Against purposeful activity and Abrahamic religions in a world of abundance

A note on Keynes’ “Economic Possibilities…”

In a recent discussion regarding the “forthcoming abundance” produced by artificial intelligence and reduced need for human labor --seemingly a beautiful future—I cited, as many people do, Keynes’ somewhat enigmatic and multi-layered 1930 short essay “The Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren”. What is relevant from that piece in the current context are Keynes’ extremely optimistic forecasts of economic growth: four- to eight-fold increase in average per capita income in advanced countries in the next one hundred years which turned out to be right on the spot; his view that such material abundance would lead to much lower need for labor and hence a workweek of about 15 hours; and finally his dilemma on whether humanity –having finally solved “the economic problem”—will know how to use all these extra hours of freedom and leisure. In that short latter discussion, there is an unmistakable similarity between Keynes of “The Economic Possibilities..” and Marx of “The German Ideology”: both holding an optimistic view that free time will enable us to fully express our human nature, by getting rid of the stultifying and numbing division of labor and (to use Marx’s example), “to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon…criticise [art] after dinner”. Keynes has a similar optimistic view that the solution of the economic problem which has, for millennia, eluded humanity will set us on a path of freedom from constraint and of flourishment of all human capabilities. Similarities in that respect between Marx and Keynes are very strong and perhaps worth exploring further. And contrasting with what we believe now—which may be far less optimistic.

What struck me however in this new reading of “The Economic Possibilities…” is something which I overlooked before and which I think, for “political” purposes, Keynes mentioned but failed to elaborate. This is Keynes’ rejection of purposeful activity as desirable for humankind once the economic problem has been solved, and doubt on whether monotheistic religions will be needed once we reach abundance.

The reasoning goes as follows. To solve the “economic problem”, there are, according to Keynes, four requirements: low population growth, absence of war, technological progress, and most importantly, saving and accumulation of capital. In order to accumulate capital, one has to display an uncommon and unusual—and in some sense anti-human—ability to defer gratification: instead of seeking pleasure in a thing or activity itself and now, one uses money to invest in a project whose return is uncertain and may lie far in the future. An economically advanced society is possible only if enough people with resources internalize this principle of deferred gratification—which is strictly speaking alien to humans: we want nice things whether good coffee, beautiful shoes, or great vacation, right now and we want them as such, not in the abstract form of accumulated money in a bank account. In other words, hedonism, pleasure now, is a normal and healthy human trait; “abstinence”, abstract enjoyment of future pleasures, is peculiar, and in some ways, even “morbid” custom, what Marx called “abstract hedonism”. The natural tendency to enjoy activities in themselves rather than to engage into activities whose fruits lie in the future has been overturned by those who do not discount future pleasures and it is to them that we owe economic growth.

But—and this is key—what happens when we have reached the “realm of freedom” and do not need to accumulate anymore? That ability -from being indispensable in the time of scarcity—is suddenly seen for what it is, an almost “semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensit[y] which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.” It is no longer needed, and, if continued to be engaged into, shows almost a personal flaw: inability to live in the moment (as every yoga teacher will tell you); to enjoy activities as such, not to conduct purposeful activities whose pay offs lie far in the future.

Where does this uncommon ability come from? Keynes makes here a most interesting “detour” and links deferment of pleasure with monotheistic religions that likewise promise the benefits of future happy life at some undefined, and empirically unverifiable, future. Here is Keynes’ very important paragraph, where the allusion is only directed to Judaism but the implications clearly carry over to the other two Abrahamic religions:

“Perhaps it is not an accident that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart and essence of our religions has also done most for the principle of compound interest and particularly loves this most purposive of human institutions.”

Abrahamic religions have been extremely useful in leading people to engage in activities whose results come at some faraway future. Without acceptance of having one’s deserts being postponed no-one would save, and no capital would be accumulated. The habit of that deferment and its validation, or praise, come from the postponement built into Judaism, Christianity and Islam (although only the first is tacitly implied) where the future pleasures were promised to those who deny to themselves earthly enjoyments. The religious abnegation and the promise of salvation on the one hand, and the deferment of economic gratification on the other, needed each other and worked hand-in-hand. (There are, of course, echoes of Max Weber here.)

But once “the economic problem” solved, we can abandon this unnatural postponement of pleasure. We can find pleasure in activities as such –not in what the activity might bring us in the future—and then the religions that teach us otherwise become redundant and even nefarious. Although Keynes does not draw this implication fully, I think we are right to simply extent by just one additional step, the argument that he has so carefully constructed, laying it, as it were, brick-by-brick: that in a world of abundance, monotheistic religions are no longer needed, because pleasure need not be deferred, and savings and investment are not necessary. All will be consumption. And daily pleasure.*

It might have perhaps been difficult for Keynes, given the ideological situation in the United Kingdom in the 1930s, his semi-official role in the government, and also the already present view of him of being somewhat of a maverick to explicitly draw this implication for us—but I believe that whoever reads his essay today, cannot miss to make this simple next step, all the elements of which are nicely and clearly laid out by Keynes.

* I am aware that Niall Ferguson has (unfairly) criticized Keynes for this.