competitive surge was a transient phenomenon that would shortly burn itself out. The Commission failed to recommend the systemic industrial restructuring required to match American scale. To do so would have required acknowledging that British Free Trade orthodoxy was failing British industry. The British rentier class, meaning specifically the City of London financial bloc that benefited from cheap foreign imports and global capital mobility, was politically dominant and would not accept that conclusion.

The British financial press carried the diagnosis through the 1890s and 1900s. The Economist, The Times, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle all dwelled on the chaotic nature of American capitalism. City of London publications used “ruinous competition” as a stock descriptor for American practices. American steel exports flooding European markets at prices below British cost of production were framed not as evidence of American productive superiority but as unnatural anomalies born of protectionist manipulation and desperate American overproduction. In 1900, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle eagerly noted when “the ruinous competition in prices which formerly existed had been ended,” reflecting British financial anxiety and the City of London’s deep desire for American consolidation that would stabilize the price level and protect rentier-friendly margins. '

https://evanwrowe.substack.com/p/the-british-read-from-this-script

Sample Text's avatar

That chart is erroneous, as has been pointed out a million times. How do you not know this?

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Understanding-Trends-in-Worker-Pay.pdf

Branko Milanovic's avatar

In every major country, the labor share of national income has declined over the past 40 years. Here is one of many such papers (see the link below). The decline in labor share means that capital incomes (i.e. profit) has increased faster than wages. That in turns means that income per capita (or income per worker) has increased faster than remuneration per worker.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19136/w19136.pdf.

Sample Text's avatar

Sorry for the late response, I wasn't notified for some reason.

1. Then attach _that_ figure. It does NOT justify using the erroneous EPI chart that has been debunked a million times.

2. This is disputed, varies based on the appropriate measure (like the imputation of self-employed labor income, (Elsby, Hobijn & Şahin 2013), or gross VS net value added (Bridgman 2017)), and is not necessarily economy-wide. Especially not if it is driven by housing (as Rognlie 2015 finds), or some specific sectors like manufacturing and trade (again, Elsby, Hobijn & Şahin 2013). Disputes about the labor income of the self-employed also relates heavily to the misleading EPI chart you attached.

This Tax Foundation article is a good summary of the main dispute.

https://taxfoundation.org/blog/labor-share-net-income-within-historical-range/

Sample Text's avatar

I would, however, like to know what specifically is wrong with Scott Winship's approach in the PDF I linked earlier, as it seems legit and I have not seen a specific flaw pointed out in it.

Aleksandra Posarac's avatar

“Million times”. Seriously. Suggest you check national accounts for various countries.

Sanjeev's avatar

Hi Prof,

The pot calling the Kettle black.

Germany tailored entire Euro currency bloc which greatly benefited its industrial economy & surpluses. The weaker economies remained weak and in large debts. And debts kept expanding which supported German surpluses. But then, the paradox of Euro is that they killed the golden goose which was keeping Euro area economy going. They forced Austerity & fiscal rules on nations like Greece. They made them into sacrificial lambs which ultimately hurt economies of surplus nations. Eurogarchs would never admit their idiocy.

How competitive is German economy or French economy? Keep aside the common currency and see where they will stand in TRUE competitive trade.

Pettis whining about wage compression in China as unfair. While the Euro project is based on forcing common currency on nations, without which at least some of the members would be better off. And of course some would be worse off, like Germany.

The sad part of European story is that they never learn. They never admit that their austerity doctrine was wrong and fiscal rules have strangulated the currency union, and not to mention the lack of central fiscal authority to stimulate demand in Euro area means Euro currency bloc remains chronically ill.

The response to Europe's problems is that they find fault outwards like complaining that China is compressing wages. And solutions proposed by Eurogarchs are - more work hours for workers, DOGE type project in Europe, aspiring for building giant monopolies like American corporations.

Ozgalahlia's avatar

Very much enjoyed reading this post and enlightened by the discussion. Richard Murphy recently posted on Substack a proposed framework addressing how an economic system imposes biological costs on its citizens and that greater consideration of this should be a key factor in determining how our economic systems are structured. He calls it an Adaptation Framework. Clearly you can see in this debate that China’s system has imposed very high costs on its citizens to achieve its economic goals and broadly stated the West has moderated the biological impacts to a greater degree but there are still severe impacts with systemic poverty and health consequences. Workers have gone backwards due to the collapse of trade unionism and profits have surged to the benefit of the few. Lower corporate taxes , deregulation of markets and labour, more corporate welfare to subsidise investment and reductions in government spending are trotted out as nauseam as the solution to “ declining productivity”. We never hear anything about reducing profits. I think we know why.