<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Global Inequality and More 3.0]]></title><description><![CDATA[Global inequality and More 3.0]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 20:03:40 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[branko2f7@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[branko2f7@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[branko2f7@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[branko2f7@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Multipolarity, neutrality and peace]]></title><description><![CDATA[Why the world peace depends on small counties&#8217; not taking sides?]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/multipolarity-neutrality-and-peace</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/multipolarity-neutrality-and-peace</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 22:18:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d1bcbe82-5e5e-41e5-afad-4160e4d42bd6_933x611.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png" width="933" height="611" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/daf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:611,&quot;width&quot;:933,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:684474,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/223952054?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k9VY!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdaf2a28d-9b46-4656-81c9-c6c3ef9e36ba_933x611.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>I recently wrote a couple of Substack pieces that were seemingly disparate, but did have one theme in common. They argued against joining military alliances, and being in favor of peace not just by saying so but doing it in the real world by refusing military entanglements.</p><p>The first piece criticked Baltic countries&#8217; <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/on-european-hypocrisy-and-warmongering">suddenly-found belligerence and global irresponsibility</a>, and indirectly (and in the later exchanges I had), directly, praising the policy of Finlandization. The second piece tried to delineate what, in my opinion, should be <a href="https://brankomilanovic.substack.com/p/an-axiomatic-approach-to-serbias">Serbia&#8217;s international policy</a> (before the current change of government, and even more now) of holding to Tito&#8217;s legacy of non-alignment.</p><p>In both articles, the common theme was this: for small counties in Europe and in the world (and especially so in Africa), the best policy is that of neutrality between the great powers. It is the only policy that gives them agency, freedom of maneuver, and relevance in the world. Without it they would be gobbled up by great powers, reduced to irrelevance or serfdom, impotence and nothingness.</p><p>Moreover, such a policy of N and N (neutral and non-aligned) is not only good for the countries themselves but is good for the world as a whole because it limits the area where the big powers fight each other, prevents them from using the rivalries and contradictions within these countries to sow discord, to pit one tribe, or one people, or one ethnic group against another. and create endless wars, and then, through inter-imperial rivalry, to hurl the word into a cataclysm. As they did before.</p><p>Small, and big non-Western, countries too have a duty to preserve world peace.</p><p>But then why did I get such horribly negative response to my articles? Many supporters of the belligerence of the Baltic states accused me of being a Putin&#8217;s stooge. They wrote that the policy of Finlandization was wrong, or if it was not wrong, it was, they wrote, just a clever ruse to trick the Soviets. They thought that their countries should have joined NATO even much earlier, become fully part of the West, and perhaps gone to war.</p><p>My piece on Serbia&#8217;s foreign policy got attacked as a vulgar attempt to revive Communism and Titoism (by one set of people) and to keep Serbia away from Russia (by another set of people). They did not care for my argument that, due to historical events, Serbia was the only country in the former Yugoslavia able, at least theoretically, to pursue the policy of neutrality and non-alignment that Tito so skillfully crafted. No, they argued, we need to get aligned with the West. The fact that Yugoslavia was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe that never belonged to the Tripartite Nazi pact (no longer than 72 hours that it took the Army to make the anti-Nazi coup in 1941), nor to the Warsaw Pact, nor to the NATO pact, was not an argument for them.</p><p>Some pro-Orthodox Russian bloggers attacked me from trying to &#8220;neutralize&#8221; Serbia from its Orthodox &#8220;brothers&#8221;. They also wanted the alignment but from the other side.</p><p>Everybody wanted to fight. No-one wanted to be neutral.</p><p>But they failed to reflect on the counterfactual that had Ukraine stuck to its originally Constitutionally-enshrined policy of neutrality, it would have had more than a million people, who are now dead, alive and happy. It would have flourished by trading with both the European Union and Russia. It would have been on its way to be a rich developed country. And they did not reflect on the fact that Finland&#8217;s economic growth was made possible by its neutrality and equal trade with the Soviets and the West. Nor that Swiss and Singaporean wealth was made possible by the policy of neutrality.</p><p>Nor that the global cold peace during the Cold War was made possible and maintained by the Bandoeng meeting and the numerous non-aligned countries&#8217; Summits from Belgrade in 1961, to Cairo and Algiers, and ultimately Havana in 1979. They did not care to think that without neutrality and nonalignment, millions of people would have perished in a nuclear war between the superpowers. They have forgotten &#8211;or never learned&#8212;history.</p><p>Multipolarity and neutrality are the only way forward to have peace and save humankind.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Between South Korea and South Vietnam]]></title><description><![CDATA[A review of Volodymyr Ishchenko&#8217;s &#8220;Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War&#8221;]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/between-south-korea-and-south-vietnam</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/between-south-korea-and-south-vietnam</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 17:08:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/90de84f4-4585-4e6f-a8a4-47c19e743770_284x480.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png" width="284" height="480" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:480,&quot;width&quot;:284,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:326748,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/222370247?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!9gfZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b808bc7-1eaa-491d-b86c-71173271d61c_284x480.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>As some people who follow my Substack might have been noticed I have been reading this Summer several books about the current Ukraine-Russia war. I find it very instructive and useful to read books that to some extent go back to the less well known origins of the conflict, that is to the breakup of the Russian Empire and the Civil War which followed rather than the presently published books. In fact, during that time the same forces that have led to the current war became quite obvious including an extraordinary heterogeneity of political and ethnic forces in Ukraine.</p><p>I have so far reviewed two of the books that deal with that period: Richard Pipes&#8217; &#8220;The <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/ukraine-lenin-and-sultan-galiev">Foundation of the Soviet Union</a>&#8221; and an extraordinary <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/destruction-and-despair">memoir by Viktor Shklovsky</a> covering the two Russian Revolutions in 1917 and the years of the Civil War 1918-21. Both are excellent books and they treat of the same events but from a very different perspective. Pipes has a historian&#8217;s point of view and Shklovsky that of a participant, witness to these events as well as of a litterateur. I have also read recently two books that deal, in broad brushes, with the history of Russia: the first by Vladislav Inozemtsev entitled (in Russian) &#8220;A non-modern country&#8221;, a very critical look at today&#8217;s Russia (for a nice summary of Inozemtsev&#8217;s views see <a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/29/the-political-economy-of-a-zombie-nation/">here</a>), and a more recent book by Sergei Medvedev &#8220;<a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/A_War_Made_in_Russia.html?id=vPOJzwEACAAJ">A War Made in Russia</a>&#8221; that is, among other things, superficial in its treatment of the economic catastrophe of the 1990s which brought to power Putin and led to the popular acceptance of his &#8220;vertical of power.&#8221;</p><p>I have just finished reading &#8220;<a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/3216-towards-the-abyss">Towards the Abyss</a>&#8221; by Ukrainian political scientist and political activist Volodomir Ishchenko. I have read a number of his pieces before. They are always distinguished by not being simplistic analytically, and by taking the political economy of the Russo-Ukrainian, at first conflict, and ultimately war, seriously. Ishchenko takes a clear class attitude in the explanation of interests of different political factions in Ukraine. &#8220;Towards the Abyss&#8221; collects Ishchenko&#8217;s articles written from the Orange Revolution (2004) through the 2014 Maidan uprising (or the coup; or both as Ishchenko argues), all the way to 2023 when the Russian war against Ukraine had already entered the second year.</p><p>It is not the discussion of the war that I found most remarkable but the fact that it is the first, or surely one of the first, books about the post-socialist societies that tries to define the class structure of such societies and to take it as an explanatory tool in order to better understand political and economic coalitions. Ivan Szelenyi had a somewhat similar approach in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv2tbwq62">a book and several articles</a> published in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but that type of analysis has since become rare. It is a striking fact, for example, that no article or book treats of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession from the class or social perspective. All, or almost all, deal only with ethnicity and religions. When economics is present it is always in the form of each republic complaining to have been exploited by others. Clearly, again, an ethnic point of view.</p><p>The post-Soviet scene does look different from the parties and coalitions and political classes that exist in post-socialist Eastern Europe. The post-Soviet, and especially the Ukrainian, scene is more complex because economic interests mingle with ethnic and language issues creating a tapestry of overlapping interests and identities, and thus conflicts. In ethnically homogeneous countries (as almost all post-partition communist countries had become), things are much simpler precisely because the two variables that play such a big role in Ukrainian politics, ethnicity and language (the latter being totally a variable of its own since it does not necessarily coincide with ethnicity), are much less important.</p><p>Reading Ishchenko&#8217;s reflections collected over the years one is inevitably reminded of similar articles that were collected in Marx&#8217;s &#8220;Civil War in France&#8221; and &#8220;The Eighteenth Brumaire&#8221;. Marx was likewise confronted with the difficulty of putting the French society at the time, with its numerous classes, within the straight jacket of English political economy that he inherited from Smith and Ricardo. It was difficult for Marx to see where he would put, for example, French peasant small-holders who represented about 30% of the population and were basically non-existent in England. They were neither capitalists, nor hired workers and because of their size and political influence could not be simply ignored. Marx ultimately produced two masterpieces of sociological and political analysis. <em>Pro memoria</em>, here is Marx&#8217;s class structure as defined in the articles that were assembled in &#8220;Civil War in France, 1848-1850&#8221;, and in the last Chapter of Capital (volume III), unfinished and published after his death.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png" width="594" height="332" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:332,&quot;width&quot;:594,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!0NgQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F154d6933-4673-4da8-bc8d-1ba809d1ebf2_594x332.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Note: from my &#8220;Visions of Inequality&#8221;.</p><p>Ishchenko&#8217;s class structure is much simpler. Before the war with Russia, Ukrainian society consistent of three large classes. The first was urban bourgeoisie that tended, by its own political preferences and material interests, to look towards Western Europe as a &#8220;civilizational project&#8221;, whereby Ukraine would become more developed socially and economically. Urban bourgeoisie was often supported by European or American money that came through various educational, technological, or social projects, or more simply, the urbanites had business and professional interests shared with Western Europeans. Thus the urban bourgeoisie had both a material interest and ideological preference for closer relations with Europe and in particular for the membership of the European Union. It is not clear at all that before the war that attitude extended to the membership of NATO. Ishchenko provides numbers on the support for NATO membership that never encompassed the majority of the population, and often not even the plurality. Until the Russian invasion, the membership of NATO was desired by 15 to 20 percent of the population whereas the membership of the European Union generally had the support of more than 50% of the population.</p><p>The second large class were extreme right-wingers and nationalists who mostly come from the western part of Ukraine and were instrumental in the overthrow of Yanukovich. As one of their leaders is quoted, &#8220;We were one-tenth of the people there but we did nine-tenth of the job&#8221;. The popular insurrection that lasted several months and involved many twists eventually led to Parliament (in a dubious way) impeaching Yanukovich who then fled to Russia, relinquishing all presidential powers. It is not very clear from Ishchenko&#8217;s essays what is the economic basis of these right-wing groups. Their political views together with their thuggishness, remind one most closely of the German SA. In fact, Ishchenko compares them implicitly so when he says that they are military wings of political parties. There are several of them, operationally independent, linked to various rightist parties. Among these groups the best known is the Azov brigade that participates very importantly in the war, providing the backbone of Ukrainian armed forces. It is an all-encompassing organization: &#8220;a unit with a political agenda affiliated to a political party, to a paramilitary organization, to summer camps training children.&#8221; (p. 116). There were also other groups that played the role in in the Euromaidan as, for example, the Right Block that originally was an association of soccer hooligans, similar to what exists in many East European countries. But it is not at all clear what social groups they represent nor what is their economic interest other than some form of corrupt political capitalism.</p><p>The third group in Ukraine before 2014&#8212;that is when Ukraine was still a unified country&#8212;were people in eastern Ukraine where big oligarchs, having gotten rich on fraudulent privatizations of Soviet industrial companies, controlled the political life &#8220;ruling&#8221; over a rather passive workforce. &#8221;These oligarchic parties were structured around a &#8216;big man&#8217;, on patron-client relation, [and] lacking any other model they reproduced the worst features of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#8212;heavy handed paternalism, popular passivity&#8212;voided of its legitimizing modernity project&#8221; (p. 111). Unlike the urban bourgeoisie, here both the oligarchs and the population looked towards Russia with whom they had economic and ethnic ties. They were keen to maintain privileges in that trade and were fearful of economic competition from the Western countries if Ukraine were to become an associate or full member of the EU. They represented what one might call conservative interests&#8212;what in Yeltsin&#8217;s era used to be called the &#8220;Red Directors&#8221; who have been transformed into oligarchs--but their support was, Ishchenko argues, rather shallow in that it depended on passivity of the workers rather than on their enthusiastic support.</p><p>The &#8220;Eastern oligarchs&#8221; appealed to the media and to the rest of the population than the &#8220;Western oligarchs&#8221; and the urban bourgeoisie because the latter were more sophisticated and included many highly educated professionals. Media scene in Kiev and other large cities was dominated by what Ishchenko calls national-liberal urban middle classes, paid very often by Western business contracts and Western NGOs. They could be also seen as a comprador bourgeoisie.</p><p>The &#8220;Western oligarchs&#8221;, who also got rich through fraudulent privatizations but in their businesses were Western-oriented, played a complex role whereby at times they sided with the extreme right-wing and at other times with national-liberal coalition. Petro Poroshenko may be the best known case. He became the president of Ukraine after Yanukovich&#8217;s ouster; oligarch himself he shifted from a national liberal position toward extreme right which allowed Zelensky in the next election to present himself as a peace candidate and to win with a landslide (with 73% of the vote in the second round). Ishchenko argues that the main reason for this ambivalent positioning of Western oligarchs was the issue of corruption. Getting closer to the European Union was in principle something they supported, but not when it involved greater scrutiny of their contracts and tighter rein on corruption. Greater transparency and control over corruption that would come with closer European relations was for them always an issue, and at time, it would lead them to move closer to extreme nationalists who were uninterested in such trivial topics like corruption.</p><p>What happened with the 2014 limited war and the rebellion in the Donbass was that the third group (&#8220;Eastern oligarchs&#8221; and workers) became totally excluded from the domestic polity because they either joined separatist or Russian forces, or they were cut off because the territory was occupied by Russia or anti-Maidan Ukrainian forces. That left on the ground only two social classes, namely the national liberal urban bourgeoisie and the right-wingers with their armed battalions. The latter carried a brunt of the war and I do not think there can be any doubt that when the war is over they would aspire to get top positions in government.</p><p>One group that has been totally eliminated during the past decade (and Ishchenko in the Introduction alludes to the fact that he and his family belong to it) are the so-called &#8220;wrong Ukrainians&#8221; or &#8220;Soviet Ukrainians&#8221;. They were (and one needs to speak of them in the past tense) the Sovietized urban middle class, whether technical or liberal intelligentsia, that shared socialist values while rejecting Soviet conformism; they accepted the progressive values brought up with the Soviet Union including not seeing the language as a marker of nationalism but as a tool for communication. As Ivashchenko rhetorically asks in the Introduction, &#8220;Did the Ukrainian speakers in my family feel oppressed when they spoke in Russian? On the contrary, it was the language of their loving partners, of the big cities, of higher education, the language spoken by most of their peers and colleagues in the technical intelligentsia. For them, it was not the language of oppression, but of advancement, as for millions of other Ukrainian families.&#8221; As in all wars that pit one extremist group against another, those in the middle get squeezed out. They are eliminated socially, and at times physically.</p><p>On top of that the party that was possibly closest to them, the Ukrainian Communist Parry (with 13% of the vote in 2012 elections), was banned in 2019 when the process of so-called decommunization was in the full swing. The &#8220;wrong Ukrainians&#8221; were first destroyed through the deliberate government action against any group that advocated a peaceful cohabitation of Ukrainians and Russians. Then they were additionally destroyed when Russia attacked Ukraine and, as Ishchenko points out, no group or party (outside of Donbas) &#8211;however close to Russia it might have been considered before the aggression&#8212;came out in support of the invasion.</p><p>The two main groups, national liberal bourgeoisie and right-wing nationalists, would thus remain after the war. The latter would probably prefer a type of political capitalism and clientelism that would dispense favors to their members. It is a general occurrence that after the war former soldiers and warriors believe that they should be especially rewarded for the sacrifices they made. It would not be surprising if the nationalists set their sights to controlling the top power. If they do so they would do it with a very clear agenda that would be based on revenge over Russia (<em>l&#8217;arm&#233;e de la revanche</em>), return of the occupied territories, all of which would (as I think Zelensky once remarked) make Ukraine turn into an armed camp ready to pounce on Russia at any moment. A very optimistic version of what Ukraine might become is South Korea that under Western protection developed into a very prosperous country with advanced technology and thriving arts. A bad version of what could happen to Ukraine is that it looks like South Vietnam: lots of political instability, short-lived government, high levels of corruption, loss of population, and perhaps a general breakdown of representative institutions. If this were to happen the post-war Ukraine might resemble the pre-war Ukraine (four presidents, seven prime ministers, and five general elections between 2000 and 2022) even if one source of instability&#8212;difference in political preferences between the West and the East&#8212;would have disappeared due to the partition of the country.</p><p>In the late 1940s, British historian AJP Taylor, after studying the Habsburg dynasty from 1809 to 1916 and reviewing all failed attempts to create a functional multi-ethnic society in Central and Eastern Europe, asked a rhetorical question whether such a society is at all possible in Central and Eastern Europe. He thought that Tito&#8217;s Yugoslavia, if it survives, would provide an answer. I read Taylor&#8217;s book during the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and I thought that, indirectly, it was the most useful book to explain why such a nation cannot exist in Central and Eastern Europe. I never thought that I would have to go back to AJP Taylor to understand the break-up of Ukraine, but in reality the same pattern existed there too and it is not impossible to think that it may spread further East, to the Russian Federation.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Destruction and despair]]></title><description><![CDATA[A review of &#8220;A Sentimental Journey 1917-1922&#8221; by Viktor Shklovsky]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/destruction-and-despair</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/destruction-and-despair</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 18:50:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d1689d5f-b811-4f81-a6e3-3d40dd2eceae_355x413.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png" width="355" height="413" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:413,&quot;width&quot;:355,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:198661,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/220244505?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l8d4!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F60455b5e-f586-4de2-979a-69653b689fdf_355x413.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The first Russian Revolution happened in February 1917; the second, more famous, in October, and the Civil War, caused by that revolution and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, lasted until 1921. At first, in 1917, the Russian Army continued reluctantly fighting against the Germans and Austrians, then stopped, and Russia at Brest-Litovsk surrendered one-third of its pre-war population, one-half of industry, and 90% of coal capacity. The former Empire disintegrated into numerous independent entities, including most importantly Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. It was a period of immense change and incredible suffering. Almost as many Russian citizens are estimated to have been killed in the Civil War (1.2 million) as during the First World War proper (1.8 million). But during the Civil War, some 5 million died from starvation and 2 million from disease. Thus the &#8220;cost&#8221; of the Civil War comes to some 8 million dead dwarfing Russian military losses in the First World War. (The data are from Niall Ferguson, <em>The Pity of War</em>, p. 391ff). It was the &#8220;time of troubles&#8221; which in many respects resembles what we see today in the same part of the world.</p><p>The subject of a memoir written by Viktor Shklovsky, the famous Russian and Soviet art critic, the founder of the Formalist school of literary criticism, is that period: 1917 to 1922. Shklovsky was a direct participant, and witness. to the enormous destruction of the country, dislocation of peoples, and devastation of the land which followed upon the two revolutions. Politically Shklovsky was close to the SRs (Socialist Revolutionary Party, heir to the 19th century populists) and was several times interrogated by the Cheka, including most seriously in 1922, when he was arrested. This was just before a giant trial of SR leadership, accused to have politically prepared the assassinations of Bolshevik leaders, including the failed one of Lenin. The irony of fate would have Bukharin play the role of the prosecutor in the trial. Despite having the support of people like Maksim Gorky and Yakov Sverdlov, Shklovsky thought it more prudent to leave the Soviet Union, and the second part of <em>Sentimental Journey</em> was written in Berlin in 1922. The book was published in Russian in 1923 and in English in 1970. Shklovsky returned to the Soviet Union in the 1920s, continued working there, became internationally famous, and died in Moscow in 1984 &#8211;just before Gorbachev came to power&#8212;at the age of ninety-one.</p><p>But all of that came later. The memoir deals with the period from the February Revolution to the end of the Civil War. It is not a real memoir, since Shklovsky writes much less about himself than about others and the war; it is more of a <em>compte-rendu</em> of the incredible wreckage the country went through. At the time of the February Revolution Shklovsky was with the Russian Army on the Western Front. He was then moved, in a general disarray, with his unit to Persia where he witnessed not so much the war between Russia and Turkey but ethnic warfare between Persians, Kurds, Turks and Aissors (the last group Christian) all merrily slaughtering each other, burning villages and pillaging. Russian army made its own contribution to the carnage.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&#8220;We had gone to a foreign country, occupied it, added to its gloom and violence our violence, laughed at its laws, hampered its trade, refused to let it open any factories and supported the shah. And for this purpose we kept troops&#8212;kept them there even after the revolution. It was imperialism&#8212;what is more, Russian imperialism, which is to say, stupid imperialism.&#8221; (p. 78)</p><p>The amount of slaughter described by Shklovsky is incredible, far surpassing what we read in other World War I narratives by Remarque, Barbusse, Hemingway: whoever believes that there is a similarity between the wars that are being fought on land, with marauding troops, and constantly changing control of the territory, and the wars that are being fought through bombing or in trenches is terribly mistaken and should, among other things, read this book.</p><p>&#8220;The town was divided into sectors; each company pillaged its own sector. To be able to see better, they set the town on fire.&#8221; (p. 94)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&#8220;Right there by the road, under a bush lay a dead man; he lay still. Next to him the soldiers were calmly having a breakfast of Austrian canned goods, setting the cans on the corpse.&#8221; (p. 44)</p><p>&#8220;A rifle--especially a Russian one&#8212;is a treasure in the East. At the beginning of our retreat, the Persians gave two to three thousand rubles for a rifle&#8230;For the sake of comparison consider the price of the women abducted from Persia and from the Caucasus by our soldiers. In Feodosia [in Crimea], for example, a woman cost 15 rubles used and 40 rubles unused and she was yours forever.&#8221; (p. 110)</p><p>After Persia, Shklovsky went to Petrograd and Moscow and then to Kiev. (Amid all this destruction, the reader is surprised that the trains still operate more or less regularly; for sure, they do not run according to the time-table, but they nevertheless bring you from Kurdistan to Moscow in several days.) Petrograd is sullen, cold and hungry. Kiev is more lively, not the least because different armies succeed each other. At first, Russian bourgeoisie fled to Kiev,</p><p>&#8220;It was the time when the entire Russian bourgeoisie was assembled in the Ukraine, when the Ukraine was occupied by Germans; but the Germans hadn&#8217;t quite picked it clean [robbed it of food]. Three-color flags [German] were flying in the streets.&#8221; (p. 157)</p><p>But then,</p><p>&#8220;There were the following forces in the Ukraine. In Kiev, Skoropadsky {Ukrainian hetman brought as a puppet government by Germans], supported by the Russian officers. They didn&#8217;t know themselves why they were supporting him, but that&#8217;s what Henaud [French diplomat] has ordered. All around Kiev was Petlyura, with an entire army.&#8221; (p. 158)</p><p>How was the war fought in Kherson? When the Whites controlled it: &#8220;The list of those who had been shot hung on the walls. Fifteen men a day. Very regular. And the last five were always Jewish names&#8212;to show that there was no discrimination.&#8221; (p. 208). Or when Ukrainians nationalists were in charge: &#8220;[Ukrainians] generally shot Bolsheviks as Russians and Russians as Bolsheviks&#8221;. (p. 159)</p><p>After &#8220;working&#8221; for the SRs in the Ukraine, Shklovsky returns to Petrograd where he is, thanks to his literary connections, housed in an artist colony&#8212;even as his conspiratorial work on behalf of SR (which is never explained but only hinted) continues.</p><p>&#8220;The classrooms were not heated. The life of the unit was concentrated on the commissary. A pound of bread was issued every day, as well as herring, several grams of rye and a piece of sugar. When you got home, it was terrible to look at these puny portions. As if you were being mocked.&#8221; (p. 180)</p><p>&#8220;A friend of mine burned his library. That was horrible work. You have to tear all the pages out of the books and wad them up.&#8221; (p 235). (The sentence illustrates perfectly the dry, detached, almost cold style with which the memoir is written.)</p><p>&#8220;Part of this [artists&#8217;] building had once been occupied by the Central Bank. I got hold of the key to the bank, walked in, and my head started swimming. Rooms, rooms, and more rooms on the side facing Nevsky prospect, rooms facing Morskaya Street, still more rooms facing the Moika canal. Open safes, the whole floor littered with papers, receipts books. manila folders. With the folders alone, I kept my stove going nearly a year.&#8221; (p 235)</p><p>How did Bolsheviks organize the economy?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&#8220;They wanted to organize everything so that the sun would rise on schedule and the weather would be made in their chancellery.&#8221; (p. 189)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">&#8220;You heard such incredible stories! Milk is being collected: the order says to take all the milk to such-and-such place by such-and-such day. But there aren&#8217;t any containers. so it is poured on the ground.&#8221; (p. 181)</p><p>The style is self-contained, almost na&#239;ve. The sentences are short, telegraph-like, written with sang-froid. Although the book is broadly-speaking chronological, the links between various events are not explained nor discussed. We do not know, once the army disintegrates, why Shklovsky moves from one city to another. It reminds me of the &#8220;cinema-verit&#233;&#8221; of another Russian artist of that time, Dziga Vertov: the same aimless trams running through deserted streets of Petrograd, stores closed, boarded, hunger omni-present.</p><p>The relevance of books like Shklovsky&#8217;s is not only historical, even if that part is important too. Many famous people make cameo appearances in the book: Kerensky, Gorky, Nikolai Sukhanov (the chronicler of the Revolution), the early Cheka, and towards the end Mandelstam (&#8220;He writes his poems with people around and reads them line by line, day by day&#8221;), Anna Akhmatova, Gumilyov (&#8220;He was alien to me and it is hard for me to write about him. There was no need to kill him&#8221;), Blok (&#8220;He died harder than Gumilyov: he died of despair&#8221;).</p><p>But the memoir, read today, brings the thoughts of repetition of history. In many cases the problems of today are nearly identical to the problems of one-hundred years ago. Nothing has been solved. The question then becomes: at what point in history do certain problems go away? When does history of something end? For it surely&#8212;for some issues&#8212;does end. Nobody is fighting for Caesar vs. Pompey today. But for other issues like the Middle East some of the actors are slightly different, but the war goes on. The same question can be asked today for the part of Eurasia that Shklovsky&#8217;s book describes.</p><p></p><p></p><p>NB. The book is published (Dalkey Archive Press,1970) with two excellent introductions: literary (by Richard Sheldon) and historical (by Sidney Monas).</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Against purposeful activity and Abrahamic religions in a world of abundance]]></title><description><![CDATA[A note on Keynes&#8217; &#8220;Economic Possibilities&#8230;&#8221;]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/against-purposeful-activity-and-abrahamic</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/against-purposeful-activity-and-abrahamic</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:29:29 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/dcd6b305-ae4e-4e76-b3ca-480c10807aaa_231x352.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png" width="231" height="352" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:352,&quot;width&quot;:231,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:120152,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/217896840?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Rhv5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333647e3-c7af-478d-af49-9444990efe0c_231x352.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In a recent discussion regarding the &#8220;forthcoming abundance&#8221; produced by artificial intelligence and reduced need for human labor --seemingly a beautiful future&#8212;I cited, as many people do, Keynes&#8217; somewhat enigmatic and multi-layered 1930 short essay <a href="http://www.econ.yale.edu/smith/econ116a/keynes1.pdf">&#8220;The Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren&#8221;</a>. What is relevant from that piece in the current context are Keynes&#8217; extremely optimistic forecasts of economic growth: four- to eight-fold increase in average per capita income in advanced countries in the next one hundred years which turned out to be right on the spot; his view that such material abundance would lead to much lower need for labor and hence a workweek of about 15 hours; and finally his dilemma on whether humanity &#8211;having finally solved &#8220;the economic problem&#8221;&#8212;will know how to use all these extra hours of freedom and leisure. In that short latter discussion, there is an unmistakable similarity between Keynes of &#8220;The Economic Possibilities..&#8221; and Marx of &#8220;The German Ideology&#8221;: both holding an optimistic view that free time will enable us to fully express our human nature, by getting rid of the stultifying and numbing division of labor and (to use Marx&#8217;s example), &#8220;to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon&#8230;criticise [art] after dinner&#8221;. Keynes has a similar optimistic view that the solution of the economic problem which has, for millennia, eluded humanity will set us on a path of freedom from constraint and of flourishment of all human capabilities. Similarities in that respect between Marx and Keynes are very strong and perhaps worth exploring further. And contrasting with what we believe now&#8212;which may be far less optimistic.</p><p>What struck me however in this new reading of &#8220;The Economic Possibilities&#8230;&#8221; is something which I overlooked before and which I think, for &#8220;political&#8221; purposes, Keynes mentioned but failed to elaborate. This is Keynes&#8217; rejection of purposeful activity as desirable for humankind once the economic problem has been solved, and doubt on whether monotheistic religions will be needed once we reach abundance.</p><p>The reasoning goes as follows. To solve the &#8220;economic problem&#8221;, there are, according to Keynes, four requirements: low population growth, absence of war, technological progress, and most importantly, saving and accumulation of capital. In order to accumulate capital, one has to display an uncommon and unusual&#8212;and in some sense anti-human&#8212;ability to defer gratification: instead of seeking pleasure in a thing or activity itself and now, one uses money to invest in a project whose return is uncertain and may lie far in the future. An economically advanced society is possible only if enough people with resources internalize this principle of deferred gratification&#8212;which is strictly speaking alien to humans: we want nice things whether good coffee, beautiful shoes, or great vacation, right now and we want them as such, not in the abstract form of accumulated money in a bank account. In other words, hedonism, pleasure now, is a normal and healthy human trait; &#8220;abstinence&#8221;, abstract enjoyment of future pleasures, is peculiar, and in some ways, even &#8220;morbid&#8221; custom, what Marx called &#8220;abstract hedonism&#8221;. The natural tendency to enjoy activities in themselves rather than to engage into activities whose fruits lie in the future has been overturned by those who do not discount future pleasures and it is to them that we owe economic growth.</p><p>But&#8212;and this is key&#8212;what happens when we have reached the &#8220;realm of freedom&#8221; and do not need to accumulate anymore? That ability -from being indispensable in the time of scarcity&#8212;is suddenly seen for what it is, an almost &#8220;semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensit[y] which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.&#8221; It is no longer needed, and, if continued to be engaged into, shows almost a personal flaw: inability to live in the moment (as every yoga teacher will tell you); to enjoy activities <em>as such</em>, not to conduct purposeful activities whose pay offs lie far in the future.</p><p>Where does this uncommon ability come from? Keynes makes here a most interesting &#8220;detour&#8221; and links deferment of pleasure with monotheistic religions that likewise promise the benefits of future happy life at some undefined, and empirically unverifiable, future. Here is Keynes&#8217; very important paragraph, where the allusion is only directed to Judaism but the implications clearly carry over to the other two Abrahamic religions:</p><p>&#8220;Perhaps it is not an accident that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart and essence of our religions has also done most for the principle of compound interest and particularly loves this most purposive of human institutions.&#8221;</p><p>Abrahamic religions have been extremely useful in leading people to engage in activities whose results come at some faraway future. Without acceptance of having one&#8217;s deserts being postponed no-one would save, and no capital would be accumulated. The habit of that deferment and its validation, or praise, come from the postponement built into Judaism, Christianity and Islam (although only the first is tacitly implied) where the future pleasures were promised to those who deny to themselves earthly enjoyments. The religious abnegation and the promise of salvation on the one hand, and the deferment of economic gratification on the other, needed each other and worked hand-in-hand. (There are, of course, echoes of Max Weber here.)</p><p>But once &#8220;the economic problem&#8221; solved, we can abandon this unnatural postponement of pleasure. We can find pleasure in activities as such &#8211;not in what the activity might bring us in the future&#8212;and then the religions that teach us otherwise become redundant and even nefarious. Although Keynes does not draw this implication fully, I think we are right to simply extent by just one additional step, the argument that he has so carefully constructed, laying it, as it were, brick-by-brick: that in a world of abundance, monotheistic religions are no longer needed, because pleasure need not be deferred, and savings and investment are not necessary. All will be consumption. And daily pleasure.*</p><p>It might have perhaps been difficult for Keynes, given the ideological situation in the United Kingdom in the 1930s, his semi-official role in the government, and also the already present view of him of being somewhat of a maverick to explicitly draw this implication for us&#8212;but I believe that whoever reads his essay today, cannot miss to make this simple next step, all the elements of which are nicely and clearly laid out by Keynes.</p><p></p><p></p><p>* I am aware that Niall Ferguson has (unfairly) criticized Keynes for this.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[My cousin, a non-person]]></title><description><![CDATA[A twentieth-century story]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/my-cousin-a-non-person</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/my-cousin-a-non-person</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 03:31:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8d2c5b7e-a4e1-4a85-9517-4a425b2a1965_749x448.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png 424w, 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!P0Vd!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2807fcc4-5e4f-47c0-86d4-b72b03b1d0c4_749x448.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div 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fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>When I was growing up, as a kid, our <em>mater familias</em>, was my (second-cousin) aunt. For reasons that are too complicated to explain she was the center of my mother&#8217;s family. She was a dentist with an established practice before the World War. She married an engineer, and they were a standard East European affluent middle class urban family. They survived the German occupation of Belgrade, Serbian collaborationist right-wing regime, Communist take-over and when I was a kid they lived in a very big and plush apartment in downtown Belgrade. They were the first people to own a TV. My father and I would walk bristly in the afternoons of the Summer 1960s to watch Wilma Rudolph and Valeryi Brumel and various javelin throwers break world records at the  Olympics in Rome.</p><p>At several annual occasions, either Slava (Serbian celebrations after one&#8217;s patron saint) or Orthodox Christmas, my aunt would throw big dinner parties, for about 10-12 people. She spent some time in France and had the French approach to dinners: beautifully served, with white tablecloth and starched napkins, deserts and cheese at the end. I think we, including myself as a kid, learned how dinners should be served from her. I still do like it that way. I hate when hosts play &#8220;democracy&#8221; and ask everybody to bring whatever they want to eat, or they deliver some mediocre half-cooked food. My aunt treated dinners as serious affairs.</p><p>My aunt and her husband and their son remained part of the urban bourgeoisie. They did well and no one ever discussed politics during these dinners. I did not notice that until years later, but the absence of politics did not bother me when I was a child.</p><p>Only from time to time, and this very seldom, would the conversation mention that the four sisters had a brother. Like all young kids I took the dead as having been dead forever; in other words of never having existed. But as I grew older and perhaps asked my mother, I figured out that there was an unmentionable brother: there were four sisters <strong>and</strong> a brother. But where was the brother? Why almost no one ever said a word about him? Even his name was rarely pronounced.</p><p>Who was he? Like many young people in the 1920s he chose a military career. He became an officer in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He swore the oath of allegiance to the King, as every military officer would. But in secret, he was a Communist at the time when the Communist party was banned and its members killed, exiled or jailed. When Germany attacked Yugoslavia in 1941, he fought bravely. For some reason his regiment did not surrender, and he did not end up in the German POW camp (<em>not</em> annihilation camp) as majority of Serbian officer corps (including my father) did. He joined Tito and Yugoslav Communists who fought against fascists and &#8220;domestic traitors&#8221;. He fought for four years and his military knowledge probably helped him advance in the Yugoslav People&#8217;s Army (JNA) ranks.</p><p>In 1945, Yugoslav partisans, helped significantly and crucially by the Red Army (a thing often forgotten today), liberated the country. Partisans were now in power. My cousin remained an officer, a Yugoslav People&#8217;s Army officer now&#8212;although I do not know at what level&#8212;probably a major or a colonel.</p><p>In 1948, Stalin decided (for reasons that have forever remained obscure) to excommunicate Tito and Yugoslav Communists. Communist Party members, and especially those in the military and the security services that were the backbone of the regime, were asked to declare themselves whether they supported Tito or Stalin. It was far from clear that Tito would win, and even less clear that Tito was ideologically right and Stalin wrong. Some either declared themselves for Stalin, or were seen to be likely to support the Soviet Union, or were simply accused to be pro-Stalinist by others envious of their jobs. They were thus jailed.</p><p>About 10,000 people, all Communist Party cadres, ended up being imprisoned, including most famously on an island in the Adriatic, called Goli Otok which in Croatian/Serbian means &#8220;naked island&#8221; giving the idea about the physical landscape of the place. Many were subjected to the usual Gulag-like torture except that this time the Gulag-like torture was applied to the Stalinists (or those accused as such).</p><p>My cousin for the reasons I do not know&#8212;and I am not sure my aunts knew either--- ended up on the Island. It was said, under the breath, that he was particularly harshly treated because having once violated his oath to serve the King, his second oath to serve Tito and Yugoslavia was considered by those who accused him of betrayal, to be equally superficial or artful. He was, of course, considered a traitor. Which for an ideological delit d&#8217;opinion is a total nonsense. But this is how people thought then and how they think today.</p><p>HIs wife was a Slovenian (Communist) lady with whom the family remained on very good terms throughout. Once, around 1950, when Tito visited Ljubljana, she threw herself&#8212;prostrated herself&#8212;in front of Tito&#8217;s car to attract the attention to the fate of her husband. She was, of course, lifted up and picked up by the security services and told not to try it again. (Nothing else happened to her.)</p><p>My cousin was released in 1951 or 1952. He soon died from pneumonia or whatever weakened his body during the prison time. The traumatized family thought that politics should never be mentioned or much less discussed. I do not know where he was buried. I do not think anyone knows. He remained present only in half-hushed conversations. He became a true non-person, even in his own family.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Three types of literature regarding the world of AI]]></title><description><![CDATA[Economics, politics and philosophy for a new era]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/three-types-of-literature-regarding</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/three-types-of-literature-regarding</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 08:07:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8de4fb30-b1c9-43db-8467-501baed21ab5_413x262.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png" width="413" height="262" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:262,&quot;width&quot;:413,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:156922,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/215620337?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y-qp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4b4a2fc2-7963-4ad9-bc4a-688653925014_413x262.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>I feel somewhat embarrassed to contribute to the deluge of the articles on artificial intelligence. I did my part already: in a piece that looked at how digital communication is </span><a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/note-on-new-technologies-in-china"><span>changing everyday life in China</span></a><span>, in another on </span><a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/artificial-intelligence-and-future"><span>how Marx and neo-classics might look at the role of artificial intelligence</span></a><span>, and more recently on what would be a social structure of a new </span><a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/sketching-the-new-dysto-utopian-world"><span>dystopian society some people fear</span></a><span>. This last piece, combined with my writings on US homoploutia and additional contributions by Nils Gilman, is the basis of a joint article about to be published in Noema magazine.</span></p><p><span>So why do I write again? Do I have anything new to say? In truth, not. But I would like to try to systematize the writings on AI because there are many pieces that deal with everything mixed up, with all possible and imaginable effects of AI. This is exactly the type of writings we have when faced with an important phenomenon whose contours can be guessed only vaguely. But at least we should be able to distinguish between different issues and corresponding literature that AI brings up.</span></p><p><span>First, there are economic and sociological articles about the impact of AI. They deal with the increase of the share of national income going to capital, and surplus population that may be displaced by AI and unable to find new jobs. AI is viewed here as any other labor-substituting technology: it reduces &#8211;for a given overall output&#8212;labor input. Still, it may be complementary to some kinds of labor while substitute for others. We mostly see nowadays the substitution part: software programmers, translators, lawyer assistants, taxi drivers. teachers etc. But there may be also people whose skills may be enhanced by AI, and who may thus command a higher wage. Nevertheless, the overall share received by capital is likely to increase because the capital intensity of production (the K/L ratio) will go up, and the profit rate may remain the same, or even increase&#8212;and for sure, we believe, it will not go down so as to offset the entire increase in capital intensity of production. Income of capitalists is likely to increase because AI companies are owned by actual people and these people, like shareholders in general, are well-off. Thus the rise in the capital share also means rising incomes of the rich and higher inequality of income.</span></p><p><span>What can be done then? There are, in my opinions, three possible ways to deal with it.</span></p><p><span>(A) Introduce guaranteed minimum income for all the surplus population released from jobs. This may solve the economic problem but may lead to psychological or sociological problems. I wrote about them before, so there is no need to repeat it here.</span></p><p><span>(B) Spread ownership of capital more widely by, for example, giving to each citizen a non-resalable equity in top AI companies. If capital share goes up but more people, at various income levels, own capital, overall income inequality need not increase.</span></p><p><span>(C) Nationalize AI companies. This seems a reasonable option given what the proponents and researchers of AI are saying: that the competition among different companies is so intense, the monetary gains tantalizing close and enormous so that no one has the time nor interest to look at potentially catastrophic consequences that the adaptive IA may bring to the entire humanity. The more we believe that IA may cause non-specified and unpredictable problems, the stronger the argument for its control by the state. Profits generated by AI may be placed in a sovereign fund with proceeds to be distributed to all citizens. Options B and C are similar in distributional outcomes, but the key difference is in the control. Under B, companies are not controlled by any outside entity. Under C, they are, and they are so not primarily for economic reasons. This brings us to the next issue--beyond economics.</span></p><p><span>The second strand of literature looks at the ideology of key founders in the AI industry, and (it may be a bit exaggerated to say) at the AI movement. An example of this literature is a recent </span><a href="https://weltinnenpolitik.substack.com/p/reading-max-weber-in-the-age-of-ai"><span>excellent essay (&#8220;Reading Max Weber in the Age of AI&#8221;) by Nicholas Mulder</span></a><span>. The ideology of founders is here perhaps more important than the ideology of earlier inventors and industrialists (Edison, Tesla, Ford or Carnegie), because the founders do not see AI just as a simple labor-replacement technology but as a force that would fundamentally change our lives and even redefine what it means to be human. When dealing with such life-changing events, the ideology of those who are leading us to that future requires some scrutiny. Quinn Slobodian and Ben Taroff do this in </span><a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/muskism-quinn-slobodianben-tarnoff?variant=43838135402530"><span>&#8220;Muskism: A Guide for the Perplexed</span></a><span>&#8221;. The book looks at the ideology of Silicon Valley tycoons because it is their view of the world that drives the new technologies. Technologies are not neutral, but political. Money is indeed one of the incentives, but not the only one. A mixture of millennialism, eugenics, search for utopia and for a spread of the specie beyond the confines of the Earth, are all elements we find among the founders&#8217; views. These ideas may matter to us not only through the technology they are developing, but also through their readiness to use political means and political power which they increasingly have, to bring about a society that may be consistent with the new technologies. Or at least, to bring about the society they like. This is transforming political life in many countries. The founders seem to reinforce the trend toward depoliticization which was already present during neoliberal globalization (by e.g. extracting from popular control many bodies allegedly run better by experts). Silicon Valley tycoons would like to exempt from popular control much more than that. The entire political life can be replaced by technologically-made decisions. If economic companies bloom under centralized control of superior managers and owners, why would not similarly smart technological decisions make societies more efficient?</span></p><p><span>The third strand of thought is philosophical. It asks the question raised a </span><a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/09/09/anthropic-insiders-warn-ai-could-kill-all-humans"><span>few days ago in a form of alarm by Jacob Coxon</span></a><span>, one of the Anthropic researchers, namely that AI robots may at one point, when their actions are entirely autonomous, finish off the humans. A similar idea is expressed in a </span><a href="https://www.hoover.org/events/obsolescence-horse-predicting-future-humanity-world-dominated-artificial-intelligence"><span>nice paper by Matthew Lowenstein</span></a><span> (&#8220;The Obsolescence of the Horse: Predicting the Future of Humanity in the World Dominated by Artificial Intelligence&#8221;) who views humans as horses of yesterday. Horses multiplied over the ages as they were used by humans for many things from agriculture to transport. But as the areas where horses were used were mechanized, horses lost their utility and their number in the world plummeted. Could not, Lowenstein implies, humans be kept for a while but as the superior race of AIs finds them of less and less use, gradually be reduced in numbers and perhaps even eliminated?</span></p><p><span>A similar line of thought looks at humans and wonders if we might have been created by a different specie whom we, once sufficiently powerful, eliminated. Finally, this line of thinking &#8211;into which I will not further indulge since I do not have enough knowledge&#8212;leads us to ask questions such as what is the definition of life and whether mental and physical world may be entirely separated.</span></p><p><span>And, for the end, we cannot totally leave aside the possibility that AI will not live up to the promises and fears it currently generates. Not only may it not become as profitable as its creators and owners claim&#8212;it could instead become a huge financial bubble. It could happen even that its economic effects are overestimated. I do not think that the analogy holds fully but I do remember the craziness of even very educated and smart people as Y2K approached. Stores were supposed to run out of goods, hungry people to roam cities in search of food, and planes not able to fly. But in that case, we went back to the prior reality rather quickly as January 1, 2000 was followed 24 hours later by January 2, 2000.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Lions of today, sheep of tomorrow]]></title><description><![CDATA[Review of Odd Arne Westad&#8217;s &#8220;The Coming Storm&#8221;]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/lions-of-today-sheep-of-tomorrow</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/lions-of-today-sheep-of-tomorrow</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:24:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/8b036ab0-6dfd-4f9b-9bfe-b7000072e6f7_324x413.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png" width="324" height="413" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vdfo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F483a3348-c8a8-4740-8d49-734e8a0868e0_324x413.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Odd Arne Westad&#8217;s recently released book <em><a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250410283/thecomingstorm/">The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict, and Warnings from History</a> </em>is the product of Westad&#8217;s The Great Strategy Seminar held at Yale University. (Arne very kindly gifted the book to me at a conference.) The book&#8217;s principal objective is to look at great power behavior in a multipolar world (that is, in a world with more than two superpowers) and to draw lessons from the First World War. This rather short book (220 pages) can be broadly divided into three parts. The first describes today&#8217;s multipolar world and how it succeeded to, what is now seen as, the episode of unipolarity when the United States was the only &#8220;hyperpower&#8221; militarily, politically, and not least importantly, ideologically. The second part goes over the well-trodden path of the causes for the First World War, but with an eye to the present situation. The third part looks at the possible flashpoints in the months or years to come that could produce a conflict between at least two great powers and drag the world into a world war. (The last part of less than a dozen pages is a very powerful plea (a <em>plaidoyer</em>) for a world without great power wars; wars that might, before we engage in them, sometime mislead us to believe that they could provide clean and neat solutions which, Westad writes, is almost never the case. Wars between great powers are to be avoided&#8212;almost at any cost. These last dozen pages should be, I hope, distributed to all the members of the UN Security Council&#8212;just as a reminder.)</p><p>Westad believe that the main conflict today is between China and the United States. And that the most important region of the world is East Asia. That conflict, as many people have noted, is similar to the conflict between Great Britain and Germany at the time when the most important part of the world was Europe. Without going into all the details, which have been written about extensively, as to why Germany and England on the one hand, and China and the US on the other, are &#8220;pre-destined&#8221; for hegemonic conflict, let us note that, according to Westad, China&#8217;s main problem is being surrounded by unfriendly powers (&#8220;encirclement&#8217;), and the US main problem is overstretch. Indeed, China, in Westad&#8217;s view, is hemmed in from all sides: from the North by Japan and South Korea, in the middle by the Philippines, and most importantly from the South and South East by Indonesia (a country of almost 300 million people that shares uneasy past with China), Vietnam with whom China fought its last war some 50 years ago, and India, which in Westad&#8217;s view, is China&#8217;s implacable enemy and with whom China shares a disputed border in the Himalayas. And this leaves out the most likely flashpoint, Taiwan&#8212;which indeed is not a military threat to China but could early be the cause of a war with the United States.</p><p>Continuing with the WW1 analogy, Russia is seen as Austria-Hungary: a senescent multi-ethnic power whose influence and strength are on the wane but which uses war to convince itself and others that it is still a force to be reckoned with. It relies, the way that Austria-Hungary relied on Germany, on China. Both China and Germany are to some extent reluctant allies with whom respectively Russia and Austria-Hungary, only a couple of decades earlier fought short wars (Austria vs Germany in 1866, and China vs. Russia in 1969), but the Great Power politics leave neither to Germany then, nor to China today any other option but to support Austria and Russia. As a Chinese political scientist once told me, &#8220;Putin has hijacked China&#8217;s foreign policy.&#8221;</p><p>One would think at this moment that Ukraine must, by analogy, be today&#8217;s Serbia. And indeed the analogy works rather well: Europe, on that reading, becomes the France of 1914. But Westad does not take that path, mainly, I believe, because of his idea that the key area of contest between China and the US is not in Europe but in East Asia. (Of course, one could counter-argue that the key area of contest between England and Germany was naval and that the Balkans thus accidentally turned out to the place where the conflict flared up, but as I said, Westad does not accept that.).</p><p>In his analogy, the France of today is India. India is a country for which Westad sees a very bright future (&#8220;India seems to be in a better position to advance than any other Major Power&#8221;, p. 87): its population is the largest in the world, its growth rate is relatively high, it is a global power in new technologies, it is a resilient if imperfect democracy, and its political system is not as brittle as Chinese may be when the issues of succession arise. In Modi India has a nationalist leader who like Bismarck in Prussia, Meiji in Japan or Louis Napoleon in France promotes nationalism (actually, Hinduism) and delivers strong economic growth.</p><p>With India being the new France, the coalition becomes US plus India vs. China and Russia with the key trigger in East Asia. Of course, Westad&#8217;s approach is not so mechanical; he does not push the analogy too far, to an unreasonable length, but there are several factors that lead him to the conclusion that the most dangerous area today for a Great Power conflict is East Asia: it is economically the fastest growing region in the world, it is the home of the key challenger (China), it is the area of interest to the emerging major power, India, and the place where the United States is politically committed but may also be overstretched.</p><p>If we agree on this assumption, we have to look at the most likely candidates to trigger a big war. Taiwan easily wins that race. Here Westad supports US policy of strategic ambiguity. On the one hand, US cannot fully commit to the defense of Taiwan because it may lead Taiwan to act recklessly and unilaterally; on the other hand, it has to read the Shanghai communiqu<span>&#233;</span> sufficiently vaguely not to give the carte blanche to China. The same policy, Westad writes, was that of England before WW1. It did not have a formal military alliance with Russia and its alliance with France was sufficiently vague that England could decide, on the spot, whether to go to war or not. (The only firm commitment England gave was to Belgium regarding its neutrality). So far, so good. But then Westad does criticize English policy for not unambiguously stating to Germany that it will support France and Russia: &#8220;The only factor that could have prevented a world war after Austria&#8217;s attack [on Serbia] would have been a clear and public British commitment to support the Franco-Russian alliance&#8221; (p 156). Yet there is a problem here. When events happen one after another with high speed, as they did in the Summer of 1914, and they would even more so in a run-up to a future war, the time left within which a big nation can readjust its policies is extraordinarily short. The window of opportunity during which, according to Westad, England could have prevented the outbreak of the War, by giving Germany the signal that the ambiguity was over, was 48 hours&#8212;if that. Similarly, in a war for Taiwan that window of opportunity for the United States could be an hour&#8212;if that. One then wonders if the policy of &#8220;strategic ambiguity&#8221; which, as Westad argues, has a lot to commend itself, may not also be ultimately self-defeating&#8212;in the sense that rather than preventing the war it becomes simply irrelevant, overtaken by the events rather than driving them.</p><p>The book was released in 2026 but the manuscript was probably completed in the first half of 2025. It shows how rapidly the current situation is evolving. The role of Iran is discussed in passing in the way it was usually done before the second US/Israel attack on Iran: as a regional annoyance. The problem of the Straits of Hormuz is not mentioned. Very few people expected that Trump would light-heartedly start another war, and even fewer expected that Iran would respond with such a strength that the strategic initiative &#8211;not unlike in the Ukraine-Russia war&#8212;would be on the side of the defenders.<span> </span>Not on the side of the attackers as the World War I doctrine almost unanimously held. Perhaps another case where WW1 analogy may not hold.</p><p>The book also shows how marginal are the areas of Africa and Latin America. The great power wars are likely to be fought again on the Eurasian continent (including its islands) with the participation of the United States. Africa and Latin Ameca are hardly mentioned, except as possible sources of raw materials. The only (mild) exception to that is Brazil that Westad considers as a potential South American hegemon and as a country that has recently, especially within BRICS, taken a recognizable and more assertive international role.</p><p>There is another omission which is made (but only to some extent) good in the last chapter of the book: NATO expansion is almost ignored&#8212;except, as I mentioned, at the end of the book (pp. 207-8) where its role in stimulating fear among the Russian elite is acknowledged. That reckless expansion is particularly dangerous because it lacks an end point. Nobody could (nor can) tell where NATO ends. It surely has nothing to do any more with the geographical area of the North Atlantic as it is difficult to see how Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Romania fit into that geography. But if it is open-ended, why could it not extend to Kazakhstan and Mongolia after having planned to expand to Ukraine and Georgia? Would China like to be fully encircled by NATO on its West and QUAD on its South and East? It seems obvious that, for the purposes of peace between Great Powers, NATO should have then, or today, defined its end-point. Strategic ambiguity here too seems of dubious value.</p><p>It is a quick read, an excellent book whose main virtue is not, in my opinion, direct analogy with the World War I, but a treatment of how in a multipolar world relatively small international events, misunderstandings, idiosyncratic fits of leaders, &#8220;hubris and fear&#8221; (as Westad often writes), resentment of the elite and of the public prodded by the media, can produce colossal miscalculations which then produce even more colossal wars and, in the era of the weapons of mass destruction, may end the civilization.<span> </span>We must not forget that WW1 was greeted with enthusiasm by leaders, almost all political parties, workers, and ordinary populace from all sides.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[On European hypocrisy and warmongering]]></title><description><![CDATA[When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the world reactions were predictable.]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/on-european-hypocrisy-and-warmongering</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/on-european-hypocrisy-and-warmongering</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 19:03:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/572768ef-b5f8-45f6-8b3d-7364598e9fcd_351x346.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png" width="351" height="346" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:346,&quot;width&quot;:351,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:227043,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/212896431?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!h29l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F076deb67-c283-4f29-834d-c48e7221e1ed_351x346.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the world reactions were predictable. The strongest reaction came from the United States, that saw itself as a guardian of the old system and possibly as a guarantor of Ukraine&#8217;s NATO eventual membership. Europe&#8217;s reaction was several octavos lower as it generally was during the Cold War. Finally, the rest of the world, while mostly condemning Russia for an obvious violation of the international law and UN rules, was not overly concerned.</p><p>Things have changed. They began changing already under Biden who, while very critical of Russia, including through the imposition of the most radical sanctions ever (with the seizure of private property and property of a government with which the United States was not at war), still observed some rules from the Cold War&#8212;namely avoidance of unnecessary escalations with a nuclear-armed power. This was evident in Biden&#8217;s policy that did not allow strikes on Russian territory. But even under Biden that policy was gradually abandoned and the US de facto entered the war through its selection and direct targeting of places in Russia.</p><p>Over the past two years, the situation has further evolved. The US has continued with a policy where it is a de facto participant in the war but has also shown a desire to wrap-up the conflict in one form or another. What was surprising is that the thirst for war has become almost insatiable in several European countries, principally in the Nordic and Baltic countries, but more recently also in Germany, and, for long-term historical reasons that go to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in the UK too.</p><p>The role of small countries&#8212;that through their geopolitical irresponsibility can wreck great damage to the world&#8212;tends to pass under the radar. The Nordic-Baltic coalition is essentially calling for a war with Russia, citing its own fears and traumas of Russian/Soviet control and occupation. Leaving aside the discussion about the full one-sidedness of such claims (could not Russians argue that the Latvian riflemen played a key role in the Russian revolution?), this type of warmongering by small nations is extraordinarily hypocritical. It is based on the idea that one can advocate for war but bear no consequence of such a war. It tries to do everything possible to make interests of great powers become entangled with interests of small powers so that great powers can fight it out, millions die, yet the objectives of small countries be satisfied after a general war.</p><p>This attitude is bad enough in itself&#8212;but what is worse is that there are clear historical precedents in Eastern Europe and the Middle East of similar policies that brought global cataclysms. Serbia was playing off Russia in the run-up to the First World War. Poland and Hungary participated in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia which paved the way for Nazi Germany to continue with aggressions. Israel has been playing up the United States for several decades in the Middle East, most obviously right now when the US entered the war against Iran &#8211;very similarly to the way Russia entered the war against Ukraine&#8212;without knowing why, or what are the political aims of that war. But the outcome arranges Israel because it weakens another Middle Eastern power and deepens the chaos in the region.</p><p>The world is now facing a similar situation where several countries, whose combined populations hardly reach the number of inhabitants of a Tier II Chinese city, want, in order to cure their frustrations and traumas, to plunge the entire world into a catastrophe that may more or less end civilization. It is an incredibly irresponsible policy. It is also hypocritical because it is based on the assumption that somebody else (in this case, the United States) will fight for them. For if they were so keen on the war and convinced of its moral value, why don&#8217;t enter it themselves? Why don&#8217;t they attack Russia directly and see what happens? It would be madness but at least it would not be irresponsible towards the rest of the world and not hypocritical.</p><p>Of course, the argument for a war (fought by somebody else) is that accepting to speak of a ceasefire along the current lines gives the advantage to the aggressor. But according to that logic, all wars should be fought until the end, until everybody is destroyed. There should never have been any negotiations. Diplomacy should not exist. The Korean war should be still fought&#8212;in fact, it probably would not because had the policies advocated by the Nordic-Baltic alliance been followed then (as McArthur wanted), we would have never been born and our parents or grandparents would have all died long ago.</p><p>The Nordic-Baltic alliance also forgets that if the cease-fire is established along the current lines of control, the territory of the Donbass etc. will indeed be controlled by Russia but no single country in the world would officially recognize it. Did they not notice that no country from the Commonwealth of Independent States has recognized it? Did they not notice that not even Belarus recognizes it? Such, indeed fragile, peace not only puts an end to today&#8217;s carnage, but leaves open a possibility of eventual long-term solution between Russia and Ukraine. Neither Putin, nor Zelensky, nor the social forces that support them are eternal. Things will change in Russia, and in Ukraine. Negotiations can take place in ten or twenty years&#8212;but at least people would be alive rather than dead.</p><p>They mention that it would lead to a &#8220;frozen conflict&#8221;. But is a frozen conflict worse than an open conflict? Is absence of death inferior to continued carnage? There are dozens of frozen conflicts all around the globe, from Cyprus to Kosovo to Western Sahara to Malvinas to Kashmir. Should we reopen them all? They are loath to answer the moral questions because the implicit value they place on Ukrainian lives is zero, and the implicit value they place on Russian dead is a plus. Consequently, an endless conflict is a positive sum game from their point of view.</p><p>Not only is the idea of an endless war immoral, but it plays with an immense risk of nuclear escalation. During the Cold War that risk was taken seriously by the two major powers. That&#8217;s why they had four binding nuclear agreements, all of which have lapsed. Today, people assume that nuclear weapons do not exist. This is an entirely invalid assumption, but even if there were just one-millionth probability of nuclear war happening, the costs of such a war are so immense (since such a war is uncontrollable), that every rational person&#8217;s calculation must be to do everything to avoid it.</p><p>The Nordic-Baltic warmongering under the current conditions is therefore (i) irresponsible, (ii) hypocritical, (iii) immoral, and (iv) flirts with a disaster of immense proportions.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The spirit of the nineties and the malaise of today]]></title><description><![CDATA[It does not require great originality nor insightfulness to contrast the world of the 1990s and that of today.]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-spirit-of-the-nineties-and-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-spirit-of-the-nineties-and-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 22:30:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1647df05-5a38-406c-a662-123a6643b685_519x419.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png" width="519" height="419" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:419,&quot;width&quot;:519,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:565794,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/211779993?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!j5XF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff157e93a-3473-4c5f-8a85-c0b910b61c94_519x419.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>It does not require great originality nor insightfulness to contrast the world of the 1990s and that of today. They are dramatically different in terms of distribution of economic power between nations and in terms of inequalities within nations. But they also differ in the ruling spirit, at least in the Western world.</p><p>Perhaps one can begin with Tocqueville&#8217;s characterization of a similar age in the 1830s France:</p><p><span>&#8220;The particular spirit of the middle class became the general spirit of government; it dominated foreign policy as well as internal affairs: an active spirit, industrious, often dishonest, generally orderly, bold out of vanity and egoism, timid by temperament, moderate in all things except in its taste for comfort, and mediocre; a spirit which, mingled with that of the people or of the aristocracy, can do wonders, but which alone, will never produce but a government without virtue and without grandeur.&#8221; (Tocqueville, </span><em><span>Souvenirs</span></em><span> [of 1848], my translation)</span></p><p>That spirit &#8220;bold out of vanity and egoism,&#8221; permeated societies within, and informed international politics. It was fundamentally born out of the defeat of Communism. It was an optimistic spirit of resuscitated capitalism brought to the front first by Margaret Thatcher and then Ronald Reagan, and Deng Xiaoping although he did not call it by that name. By the mid-1980s with Gorbachev in power in the USSR, the ideological ascendancy of capitalism as the way to organize the economy, and of liberalism as the way to organize society was reaching its peak.<span> </span>With the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, ideological and geopolitical dimensions were united. It was a triumph of an ideology, but equally a triumph of a set of Western countries. The two triumphs were distinct but in the minds of many of its beneficiaries they were seen as one: the triumph of the West was made possible by its adoption of a superior ideology. Nothing in principle impeded others of being equally successful if they accepted the same rules. Moreover, it was said, the catch-up in the technological and economic development that this would entail would not be resented by the then dominant powers because &#8211;and this was<span> </span>a significant part of the ideology&#8212;the world was &#8220;condemned&#8221; to live in peace and harmony. For does not trade between nations and individuals create a harmony of interests and a global market that can prosper only in peace, and do not &#8220;satisfied&#8221; democratic nations (to use John Rawls&#8217; terminology) not envy each other and not covet territory or riches and thus have no need for wars?</p><p>Was the spirit of the nineties really believed by those who professed it, and were they aware that they might have believed it because it was pleasing to them morally and materially? I had always had trouble finding an answer to that question. But I have no difficulty describing and locating that spirit, particularly because I lived through it in an environment which reflected it probably better than any other place in the world: in Washington, D.C., working for an international institution and then for a US think tank. I was at the cross-section of the spirit that emanated originally from the ruling classes of the United States, but by the early 1990s became accepted by everybody who mattered anywhere in the world. Everybody who mattered (that is, who had some amount of political and economic influence)&#8212;and these were the people I would meet in and around Washington, might have they arrived from whatever faraway county&#8212;believed in it. Or seemed to believe in it.</p><p>It was a spirit that saw violent conflict as obsolete, that believed that all issues can be set aright through technological advances or economic schemes. It saw the commercialization of all activities not only as desirable as such but as a tool toward more prosperous and peaceful world. If there was still a problem, it was because no technical solution for it was yet invented, or a market where the problem would be auctioned off and resolved had not been created. It was exactly the middle-class narrow spirit, as described by Tocqueville: sans grandeur, but quite unaware of it and not seeking it. It was not a bellicose spirit; it was pacific and trustful of perfectibility of man and society. It was teleological. It did not see history as cyclical, but as a straight upward line.</p><p>What many of its adherents did not perceive was that it also suited their own material interests. They did not want to look at that part, or most likely were reluctant to acknowledge it even to themselves, And, in fact, that part was not even apparent so long as their interests were in accord with the spirit of the time. What created problems and ultimately destroyed the spirit of the nineties was that material interests of many individuals and geopolitical interests of some nations were no longer served well by the spirit of the nineties.</p><p>Materially, the rise of China and more broadly of Asia lowered the economic position of Western middle classes, made their jobs redundant or precarious, while on the geopolitical stage, the rise of China challenged the dominant position of the United States. This double change (at the individual, and national levels) revealed deep inconsistencies in the spirit of the nineties. It was argued that the spirit was &#8220;sharing&#8221; and cosmopolitan; and indeed it was so long as the relative betterment of the Third World involved countries and peoples without significant power or role globally. But as soon as that betterment spread sufficiently (as it did with China), it was no longer desirable. So, one was forced to conclude: improvement in welfare of the poor is desirable only so long as it does not markedly affect the relative power and the position of the rich. Once such a caveat is made, though, the entire pacific and cosmopolitan spirit if the nineties is exposed as an ideological cover to service interests of the rich.</p><p>If we go farther and look at the concrete applications of that ostensibly generous and cosmopolitan spirit, we find increasing inconsistencies: it applied variously to friends and to others. In words of Mark Carney: &#8220;we knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false. That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim&#8221;. Political self-determination in one case was approved, while in another it was frowned upon; liberal principles of multiculturalism and intermingling were in one case celebrated; in the other they were excoriated; democracy, if it brought to power desirable parties was praised, but the same mechanism in the case of &#8220;bad delivery&#8221; was ignored.</p><p>The more the redistribution of economic and political power advanced, the more the contradiction in the spirit of the nineties became visible. Rules had to be applied with increasing inconsistency because ideological inconsistency was the only way to maintain material superiority. Thus the spirit of the nineties began its slow, and then accelerated, decomposition until it was revealed to have been no different than the spirit of many past ages: an ideology adopted and promoted by those classes that did well by its rules and had an interest to maintain it. Once that became obvious, the elaborate ideological scaffolding created to make the system appear as equitable and as promoting global welfare, collapsed as well. We were back to the traditional situation when covering one&#8217;s own interest in the cloth of some general human advantage was no longer credible&#8212;so we went to a more brutal, but in many ways more candid, times of open struggle motivated by own interests alone.</p><p></p><p></p><p>PS. Empirical evidence on some of the points made here is presented in my <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Great-Global-Transformation-Remaking-Economic/dp/0226846415">Great Global Transformation</a></em>.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Apocalypse, When?]]></title><description><![CDATA[On a new film about the Reagan-Gorbachev 1986 summit in Reykjavik]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/apocalypse-when</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/apocalypse-when</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 21:31:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e9d91ec8-07c5-4dc3-8327-d257a35cb8dc_249x349.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png" width="249" height="349" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:349,&quot;width&quot;:249,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:163550,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/211352646?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Jolj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F83e7e029-e6ba-47c8-9693-59a2ac98ebfb_249x349.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Thanks to a friend who got two free tickets I was able to see </span><em><a href="https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=the+brink+of+war+film&amp;&amp;mid=2CE2DD39C9605245E2C82CE2DD39C9605245E2C8&amp;churl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.youtube.com%2fchannel%2fUCQIjTyWmLEdsfqMQay0yGMA&amp;FORM=VAMGZC"><span>The Brink of War</span></a></em><span>, the new film by Michael Russell Gunn just a few days before its official release. The movie is about the famous and fateful summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986. Gorbachev came to power a year earlier and had already met Reagan in Geneva in 1985. He mulled the ideas of glasnost and perestroika, but it was a very early time and their meaning was as yet unclear. In foreign policy, Gorbachev, his key adviser Aleksander Yakovlev, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze (who also appears in the movie) promoted the so-called New Thinking. The Reykjavik meeting was to provide substance, or to test, the New Thinking. Reagan was in the sixth year of his presidency, with only two left. So while Gorbachev was, in a way, in the beginning of his mandate, Reagan was approaching the end. The age difference between the two leaders was substantial: Reagan was twenty years older.</span></p><p><span>The story of the Reykjavik summit is quite well known. The movie uses transcripts of the meetings and the memoirs of participants to present an almost documentary rendition of the two days of intense meetings, some of them t&#234;te-a-t&#234;te between Reagan and Gorbachev, and others with the full delegations. Raisa Gorbacheva and Nancy Reagan do play a role too, perhaps less in the movie that in real life.</span></p><p><span>The summit is famous because the two leaders came very close to the decision not only to limit nuclear arms, but to eliminate 50% of the stock held by each side within ten years. That was Gorbachev&#8217;s proposal. But them in a flight of fancy Reagan went even further and proposed total elimination of nuclear weapons. Obviously, his advisers were shocked. So was Gorbachev, who incredulously asked &#8211;--bested after having made an already extravagant proposal to destroy half of the arsenals&#8212;&#8220;All?&#8221;. Reagan nodded: &#8220;Yes, all&#8221;. But the idea then failed on one issue on which the leaders just could not compromise: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). When Gorbachev came to Reykjavik with the extravagant proposal of reducing nuclear weapons by half, he did it because he was aware that the Soviet Union could not maintain the arms race with the United States. It could not continue spending 15% of its GDP on weapons and simultaneously improve the welfare of its people. It had to go beyond Brezhnev&#8217;s &#8220;stagnation&#8221;. But he could not give nothing to his Military Industrial Complex, eager like all such complexes for more weapons and more money. He promised to give them the stop on the work on American SDI (with which Soviet marshals and generals were obsessed) in return for their acquiescence to deep nuclear cuts. So, for Gorbachev, a stop to the development of the SDI was a non-negotiable consideration; it was make-it or break-it.</span></p><p><span>For Reagan, SDI was seen as his legacy to the security of the American people. Sure, as he acknowledged to Gorbachev, US will not have to fear the USSR if all Soviet nuclear weapons were destroyed, but there could be other, &#8220;rogue&#8221;, actors that could still attack the Homeland. Who such nuclear-armed &#8220;rogue&#8221; actors in 1986 were is unclear. When we look at the countries that possessed nuclear weapons at the time, other than the two super powers (that held more than 90% of all weapons), there were only UK, France, China, India, and probably Israel. UK and France would be, Reagan assured Gorbachev, involved too in the massive cuts. Reagan would see to it. China was not mentioned by either leader; nor were India and Israel. So, it was probably Reagan&#8217;s feeling that he needed to leave a palpable legacy of complete invulnerability to the United States&#8217; population that prevented him from considering abandoning SDI. He rejected that the development be done only in labs; SDI had to be tested in real life. But then in an incredible turn, he proposed to give to the USSR all technological secrets linked to SDI so that they could make their own SDI. &#8220;Yes&#8212;he said--I would give you the entire SDI&#8221;. That led to the most heated exchange in the movie with Gorbachev reminding Reagan that the US limits even low-technology exports to the USSR, including &#8220;milking machines for cows&#8221;, and &#8220;now you are offering to give me the most sophisticated military technology ever made? Does this sound reasonable? Will Congress, Pentagon, your own administration ever approve it?&#8221;</span></p><p><span>On this stumbling stone the movie, and the Summit, end. Afterward, as we know, US and USSR however continued with limitation and reductions of both strategic and medium-range missiles. It was a great success for the two countries and the world. Perhaps for the first time ever development of weapons was under some control, following some rules, and thousands of offensive weapons that could end civilization in matters of minutes were scrapped. Reykjavik, even if it did not produce anything by itself, was a key post on the path to nuclear disarmament.</span></p><p><span>Both Gorbachev and Reagan were idealists. Reagan truly believed in the advantages of the American system of free enterprise, freedom of worship, and freedom of speech. Gorbachev equally earnestly believed in the advantages of Soviet socialism in providing material equality, similar chances of success for all, and social mobility (himself being the illustration of all these three aspects, as indeed Reagan&#8217;s own career illustrates the advantages of the American dream). However different their ideologies, it is not impossible to think that each recognized in the other elements of idealism; different idealisms for sure, but idealisms nevertheless, and not sheer pragmatism and Machiavellian scheming.</span></p><p><span>In the movie, Gorbachev is better served by the actor (Jared Harris) who plays him; by his facial expressions, bursts of anger when he bangs the table, and then, at times, pensive, and even nostalgic or soft expressions, Gorbachev comes alive. Reagan who was famously avuncular and who would utter most bellicose statements but then cover them with his brilliant smile, comes out, in the interpretation of Jeff Daniels, as wooden, stiff, almost cardboard-like character. Thus, two-thirds of the movie that consists almost entirely of conversations of the two leaders are dominated by Gorbachev. The momentum is clearly on his side.</span></p><p><span>Was it like that in real life? One is left wondering. Gorbachev is shown not only as an excellent negotiator, but deeply in control of the numbers and the roles of different parts of Soviet and American nuclear triads. Reagan is much less sure. Perhaps he was already somewhat senile (as we know from other sources) and perhaps numbers were not his forte. But how is it that Gorbachev comes across as such an able negotiator when from multiple other sources, including his many negotiations with Americans, Germans, French, NATO etc., we know him to be naive and rather incompetent negotiator? This is at its most obvious at the negotiations about the Soviet military withdrawal from East Germany, and NATO guarantees on non-expansion. It would seem, not just ex post, but in real time, that even a modestly competent negotiator would be able to use the &#8220;cards&#8221; that the Soviet Union then possessed to extract better terms and written commitments regarding future relations. This was not something that nobody thought about at the time, including in Gorbachev&#8217;s entourage. Was he just much better in 1986 than in 1989? I do not know. I am sure there are others who know, or at least have hypotheses, and have written about it. Vladislav Zubok, for example, in </span><em><span>Collapse</span></em><span> (my review </span><a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/three-steps-to-freedom"><span>here</span></a><span>) rightly ridicules Gorbachev for taking abroad on serious trips, delegations composed mostly of artists, writers, musicians and composers. Whether Raisa played a role in choosing such motley crews when the negotiations were going on about serious matters of arms control, borders, and finance, we do not know.</span></p><p><span>At the end of the movie, one is left with melancholy thoughts. Now, forty years after the Reykjavik summit, and after the victory of democracy (briefly profiled at the end of the movie with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the usual pictures), the world has no controls on the deployment of new nuclear weapons; all four arms agreements between the US and the Soviet Union (and afterwards Russia) have lapsed; there are nine countries that possess nuclear weapons and probably as many that plan to acquire them; we hear daily threats about the use of nuclear weapons, and the world is much closer to the Apocalypse than even in the dark days of mutual incomprehension between the two superpowers. One wonders, How did we get here?</span></p><p></p><p><span>PS. In a movie that is almost documentary in its aspirations, one would have thought that the fact-checker would not allow Raisa Gorbacheva to twice refer to her husband as the Soviet Premier. Gorbachev was never a Soviet premier and one expects that his wife knew the job title of her husband.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The strange case of China’s urban consumption]]></title><description><![CDATA[Why are rich not consuming?]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-strange-case-of-chinas-urban</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-strange-case-of-chinas-urban</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 23:29:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/52ee7d8f-db71-4ad2-a9f2-b5c327cddd83_289x215.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png" width="289" height="215" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:215,&quot;width&quot;:289,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:127335,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/210680124?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLCx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffb561edd-7b6a-4436-b74e-fa4f75d04e93_289x215.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p>The real (inflation-adjusted) increase in China&#8217;s per capita GDP between 2018 and 2024 was, according to the official numbers also reported in World Bank/IMF statistics, 34 percent (an average rate of growth of almost 5 percent per year). When we look at Chinese household income surveys, whose scanty data (five quintiles with their average income) are published in China&#8217;s Statistical Yearbooks, that growth is almost perfectly matched: real per capita income in 2024 was 35 percent higher than in 2018. The inequality which can be calculated with such limited numbers is practically constant at 39 to 40 Gini points in all the years. Urban inequality is similarly unchanged, and rural inequality is up, mostly because of strong income growth among the top quintile (20 percent) of rural income distribution. But on the other hand, since rural incomes grew faster than urban, this counterbalanced pro-rich growth in rural areas and kept the overall inequality at an unchanged level. Thus the pictures painted by National Accounts (GDP numbers) and household surveys (income numbers) are quite consistent.</p><p>(It is worth mentioning that the &#8220;unchanged&#8221; inequality level that we calculate from the published data gives a Gini of 39-40. The official Chinese Gini which is based on the same surveys, but is presumably calculated across all micro data is higher, at 46-47. It too is unchanged over the six-year period we consider here.)</p><p>The situation changes completely when we look at consumption that also comes from the large official household surveys. Consumption data are published with much greater detail thanks to the Chinese government supplying them to the World Bank in the form of percentiles (100 data points) every year for rural, urban and all of China. Such data, currently go only up to 2022, but, as I will show, the period 2018-22 is very differently depicted in consumption than income data. The tables below give a comparison.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png" width="856" height="579" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:579,&quot;width&quot;:856,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:47531,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/210680124?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rwW_!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe0abec30-f353-4b30-8d1e-a189e2de0378_856x579.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Urban consumption increased but slightly between 2018 and 2022: both at the median and the mean it was only 7.5 percent higher than in 2018. Rural consumption, on the other hand, boomed, rising by more than 25 percent and shrinking in the process the urban/rural gap, calculated from consumption data, from 1.7 to about 1.5. Overall, consumption Gini thus went down by almost 2.5 Gini points, which is a significant decrease.</p><p>Now, this description of the changes is in contradiction with what we can see from income data, both for the entire 2018-24 period, and for the subperiod 2018-22 (shown in the tables). According to income data, urban per capita real growth was 17 percent, not 7.5 percent (as consumption says). Total growth was, if we believe income data, 21 percent and less than 14 percent according to consumption data. There is clearly something new going on with the consumption/income ratio in urban areas. (In rural areas, income and consumption growth moved more or less in parallel.)</p><p>Let us summarize these major discrepancies.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png" width="821" height="171" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:171,&quot;width&quot;:821,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:19469,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/210680124?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NXBS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc9c160ab-206e-4af3-884d-93d095377862_821x171.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p>How can we reconcile these results? What seems to have happened during the covid years is a huge shift away from urban to rural consumption. Looking at urban areas only, incomes continued growing while consumption barely increased (by less than 2% annually). Is it because under covid it was harder to consume, or because incomes were recorded in cities whereas people re-migrated to rural areas and consumed there? Or perhaps was it because urban people decided to save more than before? All three explanations, not only separately, but put together are possible.</p><p>Consider the consumption of the top urban percentile (the infamous top 1 percent). In real (inflation-adjusted) terms it was broadly stagnant in the last three years (for which we have the data): 2020 to 2022. (Strictly speaking, it was lower in 2022 than in 2020). The story is the same for the entire top urban decile. Rich people in urban areas consumed less or about the same, and since their earnings (it seems) rose, they must have saved much more.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf" width="537" height="393" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:393,&quot;width&quot;:537,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RewO!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6d68acee-ff76-4e6d-b3e0-1852fb037745_537x393.emf 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Could it that a significant part of China&#8217;s &#8220;consumption or wage compression&#8221; that we see in macro data is due to much greater savings of the urban elite? In other words, the issue behind the &#8220;compressed&#8221; or low consumption is not so much low social transfers or large state-sector corporate savings, but decisions of the elite to spend less and to save more. That decision does not seem to be driven by slower income growth among the urban rich: although income data show them growing at slower pace than many others (including the rural rich), this is not comparable at all to what we observe in their consumption behavior: stagnation.</p><p>Why are they saving more? Is it precautionary saving, greater availability of various domestic financial instruments, aging, transfer of money abroad (which compresses consumption at home), or possibly something else like overstated income in which case reduced consumption may be simply a reflection of lower income of the urban elite.</p><p></p><p>PS. Sources for this piece are three-fold: (1) Chinese official income distribution data published in various editions of the Statistical Yearbook, (2) consumption distribution data from the World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform (expressed in 2011 PPP dollars), and (3) National Accounts. I am grateful to Paul Segal and Nishant Yonzan who pointed out to a mistake in the originally published version of this Substack, and to Nishant Yonzan who provided the most recent data.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ukraine, Lenin and Sultan-Galiev]]></title><description><![CDATA[Re-reading Richard Pipes&#8217; "The Formation of the Soviet Union"]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/ukraine-lenin-and-sultan-galiev</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/ukraine-lenin-and-sultan-galiev</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 02:56:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span>It is a foolhardy endeavor today to review a book that discusses &#8220;the national question&#8221;. The topic is always slippery but in today&#8217;s age of nationalism it is certain to attract attacks from all sides involved in the book. And never more so than in Eastern Europe, and especially now when the two largest states in the region are involved in a fratricidal and increasingly murderous war for more than four years.</span></p><p><span>Still I could not resist the temptation to go back to Richard Pipes&#8217; book </span><em><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674309517"><span>The Formation of the Soviet Union</span></a></em><span> (originally published in 1954; revised edition in 1964, with the latest preface written in 1997). As is well known, Pipes does not look kindly on the Bolshevik revolution and his </span><em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Russian-Revolution-Richard-Pipes/dp/0679736603"><span>The Russian Revolution</span></a></em><span> (published in 1991) treats the revolution throughout as a coup, similar to, for example, Mussolini&#8217;s March on Rome. But Pipes was an excellent historian, and, what I think is absolutely indispensable in a great historian, an excellent writer. I remember that reading many years ago Pipes&#8217; description of the events in Petrograd (St Petersburg) in September 1917, I genuinely felt unsure which way the events would move. Yes, I did know that the &#8220;coup&#8221; was to take place next month but the book put the reader in the shoes of a person who in September 1917 had no idea what might transpire next: war or peace with Germany, Provisional government or the new Constituent Assembly, Bolshevik coup or a military overthrow of Kerenski&#8217;s government.</span></p><p><span>Pipes is similarly excellent in the story of the formation of the Soviet Union. This is an extraordinary difficult topic to write about because of the complexity of the action that takes place from Warsaw to the Chinese border and that involves literally hundreds of parties&#8212;where party can be understood as everything from a political organization to a group of robbers. The book is divided into chapters that, after the general discussion of the national question in Tsarist Russia, proceed across three large regions (Ukraine and Belorussia, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia) and do so chronologically (the Provisional government, the Bolshevik &#8220;coup&#8221;, the Civil War and foreign invasions, and ultimately in 1923 the formation of the Soviet Union). Because of complexity of the topic I will limit my piece to three issues: Ukraine, Sultan-Galiev, and Lenin&#8217;s view on the national question. It is notable that the national question approach of the book makes it deal only with the reintegration of the &#8220;borderland areas&#8221; into a system ruled from Moscow, but not with the attitude of the Russian population within (whatever geographically it may mean) Russia.</span></p><p><strong><span>Ukraine.</span></strong><span> For obvious reasons (importance and the size of the area), Ukraine takes the pride of place. Ukraine&#8217;s political situation was extraordinarily complex: no fewer than nine government have succeeded themselves in Kiev/Kyiv, including a German puppet government and a German occupation government, and if we include Kharkov/Kharkiv Soviet government as well, Krivoi-Rog Soviet government etc. we easily come to dozen if not more governments between 1917 and 1922. Most of them were governments on paper only; the area was in a state of total anarchy. Pipes concludes: &#8220;The history of the Ukraine from 1917&#8230; until early 1920s, when the Soviet rule was finally established reflects a state of rapidly-spreading anarchy which, both in its extent and its duration, is perhaps unique in the history of modern Europe&#8221; (p. 148).</span></p><p><span>To the risk of simplification, Pipes sees the main cause of heterogeneity in Ukrainian body politic in the difference in interests and to some extent culture between the more urbanized and industrialized areas that were Russian-populated or heavily Russified (including Jewish population), and much larger rural areas that were Ukrainian, often in some vague sense because the national identity may not have been very strongly felt among many peasants, interested primarily, and perhaps only, in land reform: &#8220;this desire to apportion the rich Ukrainian black earth independent of Russia, for the sole benefit of the local population, became a powerful factor in the development of nationalist sentiment among the Ukrainian rural masses&#8221; (p. 57).</span></p><p><span>This level of heterogeneity is not atypical: we find it in many parts of the world. What added to anarchy was that there were two other dividing lines: between pro-bourgeois and pro-workers parties, and between those who were in favor of greater centralization and those who were against. Thus a moderate nationalist Ukrainian party was in agreement with Bolsheviks when both wanted to weaken the Provisional government in Petrograd. When Bolsheviks came to power that identity of interests evaporated: Bolsheviks wanted stronger central government, Ukrainian moderate nationalists wanted autonomy or independence. But then when Bolsheviks were driven out of Ukraine by the German army and during the Civil War by the Whites, the alliance between the moderate (and even extreme) nationalists and Bolsheviks surged again. Both dreaded the return of pro-Tsarist forces in Russia.</span></p><p><span>This is just one of the coalitional switches: there were many others, more complicated, driven by the issues going from the formation of Ukrainian-only solder battalions in the Russian army to the attitude toward desertion from the frontline, to the Ukrainian negotiations with the Germans to let them occupy Ukraine and create a puppet government, to finally the attitude toward the German occupation in 1918. The splits went through Bolshevik lines too: Lenin was against restarting the war with Germany when it occupied Ukraine; many others among the Bolsheviks were in favor. Or more generally, &#8220;the left [of Ukrainian Bolsheviks] stood for a peasant revolution, and for a certain measure of interparty democracy; the right for a strictly proletarian movement, and for complete subordination to the party organs in Moscow&#8221; (p. 131).</span></p><p><span>One of the finer ironic details is that Ukrainian Rada&#8217;s delegation that was included in the all-Soviet (Russian) delegation negotiating peace at Brest-Litovsk, established on its own contacts with the German delegation and negotiated German invasion of Ukraine. That occupation, in the brutality with which food was extracted from peasants, hostages taken and executed, looks to today&#8217;s reader like the first act in Soviet collectivization and Holodomor that would happen ten years later.</span></p><p><span>Finally, and not least importantly, there was a huge fissiparousness of Ukrainian parties, again not an unusual situation when, after a revolution, parties become led by various intellectuals with next to zero political experience. For Marxist economic historians, it is thus amusing to read a member of the Rada complain of the fact that Tugan-Baranovsky, one of the first commentators and critics of Marx, named minister of finance, had disappeared for several months and no one has heard of him nor knew of his whereabouts.</span></p><p><span>A plurality of the population perhaps (it is impossible to speak of a majority in the case of Ukraine) was politically close to the Ukrainian SRs (it was in reality two parties: Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers&#8217; Party and Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party) whose main plank was the agrarian reform and famers&#8217; access to land. In other words, expropriation of large landowners. This was coupled with moderate nationalism that, in addition to the obvious demands for education and official use of Ukrainian language (banned in Tsarist Russia), was comfortable with autonomy of Ukraine within Russia. They won most votes in Ukraine in the election for the Constituent Assembly held in December 1917. The stronger the centralizing forces in Moscow, the more pro-independence was that portion of the Ukrainian political parties. Bolsheviks&#8217; main support came from the urban areas, with Kiev itself playing a swing role: it was both the center of Russified urbanized population and intellectual home of pro-independence thinkers.</span></p><p><span>There is in principle the difference between being in favor of centralization and being pro-Russia. In reality, the two positions came eventually largely to overlap, but during the Civil War and with the formation of the Soviet Union centralization was seen by many as a way to reinforce the proletarian state and Bolshevik power. Thus it is notable that the sternest supporters of centralization were often non-Russian Bolsheviks, led to that position by ideological and state-building zeal: Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev Kamenev, Dzerzinsky, Ordzhonikidze. The last two, together with Stalin, played a key role in the formation of the Soviet Union, and in &#8220;solving&#8221; the Georgian national question that, just months before December 1922 and the decisive discussions on the Constitution of the Soviet Union, became the most contentious issue that almost derailed the entire process.</span></p><p><strong><span>Lenin&#8217;s </span></strong><span>position on &#8220;the national question&#8221; changed over the years and Pipes pays lots of attention to it, including at the end of the book where he cites fully (on four pages) Lenin&#8217;s last writings on Soviet federalism and on dangers of great- Russian chauvinism. (I wish there were more discussion of Soviet federalism, the difference between the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, the asymmetric party federalism where some Russian and Soviet institutions were merged; Russian Federation being the only one without its own Communist party etc. But understandably that might have led the book toward more politics and political philosophy and less history.).</span></p><p><span>Pipes sketches the standard Marxist view, originally very dogmatically shared by Lenin, that nations are largely the product of capitalist development and that with socialist victory they would tend to disappear. This view, originating with Marx, was consistent with the creation of large states, minimization of the national question as such and, in the Austrian vision of Otto Bauer and Karl Adler, with the solution of that question through so-called &#8220;personal autonomy&#8221;. In other words, there would not be territorially-based ethnic states: one could be a Martian, go to a Martian school and publish articles in Martian language, whether in Moscow, Berlin or Vienna, but there would not be a Martian People&#8217;s Republic. Personal autonomy, but no territorial autonomy. (That position was even in the Austrian part of the Austro-Hungarian empire rejected by Czech and Slovak parties; it never even came close to application in the Hungarian part.)</span></p><p><span>Lenin began with this view, but then, probably around 1917 or 1918, moved to a much more radical view holding that the creation of ethnic-based republics, with the right of self-determination including secession after the communist revolution, was the way to solve the national question. Pipes ascribes Lenin&#8217;s change of position to a very tactical reason: Bolsheviks had to promise an extreme version of self-determination to all national groups in order to garner their support during the Civil War. It was a strong reversal (not the first time that it happened in Lenin&#8217;s intellectual life): nations were no longer seen as simple products of capitalism on their way out of history but part and parcel of a socialist new order.</span></p><p><span>It is explained, I think, not only in function of winning the Russian civil war, but also by Lenin&#8217;s realization that after the end of the Great War the colonial question, brought up by the Versailles Conference, gives to Marxists an ideal tool to spread the struggle against capitalism to the rest of the world and to get support in countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Egypt etc. Lenin&#8217;s thinking was thus global, motivated not solely by the need to win the Civil War domestically but to spur the world revolution. This became very obvious at the Second Comintern conference in the Summer of 1920.</span></p><p><span>Pipes however does not mention, as other writers (including Adam Tooze in </span><em><span>The Deluge</span></em><span>) do, that Lenin was also moved by the need not to be outbid by Woodrow Wilson who similarly proclaimed the right to national self-determination. Marxists had to do better than a bourgeois American politician: Lenin could not offer to India less than Woodrow Wilson.</span></p><p><strong><span>Sultan-Galiev</span></strong><span>. What happens to the rest of the world and the &#8220;underdeveloped peoples&#8221; if for them the rule of the proletariat or the continued rule of the bourgeoise in the rich world makes no difference? What happens if both &#8220;Northern&#8221; workers and &#8220;Northern&#8221; capitalists are happy to exploit the rest of the world? Enter Sultan-Galiev. He asked openly that question that was first indirectly posed by Engels in 1858: &#8220;the English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is actually aiming at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation that exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain degree justifiable&#8221; (Marx-Engels: Selected Correspondence, p. 105).</span></p><p><span>Sultan-Galiev, a Tatar revolutionary and an early Bolshevik, went logically all the way to the other end where class struggle, on the global level, becomes in fact a struggle between nations. In today&#8217;s language of inequality, we could say, when between-country income differences far outweigh within-country income differences. He was the first &#8220;formulator&#8221; of what Lin Biao would forty years later proclaim as the class struggle at the global level: between the North and the West, on the one hand who are alike the urban ruling class, and everybody else who is peasant and, alike in the Chinese revolution, represents a genuine revolutionary force. Sultan-Guliev was for his efforts expelled from the Soviet Communist Party and, in what is seen as the first Stalinist trial of a Party cadre, was judged and condemned to death. He disappeared in 1930.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png" width="481" height="349" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:349,&quot;width&quot;:481,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!k1Ez!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F890b4775-dab0-42b1-a49c-2b1a803b0b8b_481x349.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>From Pipes, &#8220;The Formation of the Soviet Union&#8221;, p. 278.</span></p><p><span>PS. I have written on the same theme before (</span><a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/why-was-the-soviet-union-created"><span>here</span></a><span>). That piece &#8220;Why was the Soviet Union created?&#8221; is worth reading also for very good comments.</span></p><p><span>PS2. One cannot have a Yugoslav background, read Pipes and not think of the differences and similarities between the Soviet and Yugoslav approach to the national question. But this is for another day.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[More on Trotsky and interpretation of Trotsky]]></title><description><![CDATA[A quick reply to Alex Callinicos]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/more-on-trotsky-and-interpretation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/more-on-trotsky-and-interpretation</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 19:47:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/02671b44-22d9-4392-b487-d68b2a4c8677_530x404.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png" width="530" height="404" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:404,&quot;width&quot;:530,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:226145,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/208596600?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SDOw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F2c30aedf-4187-436a-82aa-81af5256a695_530x404.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Several years ago when I was rereading Kolakowski&#8217;s <em>Main Currents of Marxism</em> I was struck by his pitiless portrait of Trotsky. Kolakowski was scathing. And it was not that Kolakowski was scathing of every Marxist who came after Marx because at that time, after 1968, when the <em>Main Currents</em> were written Kolakowski was still transitioning from Communism of his youth toward what he later in life became, a conservative and religious fanatic. Thus his judgment on many of the thinkers discussed in <em>The Main Currents</em> (Lukacs, Gramsci, Plekhanov, even Lenin) is much more balanced and often full of admiration. But Trotsky, for Kolakowski, was a &#8220;poseur&#8221; and as for later Trotskyists: &#8220;<span>[t]here was never any such thing as a Trotskyist theory&#8212;only a relapsed leader who tried desperately to recover his role, who could not realize that his efforts were vain, and who would not accept responsibility for a state of affairs which he regarded as a strange degeneration&#8221;. (vol. 3, p. 219)</span></p><p>The question I asked myself was, why? I tried to explain it in <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/trotsky-after-kolakowski">the essay</a> that I wrote in August 2021 and that I recirculated yesterday&#8212;for no other reason that a reader liked it, mentioned it to me, and this reminded of the piece. (By the way, the essay is not included in my <em>World Under Capitalism</em> because I decided not to include book reviews and this could be, in a way, considered one.) Alex Callinicos, whom I very much admire, wrote today a deeply critical essay on my piece (<a href="https://alexcallinicos.substack.com/p/a-reply-to-branko-milanovic-on-trotsky">here</a>). This short Substack is my attempt to explain to Alex and to the others some parts of my thinking, a view of Trotsky and Trotskyism that they find erroneous, both as formulated by Kolakowski and the way I interpreted it.</p><p>What drove Kolakowski to such a contemptuous attitude, I wondered? There was something deeply problematic with Trotsky despite many extraordinary qualities that I list in my original piece: intelligence, bravery, ability to manage people, armies and diplomatic negotiations (the first Soviet in 1905, the Red Army, Brest-Litovsk), excellent writing skills, general culture. His qualities came to the fore only when he played No.2 role under somebody whom he respected. That somebody was Lenin. In my view&#8212;which is not original&#8212;Trotsky never wanted to be No. 1, a position that of right belonged to him after Lenin&#8217;s death. One needs only to remember that Bolsheviks&#8217; meeting rooms were routinely decorated by only two portraits: those of Lenin and Trotsky. The party was also colloquially known as the party of Lenin and Trotsky.</p><p>With Lenin, Trotsky&#8217;s huge qualities were on display; without Lenin, Trotsky&#8217;s flaws came to the fore: his arrogance, impatience with less well-educated Bolshevik cadres, certain hauteur that all contemporaries noted; so much so that at the Central Committee vote in May 1924 (just four months after Lenin death) Trotsky received the second lowest number of votes. His tribulations with the Party continued: he was offered to be the head of the Sovnarkom, he declined; he created, half-heartedly and not very effectively, a faction within the Communist Party of the USSR (as it become known) and all the way to 1927 the struggle continued. It is at the time of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution that Trotskyists for the last time gathered freely and organized an alternative celebration. A year later, most of them were in jail even as Stalin, in an abrupt volte-face, decided to go for industrialization at all costs, argued by Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, and originally rejected by Stalin.</p><p>Why do I go through all these details? Because I think they are important to understand what later became of the Trotskyist movement. Despite the extraordinary courage of Trotsky himself (who sacrificed himself and his entire family), and many other members of the movement, the &#8220;original sin&#8221; was reflected in that unwillingness to take responsibility and power when the occasion presented itself. There was, I think, always a seed of defeatism in the movement: they liked to discuss, argue, pontificate, &#8220;couper les cheveux en quatre&#8221; but not to take power and rule. This is true <em>despite </em>doubtless personal qualities of its members. Let me give three examples about which I wrote: Trotsky himself and his first-rate book on the Soviet system <em>The Revolution Betrayed</em> reviewed <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/trotsky-on-the-class-structure-of">here</a>; Victor Serge, a man imprisoned by all regimes, including Stalinist and his beautiful and dark diaries (reviewed <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-book-of-the-dead">here</a>), and Wang Fan-his a brilliant Chinese Trotskyist, a man of warmth, bravery and erudition (his memoirs reviewed <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/i-wont-go-to-moscow-until-the-revolution">here</a>). I could go on listing other Trotskyists, equally extraordinary people. But the movement, spread to five continents, never came close anywhere to taking power&#8212;and this is my contention&#8212;it did <em>not</em> want to take power. Not even in China where it had a strong base in the industrial areas, but was sidelined by Mao&#8217;s accent on peasant rebellion. Perhaps the only important role that it ever played was in the Spanish Civil War, and had the republicans won that war, it might have fought seriously for the role in government, against more moderate socialists and Stalinists alike.</p><p>Now, I am fully aware that my statement that the Trotskyist parties did not want to seriously struggle for power can be challenged. They never said so explicitly&#8212;and it would be folly to do so. My impression is just an impression. But I do think that this reluctance to accept responsibility of governing, to take the bull by the horns, first time displayed by Trotsky, seeped afterwards to other parts of the Communist movement, even when they had nothing to do with Trotsky himself or with Trotskyism. I do not think that it is particularly controversial to claim that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) really liked being in opposition rather than governing, even when in 1976 it obtained 35% of the popular vote and became the second largest party (4 percentage points behind Christian Democrats). Indeed, it was not easy to govern Italy, not the least because of country&#8217;s &#8220;limited sovereignty&#8221; that it enjoyed with respect to the United States. Yet a combative &#8220;Leninist&#8221; party would have gone for power. PCI did not. The same is true of the PCF in 1968. Many, including de Gaulle and Raymond Aron thought that the communists would go for the jugular. They had control of the industrial proletariat while the youth totally disorganized le bloc bourgeois. But de Gaulle and Aron (politically so different) quickly realized that PCF was, in fact, a party of stability, a party that would not rock the boat, would extract some concessions for workers (as they indeed did), but would &#8220;vote&#8221; for the maintenance of capitalism.</p><p>The point is, I think, that many in the worker&#8217;s movement ceased believing that transcending or overthrowing capitalism is possible. They fled from responsibility and action that an alternative belief would have required. And I thought that the first who clearly declined to take the responsibility for governing a socialist state, when it was given to him on a silver platter, was precisely Lav Trotsky. And that that decision opened the way to Stalinism.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Sketching the new dysto-utopian world with massive presence of artificial intelligence]]></title><description><![CDATA[A four-class society (a long read)]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/sketching-the-new-dysto-utopian-world</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/sketching-the-new-dysto-utopian-world</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 19:01:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/571c91d2-ce87-49e8-924c-a9c51ff7c01e_554x352.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!niLe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb97ddaf6-e58c-45b8-91f7-155ac6271172_554x352.png" width="554" height="352" 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class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>The massive deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) presents economists with perhaps the unique situation in the past five or six decades. The artificial intelligence is an all-purpose technology and its effects are, from the current perspective, quite difficult or even impossible to predict. If one wonders whether there would be increased unemployment due to the introduction of the AI it makes no sense to talk to labor economists. Labor economists might be able to answer questions such as whether any specific technology would lead to unemployment or whether the increase in the minimum wage would make some people redundant but they cannot address the question of the effects of a new general purpose technology because both the extent of the application of such a technology and its effects on labor demand are simply unknown. The new general purpose technology could be, like electricity, included in 90% of the activities or it might fail and the hopes, and fears, that we entertain for the artificial intelligence may be disappointed.</span></p><p><span>This then requires not looking for concrete answers which I think at this stage are impossible to make but defining a meaningful set of questions regarding the possible effect of the AI, and then sketching the new world it might produce.</span></p><p><span>The first meaningful question is whether AI would lead to an increase in total output or would keep total output more or less the same but would reshuffle the roles of machines (including artificial intelligence itself which can be called a machine) and live labor. In other words, whether AI would be an output-augmenting technology or factor-shifting technology, meaning that it substitutes capital for live labor but does not lead to the production of many new goods and services, or increased production of the already existing goods and services. I have dictated most of this essay; I did not write it as I normally do in Word, nor did I write in longhand as I used to do twenty years ago. But in this example, neither word processing technology nor machine-dictation have made me produce more essays. There was probably some improvement in productivity, in the sense that a readable essay was produced in less time, but little else. Yet the all-purpose technology of the information revolution has made this essay much more accessible to many people. In that sense, there was an increase in overall welfare (assuming that reading this Substack does not produce anger and unhappiness in many of its readers).</span></p><p><span>The second related question is whether AI would lead to increased productivity defined as output per live unit of labor. There, as both the common sense of labor substitution by AI, and the previous example, suggest, we can relatively safely assume that AI would increase output per unit of live labor. And in some cases, dramatically so. In order </span><em><span>not</span></em><span> to come to this conclusion we would have to assume that total output would shrink by the application of AI to the same extent that the use of live labor is expected to shrink. This seems most unrealistic. Consequently, the ratio between total output and total live labor, we can safely predict, would go up.</span></p><p><span>The third issue is whether AI would create a significant surplus population. I prefer to use the term surplus population to a more neutral term of higher unemployment because it reflects better what may be the effects of a general purpose technology. It might create people who are basically unemployable and whose skills belong to a revolved era. These may be skills and knowledge that are entirely made redundant by the deployment of the AI; or people whose skills require a &#8220;retooling&#8221; for the needs of a new economy that would take five or more years. In either case, such people are over a medium- to long-term a surplus population. If the surplus population becomes large, for example reaching 15 or 20 percent of the labor force it would create political problems. The issue will then be how to solve this political problem. It may be dealt within the existing system of unemployment benefits with the proviso that in the case of the surplus population unemployment benefits might run for years rather than for six or nine months as they do nowadays. Or through, as many people argue, universal guaranteed income. Both would require a change in the way the welfare system is organized and funded. We would have to accept the possibility of people who would never work during their lifetime or might work for very little time in some subaltern occupations.</span></p><p><span>Money transfers however do not eliminate the political issue of a large surplus population. It would be na&#239;ve to believe that simply giving people money to survive would make them happy. Surplus population could create a permanent pool of malcontents who would be politically difficult to handle, a malleable population who would be there to be exploited and used by political operators. The very presence of a large group of people who have nothing to do and lots of free time to plot rebellions would by itself be politically destabilizing.</span></p><p><span>The next issue is the question of profits. Very few people doubt that the total amount of profits, when the AI comes to be deployed, would increase. AI is like any other capital and the people who own the AI would of course make money. They would become richer. In some cases they might become extraordinarily rich and gain a huge political influence. That huge wealth and political power of a few combined with the existence of a large surplus population would create an extremely dangerous political cocktail. It is not necessarily true that the new techno-lords would always act as a class. Some among them might have ambitions to lead the army of malcontents and displace other techno-lords from their positions. The fall of the Roman republic provides one such historical precedent; the struggle between different oligarchic clans in post-Communist Russia another.</span></p><p><span>But here my question is whether the profit rate would go up or not. The higher mass of profits due to the AI does not necessarily translate into a higher overall rate of profit because the amount of new capital that would be sunk into AI may be so high that it outpaces the increase of total amount of profit. In other words, the profit/capital (&#960;/K) ratio may go down. We might thus face what, at first sight, looks like a paradoxical situation: the average rate of profit in an economy where AI is deployed might go down. But there are countervailing forces. Schumpeterian creative distraction brought about by the AI, might destroy the value of lots of capital that would no longer be usable. For capital, AI will thus do the same that it did for labor: create a surplus capital the way that it has created a surplus labor. Such surplus capital no longer enters into the calculation of the average profit rate; the denominator K in the calculation of the rate of profit would be reduced and the average rate of profit might go up. But notice that the creative destruction that maintains the rate of profit at a high level means large capital losses for the people who own &#8220;wrong&#8221; capital. Thus the malcontents may not be only the unemployable laborers but also former capitalists who are now pauperized.</span></p><p><span>What do we get when we put all of this together? There would be almost certainly an increase in the share of national income going to capital-owners because the quantity of capital employed would have increased and the average rate of profit would have remained more or less the same. The share of labor would go down. Since most of capital, as we know empirically, is held by people who are at the upper ranges of income distribution, rising capital share would exacerbate income and wealth inequality. This too is likely but not certain. New technologies of such magnitude might actually increase capital income not only at the top, among the current owners of capital, but also among those who are in the middle of the wealth distribution. In that case it becomes less evident that the increasing capital share would necessarily by itself drive income inequality up.</span></p><p><span>But there is a second element that would push inequality up for sure. This is the surplus population whose new state-guaranteed payouts would be much lower than their former wages.</span></p><p><span>Finally, we come to the key question which is in truth a social question: how would the new income distribution look like? This would be a tetra society, that is society composed of four classes. On the bottom there is the surplus population, the lumpenproletariat or the idle helots with no jobs and nothing to do. They would have to be kept quiet and docile through dispensation of bread and circuses. Bread and circuses in the modern case obviously means some kind of minimum unemployment benefit for life and streaming of low-cost entertainment 24/7.</span></p><p><span>Then there would be a relatively large service-sector working class employed in the areas that cannot (as yet) be replaced by the AI. They would subsist on low to moderate wages, and they will be permanently living under the threat of their replacement by the AI and thus descent into the lumpenproletariat.</span></p><p><span>The third class are people who would combine, as they do now, high capital incomes and high labor incomes. This is what I called the homoploutic class that currently represents about 3% of the US population: people who are both among the top 10 percent of capitalists and the top 10 percent of wage-earners. That particular group might increase in size. Even if they currently hold no shares in new companies their high labor incomes as well as their high capital incomes allow them to expand their shareholding in the most profitable sectors and thus not only to retain their position but to improve it and to increase the circle of people who are homoploutic.</span></p><p><span>Finally at the top of the income pyramid would be extraordinary rich people whom we already see now. This may not be just five or six or ten extreme plutocrats but there could be possibly thousands of people with extraordinary wealth.</span></p><p><span>Such a social pyramid would look, both in the sharpness with which incomes rise as we move towards at the top and also in the flatness of incomes among many on the bottom, like pyramids in pre-industrial societies which failed to create sufficiently large middle classes. The sketch applies, of course, only to the more advanced and richer societies. Other societies &#8211;not as advanced in terms of AI&#8212;might retain a more familiar social and class structure.</span></p><p><span>The interesting thing could be that more advanced and richer societies would lack the middle class and be politically more turbulent than the less advanced societies. One of the dogmas of the twentieth century was that development (higher overall income) and education create a strong middle class that is in turn a guarantor of political stability. But perhaps that that dogma was true only for a particular type of industrialized Fordist societies but not generally for the societies with high overall income.</span></p><p><span>What could be in principle called the middle class in societies with lots of AI would be service sector workers who have not been displaced by artificial intelligence. Yet they cannot be treated fully as a middle class because their incomes are relatively low compared to the incomes of the top two classes of homoploutic individuals and techno lords, and their position is precarious as they are in the constant danger of falling down, rejoining the lumpenproletariat.</span></p><p><span>There is little doubt that such a society, as we sketched it, would display strong dystopian characteristics. The utopian promise of machines doing lots of work that is currently done by humans, and allowing us to enjoy free time and leisure, would turn out in reality to produce socially extremely unequal and politically much more unstable societies than the current proponents of abundance created by the artificial intelligence want us to believe.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Don’t ask me about my profits, but let’s talk about your wages]]></title><description><![CDATA[How Western capitalists use China-bashing to deflect attention from their soaring profits]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/dont-ask-me-about-my-profits-but</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/dont-ask-me-about-my-profits-but</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 16:15:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span>The discussion began with me, being tired of permanent Franco-German kvetching about China&#8217;s trade surpluses, writing this on Twitter:</span></p><p><span>&#8220;Nobody can take seriously European complaints about China. China is now building things better and more cheaply than Germany or France. When France and Germany built things better and more cheaply than others, they ridiculed such complaints. Now they are losing and not liking it. Moreover, Europe came to that position by exploiting the rest of the world. China did not.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>The Frenco-German complaint about China subsidization, workers working too long hours etc. reminded me of similar complaint, but coming from the other side, that I heard many years ago in Africa, while working for the World Bank. Africans also complained of permanent trade deficits with Europe and spoke of unfair competition: &#8220;Look, Europeans have these fancy machines and in one hour they produce ten widgets. We, in Africa, have to work ten hours to do the same thing. Obviously, we are undersold, we run permanent trade deficits and then have to borrow from the IMF under atrociously bad conditions. We are all for fair competition&#8212;but European should get rid of their new machines, and then let us compete like men: mano a mano, fairly&#8221;. Obviously African comments were met with derision: they are, the French and the IMF argued, Luddites, ignoramuses, foes of productivity and technical progress.</span></p><p><span>But now when the shoe is on the other foot, European make the same complaints against the Chinese: they should work less, invent many fewer new things, and pay their workers much more (I will return to this last point).</span></p><p><span>In response to my tweet Michael Pettis wrote:</span></p><p><span>&#8220;Although I agree with much of Milanovic says about inequality, I disagree with him here. I think he is confusing &#8220;efficient&#8221; manufacturing with &#8220;competitive&#8221; manufacturing. China is not necessarily building things better and more cheaply than Germany or France, but it is certainly selling them far more cheaply, and the difference shows up both in the extremely low share households receive of what they produce and in the astonishing rise in China&#8217;s debt-to-GDP ratio. This was the same strategy Japan followed in the 1980s, and not only was it unsustainable, but the high debt and low consumption share ultimately forced Japan into an extraordinarily difficult adjustment. If Germany and France were willing to suppress wages (or, which is the same thing, to eliminate social transfers), or if they were willing to borrow comparable amounts to subsidize the competitiveness of their manufacturers, it is pretty obvious that French and German manufacturers would also be able to sell much more cheaply in global markets. But while these policies would increase manufacturing competitiveness, they would not make manufacturing any more efficient. They would simply shift part of the economic costs of production onto the rest of the country.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>I in turn replied to Michael.</span></p><p><span>&#8220;Michael, I agree with what you say, but this is the nature of international competition. France and Germany cannot (or do not want) to decrease wages and they lose the market. You seem to postulate that everybody should follow what Europe does. Honestly, it is the same as if Africans said to the French. your competition is not &#8220;loyale&#8221; because you work on fancy machines and we do not. So, yes. if France and Germany compressed wages &amp; transfers they could compete with China. But European policy is not a policy that everybody ought to follow nor does it define &#8220;fair&#8221; policy.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>And the conversation (at least in this round) was concluded by Michael.</span></p><p><span>&#8220;Yes, Branko, but because it would politically disruptive (and bad for the global economy) if Europe were also to compress wages and transfers by enough to regain competitiveness, the alternative for Europe is to intervene in its external accounts for the purpose of reversing the advantage enjoyed by economies that compete by suppressing household income. This was what Joan Robinson warned about. In a global economy in which some economies are relatively open, while others intervene to increase their competitiveness, the persistent surpluses of the latter will eventually force the former themselves to intervene, at the cost of global trade. Michael Kalecki made a similar point. He showed that if a country suppresses wages relative to productivity, household consumption tends to weaken. The country can nevertheless maintain high production if the resulting shortfall in consumption is offset either by higher investment (as was the case in China in the 1990s and during the final stage of the housing bubble in the 2010s) or by a trade surplus. The problem he noted, is that this only works if some countries do it. In an open trading environment, if my wages are lower (relative to productivity) than yours, my products will be more competitive, and I can grow faster by absorbing part of your demand (leaving you to choose between growing more quickly or boosting domestic demand with more debt). But this only works as long as you don&#8217;t reduce your own wages relative to your own productivity. If we both do it, we are collectively worse off because, as Kalecki argued, it is wages that drive demand which, in turn, drives business profits (and growth). The key point is that if a country can reduce the prices of its manufacturing goods across the board by suppressing wages and subsidizing production, its lower prices are not evidence of greater efficiency. They are mostly evidence of the extent to which workers and the financial system are subsidizing prices. On the other hand, if &#8211; consistent with comparative advantage &#8211; some of its goods are relatively cheaper while others relative more expensive, and these are exchanged through trade, then you might be able to argue that it produced the former goods more efficiently while its trade partner produced the latter more efficiently.&#8221;</span></p><p><strong><span>Now, the interesting part begins</span></strong><span>. I am a huge fan of Matt Klein and Michael Pettis&#8217; book </span><em><span>Trade wars are class wars</span></em><span>. I discuss it very favorably in my </span><em><span>Great Global Transformation</span></em><span>. I find their explanation of why Chinese SOEs have to &#8220;compress&#8221; wages and run large surpluses very convincing: it is a political economy explanation: China needs large retained profits of SOEs to either affect domestic production and innovation in the desired direction, or to invest such profits, for political or economic reasons, abroad. It thus structurally aims for trade surpluses because, in Pettis&#8217; words &#8220;it compresses wages&#8221;.</span></p><p><span>But notice several problems here. What does &#8220;to compress&#8221; wages actually mean? Is there a wage rate that one can decide that should be valid for China? But if for China, can we then also decide what is the correct wage for France? The problem is simply that French wages (especially including social transfers and few days of work) are relatively high (France&#8217;s GDP per capita is also significantly higher than the Chinese) and the French then complain that Chinese wages are too low. Note, this is the French who assign to themselves the power to decide whether Chinese wages are too low or too high. But having a system that can &#8220;compress&#8221; wages is a structural advantage that can indeed be seen as any &#8220;normal&#8221; advantage in foreign trade: if you have a better machine than the other guy, or cheaper access to resources, this is your structural or comparative or even absolute advantage. Similarly, if you can run an economy with lower wages than the other guy, this is similarly a structural advantage. There is nothing unfair in it.</span></p><p><span>It is a common complaint that many years ago Marx identified: all capitalists want that workers of other capitalists be paid higher wages so that they can become their customers, but they want their own workers to be paid as little as possible. This is exactly what the West is doing now: London and New York financial newspapers that attack any workers&#8217; improvement at home are full of articles urging China to &#8220;decompress&#8221; wages and introduce more generous social transfers. Suddenly, </span><em><span>The Financial Times</span></em><span> and </span><em><span>The Wall Street Journal</span></em><span> are brimming with concern about Chinese workers&#8217; welfare.</span></p><p><span>Furthermore and very importantly, one can equally argue that the West has &#8220;suppressed&#8221; wages too. Below is the famous graph that shows decoupling of output per worker (dark blue line) from wage per worker (light blue line). This is simply another way of saying that since the early 1980s, profits have risen in Western countries much more than labor incomes. Not only can it be listed under the rubric of wage compression, but the tables could be &#8211;and should be&#8212;turned by asking western capitalists why, if they want to seriously compete with China, they do not cut their own profits and thus make their products more attractive? But no, they do not like to talk about their profits, but they love to talk of other people&#8217;s wages.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png" width="583" height="390" 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https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ZXlM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27d4bea8-d941-4210-b6e1-06abcfe5db4e_583x390.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Adam Smith, 250 years ago, put it very well.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span>&#8220;Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits&#8221;. (</span><em><span>Wealth of Nations</span></em><span>, Book I, Chapter 9, &#8220;Of the profits of stock&#8221;)</span></p><p><span>The problem is in essence very simple. Decentralized Western capitalists have been able to squeeze domestic labor for forty years and run outsized profits. But now they are faced by a centralized capitalist (which is in effect the Chinese state) who is even more efficient in squeezing wages and increasing productivity. That centralized capitalist is now driving out of business Western decentralized capitalists. This is why the latter have to move the heaven and the earth in order to stop the centralized capitalist from winning. But they have to do all of that while never mentioning the role their own profits play in it.</span></p><p></p><p></p><p><span>PS. It is interesting that the same evening when Michael Pettis and I had this discussion, I listened on NPR to a debate, conducted on a rather low level, by Senator Moreno and another gentleman who are co-sponsors of a bill to ban Chinese vehicle imports and other supply parts in the US. The fact that the debate was made under the auspices of the American Enterprise Institute made sure that the topic of high profits, which make many American goods uncompetitive, was never even mentioned. And how could it be mentioned when that very same American capitalists that make huge profits also fund the campaigns of American politicians?</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A self-absorbed giant]]></title><description><![CDATA[Dearth of Chinese lessons for the rest of the world]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/a-self-absorbed-giant</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/a-self-absorbed-giant</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 17:36:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7f29a360-1393-4c60-9835-05b34a5f488d_242x384.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png" width="242" height="384" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:384,&quot;width&quot;:242,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:173062,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/206724847?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zul6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e651d85-b323-4952-a73d-d3deec340bdb_242x384.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>Several days ago, at a conference in Guangxi Province in Southern China, I had a conversation with the editor of the Chinese company that published translations of two of my books. He was very happy with how my </span><em><span>Global Inequality</span></em><span> did in China (which, to be realistic, probably means a sale of a few thousand copies) because, as he said, &#8220;the audience in China is interested only in China. They do not want to read books about other countries and the rest of the world.&#8221; And indeed, he added, Chinese authors write almost exclusively about China.</span></p><p><span>Like many comments, when made by somebody who is more knowledgeable about the topic than us&#8212;but express exactly what we might have thought for a long time&#8212;it struck me: it is something that I and, I am sure, many other people have noticed.</span></p><p><span>Let&#8217;s go over the most recent crop of books, of various ideological persuasions, on China that have become very popular in the United States: Chen Jian (with Odd Arne Westen), </span><em><span>The Great Transformation; From Revolution to reform</span></em><span>*, Yusheng Huang, </span><em><span>The Rise and Fall of the East</span></em><span>*, Tongson Boi, </span><em><span>Against Political Equality</span></em><span>*, Lin Chun, </span><em><span>Revolution and Counterrevolution in China</span></em><span>*, Yuen Yuen Ang, </span><em><span>China&#8217;s Gilded Age</span></em><span>*, Ho-fung Hung, </span><em><span>The China Boom: Why China will not rule the world</span></em><span>*</span><em><span>, </span></em><span>Dan Wang, </span><em><span>Breakneck: China&#8217;s Quest to Engineer the Future</span></em><span>, Jian Chen: </span><em><span>Zhou Enlai: A Life</span></em><span>. I listed here some books that I have reviewed on my Substack (noted with asterisks) and a few others. What is easily observable is that in all cases authors are Chinese or of Chinese origin. There are, at the same time, hundreds of books written by American authors (of non-Chinese background) on China. But what seems to be missing&#8212;and was in effect implied in the comment of my publisher&#8212;is books by Chinese authors on America or the West or Africa or any other part of the world. I do not know the Chinese publishing well enough: there must obviously be such books&#8212;but I do know the English-language publishing scene, and I do not see such books there. Is it that American publishers do not want to publish them or is it that no Chinese historian has cared to write a biography of (say) Ronald Reagan or Bill Clinton the way that Ezra Vogel has published a biography of Deng Xiaoping or Joseph Torigian biography of Xi Zhongxun (Xi Jinping&#8217;s father)?; why did not Jiang Zemin write a book </span><em><span>On America</span></em><span> the way the Kissinger wrote </span><em><span>On China</span></em><span>? (The only such book that seems to be mentioned in American circles is the book by the current Politburo member Wang Huning written after his one-year stay in the United States in 1980s, </span><em><span>America Against America</span></em><span>.)</span></p><p><span>I do not think that the main reasons for this are political but cultural. People in academia have all witnessed a dramatic increase In the number of papers written on China&#8217;s economics, politics and international relations in many journals. I must have refereed at least five such papers within the past twelve months. They are written by people of various backgrounds, including of course by many Chinese, but what is again noticeable when one reads CV of such Chinese authors is that they &#8211;with a few exceptions&#8212;write papers </span><em><span>only</span></em><span> on China. I do not think that if one were to do an empirical investigation of similar concentration on own country, my anecdotal impression would be overturned.</span></p><p><span>Then as before, the question is, why? In principle, there are, I think, two possibilities. Chinese authors (as my publisher said), do not care much about the rest of the world. This may be a remnant of a couple of millennia of history when China&#8217;s interaction with the rest of the world was limited to the reception of formal tributes and some trade. Not much interest was evinced regarding the others (most famously not even in the grand voyage undertaken in the middle of the 15</span><sup><span>th</span></sup><span> century). Or, it could also be due to the lack of confidence of discussing others because of insufficient knowledge (which in turn may be due to insufficient interest). But that second hypothesis cannot really hold in the case of numerous Chinese-origin authors who have lived for decades in America and elsewhere and know these countries probably better than most of the &#8220;native&#8221; citizens.</span></p><p><span>To come to my key point: this self-concentration limits China&#8217;s ideological influence in the rest of the world and its soft power. The latter has definitely increased with China&#8217;s economic success, but in that area the country still &#8220;punches way below its (economic) weight.&#8221; Compare the explosive rise in Chinese-made electric vehicles with the increase of China&#8217;s soft power: do we see a similar trend there? Yes, indeed some improvements, reflected in new visa-free policies towards European countries and thus more tourists, greater number of foreign students in China, so-called Chinamaxxing among some groups of the young in America, success of Chinese films (e.g. by Jia Zhangke; my favorite is the last scene from &#8220;Caught by the Tides&#8221;) and soap-operas. But all of that is very modest for a country that produces almost one-quarter of world output. It surely does not &#8220;produce&#8221; one quarter of world culture or intellectual activity (if the latter is defined as influential books, of fiction and non-fiction, politics, history; films, plastic arts, music, theater etc.)</span></p><p><span>Paradoxically, China might have had more soft power when it followed self-destructive policies of Maoist Cultural Revolution. Although Maoism was never well defined nor was it a global ideology, it had followers across the world from the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Naxalites in India to Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the New Left in Europe. The point is not that these followers were &#8220;nice guys&#8221;; the point is that China&#8217;s ideological power (even if that power was nor exercised for the good) might have been greater then than now.</span></p><p><span>I have written of the same problem in the context of China&#8217;s influence on economic policies of other countries, and on sharing the &#8220;recipes for growth&#8221;. China&#8217;s tremendous success had not resulted in a blueprint that could be followed from Afghanistan to Zambia on how to become rich in four decades. The lack of interest in the rest of the world, and the inability (of perhaps, impossibility) to summarize or translate the lessons of China&#8217;s success into policies needed for economic growth in general, and therefore elsewhere, will, I think, continue to hamper and severely limit the soft power of China in the years to come.</span></p><p></p><p><span>Addendum: I forgot to mention that a part of the problem is caused by an insanely competitive educational system. If you are a Chinese postdoc in economics &amp; need academic points and a job, you will naturally gravitate towards the areas where you have absolute and comparative advantage such that your papers will be published in the top 5 or top 10 journals. Thus you would choose China-centered topics. Many Chinese researchers do so and it is visible that the strategy works as they publish in top journals. However, this in turn makes Chinese students and researchers less interested in the rest of the world (where they do not enjoy comparative advantage), and ultimately and paradoxically undercuts Chinese global soft power. </span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[International development: From moralizing to calculations to laissez-faire to rhetoric]]></title><description><![CDATA[A review of Christian Christiansen&#8217;s &#8220;Designing Global Economic Equality&#8221;]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/international-development-from-moralizing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/international-development-from-moralizing</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 13:23:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7fb7d5ad-fc59-4182-8d78-8150652d875f_482x262.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nw-b!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png" width="482" height="262" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:262,&quot;width&quot;:482,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:137682,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/201594797?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F829a6481-ec0f-4b87-a1ed-ce66aef580b7_482x262.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" 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class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The just published book by Christian Christiansen <em><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/designing-global-economic-equality-9780197811467?cc=es&amp;lang=en&amp;">Designing Global Economic Equality</a>: The Making and Unmaking of Global Egalitarian Policies at the United Nations</em> provides a review of intellectual history of the idea of global inequality. It follows recent excellent books by Samuel Moyn <em><a href="https://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/not-enough-human-rights-unequal-world">Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World</a></em> and Quinn Slobodian <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Globalists-End-Empire-Birth-Neoliberalism/dp/0674979524">Globalists: The End of the Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism</a></em> and <em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/472194/hayeks-bastards-by-slobodian-quinn/9781837310111">Hayek&#8217;s Bastards:</a></em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/472194/hayeks-bastards-by-slobodian-quinn/9781837310111"> </a><em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/472194/hayeks-bastards-by-slobodian-quinn/9781837310111">The Neoliberal Roots of the Populist Right</a></em> (reviewed on my Substack <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/from-welfare-in-one-country-to-global">here</a>, <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/globalists-neoliberals-in-search">here</a> and <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/gold-volk-and-iqs">here)</a> in evaluating the transition in the intellectual discourse and in international politics of the ideas of global poverty, global inequality and global development. The scope of Christiansen book is narrower than that of the other two which often move into the arena of economic and political history.</p><p>Among the three &#8220;globals&#8221; I mentioned above Christiansen focuses only on one dealing with inequality. Global inequality, as Christiansen writes, and as it becomes clear to the reader, meant many things to many people. It entered the jargon of economics already in the 1950s. Colin Clarke&#8217;s <em>Conditions of Economic Progress</em> published in 1940, but then forgotten during the war, and resuscitated after 1945, played a very important role by putting numbers on the huge gap (&#8220;the chasm&#8221;) that existed between the developed Europe and the US, and impoverished Asia and Africa.</p><p>In the early 1960s, many African countries become independent and the rich would discover poverty in the Third World; not that that poverty was unknown before, but now, when the countries became independent, the Third World poverty acquired a political meaning: poor nations of Africa and Asia could be easily tempted by the &#8220;false promise&#8221; of communism and become allies of the Soviet Union. There is thus an element of self-interest from the very beginning of Western involvement in &#8220;solving&#8221; mass poverty in Africa and Asia. There were, nonetheless, other elements too: the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe that implied that aid can jumpstart economic development, and a turn toward the welfare state which could be interpreted, and was interpreted by some including Jan and Alva Myrdal, that it naturally must lead to a global welfare state. In other words, the world should ultimately become a greater Sweden. These hopes were, of course, soon disappointed.</p><p>The era of two overestimations. I would like to name the period from the early 1950s to the introduction of the New International Economic Order in 1974, &#8220;the period of two overestimations&#8221;. The first was the overestimation of the willingness of rich countries to provide aid. Innumerable individuals (beginning with quasi omnipresent in the book Barbara Ward) and likewise innumerable international commissions composed of equally innumerable wise men (mostly men), totally overestimated the likelihood that the rich countries would spend a sizeable share of their GDP on economic aid. The original target, in the 1960s, was 1% of the rich countries&#8217; GDPs. It was then scaled down to 0.7% of GDP. Like many UN objectives and &#8220;pledges&#8221;, it was ignored. Today, rich countries&#8217; foreign aid is estimated at less than 0.3% of GDP and lots of that includes military transfers, or aid that can be understood only in terms of political geostrategics, not at all in terms of alleviating poverty and reducing inequality between the (somewhat awkwardly) labeled Global North and Global South.</p><p>The second overestimation was that aid could propel poor countries&#8217; growth. That practically never worked. The Marshall plan was a singular exception, but it was an exception (we understand it much better now), because Europe needed capital but had everything else: highly qualified labor force, variety of already built industrial factories that just needed raw materials (and thus foreign exchange) to begin producing again, well-known and much used markets. None of that existed in the newly decolonized countries in Africa and parts of Asia.</p><p>Those two over-estimations went together with a somewhat otiose language of moral responsibility of the North, the rhetoric couched in ethical terms, and not in terms of restitution for the harm of colonization (although there were, as Christiansen writes, such authors as well); and often in the wooden language of the many reports (the Pierson report, Columbia Conference on International Development, the Brandt report). Christiansen gives copious quotes from many of these reports and one becomes quickly incredulous that authors truly believed that vague--and invariably vain&#8212;appeals to moral conscience of the rich and to their ill-defined responsibility for poverty in the Third World would ever have any traction in real life. Perhaps our era is much more cynical, but making such abstract calls for action&#8212;that invariably are vague as to who and how should do things&#8212;seemed rather written to display moral virtues of the writers than to lead to some measurable change. Robert McNamara, the engineer of body-counts, is no less morally disposed in the appeals to the conscience of the West than the indefatigable Barbara Ward who became his close advisor (after, or perhaps simultaneously as, advising the Popes and many other influential personalities).</p><p>The most interesting person of the period is Ra&#250;l Prebisch. Prebisch was a structuralist (even if he was not sure he agreed with such a description) who made points that were understandable and sensible: the international system was systematically skewed in favor of rich countries (for example, by ruling out nationalization of multinationals working in poor countries), by protecting Western industries against the nascent industries of the South (and thus making export growth of the South more difficult), and finally by profiting from the long-term movement of terms of trade against agriculture. Prebisch thus saw poor countries, and especially his native Latin America (he was born in Argentina), locked in a situation where they were short of foreign exchange to start serious import substitution (which obviously requires, at first, technological imports from the North), impotent in their dealings with Northern multinationals, and stuck with production of raw materials whose relative price is on a long-term decline. Moreover, high inequality in the South leads to wasteful expenditure by the elite on luxury goods thus additionally reducing the funds for &#8220;primary accumulation&#8221; and growth. Even if Prebisch was wrong on the long-term evolution of the prices of primary commodities, his basic story made sense then, and continues to do to some extent even now. What better example than China which indeed faced all the issues listed by Prebisch but was able, by improving its position vis-&#224;-vis foreign investors to conquer their technology, move to higher value-added production, not waste too much money on luxury consumption, and achieve extraordinarily high rates of growth.</p><p>As this short sketch of Prebisch shows, he was no great friend of neoliberal approach to global inequality according to which poor countries should just follow the path of the rich: find the right niche in the international division of labor and go along the stadial development &#224; la Walt Rostow (another important development economist who is, unfortunately, not much mentioned by Christiansen). It is no surprise that Prebisch got into a couple of nasty quarrels (unusual for him) with Milton Friedman and neoclassical economists who, from the late 1970s, dominated the field of &#8220;global inequality&#8221; and development.</p><p>We thus enter into the second phase that may be dubbed that of &#8220;neoliberal globalization&#8221;. The rule here was: countries should simply follow market signals and grow. It was a na&#239;ve doctrine. While the moralizing doctrines of Barbara Ward and Jan Myrdal were naive in their assumption that there is such a political or moral entity as &#8220;global community&#8221;, the neoclassicals were na&#239;ve in believing that unmolested markets will make everybody rich, or at least no longer poor. While one group was naive politically, the otter was naive economically.</p><p>This transition, occurring at around the ninth decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is much discussed in both its national and global aspects. It is notable that Christiansen links the economic disputes of the period with those in the field of international relations. A precursor to the move to the right in economics was, Christiansen writes, Robert Tucker (<em>Inequality of Nations</em>, 1977) that hailed back to political realism: the real&#8212;the only--actors in the world of international economics are states. States have interests but not ethics. The global community does not exist. The neoliberal turn thus took as its underpinning a very realistic (in the sense of the so-called realistic theory) view of international relations.</p><p>As must have become clear to the reader up to now, the term &#8220;global inequality&#8221; in reality meant, most of the time, contrasting some average numbers for the North and the South: average GDP per capita, or average life expectancy, or average school attainment. For me, since the work on global income or wealth inequality has become possible (thanks to more plentiful data), &#8221;global&#8221; means inclusion of all individuals in the world, not simplified by an average quantity but with their actual incomes or wealth. In Christiansen&#8217;s book, reflecting much less empirically rich times, it was simply a gap between the North and the South. This point is important to make because a similar confusion (do we compare the mean against the mean, or do we take all individuals and look at global distributions?) continues, not infrequently, today. Both pictures have validity and use, but the one that looks at all individuals in the world is of course hard to create but is richer in its empirical and even political meanings. Neither the North, nor the South can be usefully summarized by one number. In today&#8217;s world even less so than in the past.</p><p>Finally, we come to the almost-present where the book ends: to the period of &#8220;embedded globalization&#8221; or &#8220;inclusive capitalism&#8221; where neoliberal globalization was, in words, tamed by market consultants and the UN. It is a rather bizarre phase in the evolution that we, following Christiansen, chart here. Under the pressure of the Asian financial crisis, Seattle and Genova riots, market consultants had devised the idea of &#8220;responsible capitalism&#8221; or &#8220;embedded capitalism&#8221; such that companies will continue making money, but now, they argued, companies would do so by focusing on green technologies, treating workers nicely, and doing similar implausible things. UN, short of money and ideas, bought that phantasy and we are treated to no fewer than three speeches, delivered year after year by Kofi Annan, then General Secretary of the United Nations, at Davos (where one wonders why, in the first place, the head of an inter-state organization should go at all). The whole discussion, including in Christiansen&#8217;s book, becomes murky here. It is not clear what UN and international organizations believe any longer the policy to reduce the gap should be. We are lost in a fog of fantastic statements where all contradictions between business and state, the poor countries and the rich, the powerful and the weak seem to have been solved, at least by a rhetorical sleight of hand. It was probably intellectually the most barren period.</p><p>Christiansen&#8217;s book is, for the students of development economics and international relations, and people like me who study world inequalities, enjoyable and very well documented. There are many things to learn. It covers the political West-Third World relations since the end of the Second World War in detail. It uses mostly the UN as the forum where they were intellectually played out. Development economists, not linked to international organizations, play a secondary role; macro economics is not much mentioned, and the Soviet bloc and China are totally absent. I also think that more attention should have been paid to the New International Economic Order. It is a complex project: it stood for certain principles of the UN much more so than the political West, but it also rejected interference in domestic affairs and hence the protection of human rights. It wanted to reduce inequality on its own terms, but its &#8220;reign&#8221; was short-lived. It ended with the increase of US interest rates that plunged the Third World into insolvency, reimposed the role of the IMF and brought the original hierarchy back. Except&#8230;except for many in Asia who grew faster than ever and redefined the meaning of North-South relations.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A different game]]></title><description><![CDATA[On football&#8217;s extreme commercialization]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/a-different-game</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/a-different-game</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 14:52:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png" width="723" height="396" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:396,&quot;width&quot;:723,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:26554,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/200133012?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!B5sn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb14de37a-e566-4e70-851b-456e667a3f40_723x396.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>As people who read my Substack and other short pieces might have noticed I have not commented on almost anything regarding football in the past several years. I have lost quite a lot of interest, in part because of the interruption brought by covid (and the sad spectacle of empty stands and piped-in supporters&#8217; noise generated by TV producers), and was then increasingly alienated by the extreme commercialization of the game. It is not that professional football (soccer) was ever free of money and commercial interests. But, keeping in step, with neoliberal commodification, it has become so brazenly and openly commercialized that some of its original features that made football stand out among sports have been lost. A sport that has historically been grounded (and not only in England, the cradle of football, but in all countries where it has spread in the twentieth century) in the local and the class (bourgeoisie vs workers; mixed heritage vs. White; right-wingers vs. left-wingers) has now become a deracinated sport. It has grown unmoored from most of its local, national or class roots. It is even doubtful, I think, to what extent it can be called a &#8220;sport&#8221; any more and not an &#8220;entertainment&#8221; in the sense in which the term is used by Hollywood and Madison Avenue.</p><p>I do not think that these critiques of the current state of football, and implicitly of its associations (FIFA and its constellation of regional groupings), is new. People have been saying this for years. And it has steadily grown worse. Perhaps the sight of this year&#8217;s Champions&#8217; League final brought it home more than ever. Without going into the details of the game, I think it would not be unfair to summarize it by saying that (a) it was a very boring game and devoid of individual sparks of genius, and (b) it was just physical and tactical. Players, whose physical prowess, conditioning, and endurance are extraordinary, looked more like creatures from an AI-generated computer game than footballers of the past. There was no Omar Sivori who refused to wear shin-guards, no disheveled, cocaine-driven Maradona, no Garrincha half-asleep at the right-wing, no pot-belly Ferenc Puskas who could not run 100 meters and yet would score hundreds of goals, no fifth Beatle, no crazy individual. There were accordingly no unexpected passes, no incredible dribblings, no solo actions, no bizarre moves. But there was lots of tactical prevarication, with players lined up as Roman legionnaires executing a difficult maneuver before entering the battle, and performing their narrowly-circumscribed duties at perfection.</p><p>To add to this lack of genius and plethora of tactics, the winning team is largely an artificial creation, implanted in one of the largest capitals of Europe&#8212;not known for its love of the game&#8212;by foreign money. It has indeed acquired a strong following now, but that following itself has not birthed the team; it has never been powerful or passionate enough to create a team. On the contrary, the following was created once the team has become famous. There was no internal, endogenous growth that, step by step, over the years would have created a team. It is the same as if instead of planting trees to provide a shade, one were to simply uproot the trees from the forest and plant them on the sidewalk. Indeed, both provide equal shade at the time of heat. But one set of trees would have been created by a community that would oversee, over the years, its execution; the other would be brought in by the developers. The developers, in this case as in several others, simply decided to invest money in football rather than in building new city blocs. That&#8217;s how the winning teams are created nowadays. Socially, ex nihilo.</p><p>The winning teams are, not surprisingly, more and more the same: in the Champions&#8217; League, an average of 25 teams were quarter-finalists in every five-year cycle from 1958 up to the early 2000s; since then, the number has gone down to around 20, and in the latest cycle is likely to be only 15 (see the figure, and explanation below). The very end of boredom will be reached when each season the same eight teams are quarter-finalists.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png" width="581" height="389" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:389,&quot;width&quot;:581,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vPA6!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe1d09c47-60b4-49ae-a4d9-16632dc54d6b_581x389.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The spectacle &#8211;for it is indeed now a spectacle&#8212;has acquired characteristics of a circus, very much in sight in this year&#8217;s final. Calling out the players&#8217; names with an exaggerated accentuation, setting fireworks, bringing in enormous screens (like in the new Bernabeu in Madrid), announcing the entrance of players into the arena as if they were gladiators, reminded me of what American football has become. It is a sort of a sport, just a &#8220;sort&#8221;&#8212;but devoid of all the characteristics of localism and class that I mentioned before. The teams may move from one city to another, the franchise is there to make money. The football franchises of FIFA and UEFA are now giant companies: players are entertainers, the game is a circus, and the businessmen are there to pocket the money.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Explanation of the graph</strong>. Figure shows the number of teams that are the quarterfinalists in each five-year cycle of the Champions&#8217; League (or the European Cup as it was called earlier) beginning with the 1958-62 cycle. With the competition most equalized, there would be every year, eight different teams in the quarter-finals and thus the most egalitarian Champions&#8217; League would have 40 different teams in each five-year cycle (5 times 8=40). The highest number in the graph is 40. The most &#8220;monopolized&#8221; or &#8220;centralized&#8221; competition would have the same eight teams in quarter-finals each year. Thus the lowest number in the graph is 8; consequently, the higher the value, the more equal the League. The Champions&#8217; League went from having about twenty-five different teams in each cycle up to the early 2000s, to only twenty, and now in the current cycle, running from 2023 to 2027, the number is likely to be around 15 (the current value, after three years, is 12).</p><p>PS. This critique of FIFA and UEFA should not make one forget that an even worse association is the one ruling tennis. <a href="https://brankomilanovic.substack.com/p/the-age-of-open-financial-imperialism">I wrote about that several years</a> ago (&#8220;The age of open financial imperialism&#8221;) when I had a discussion with Nate Silver. The tennis association is as outrageously commercialized as the football association, but is, in addition, not elected by anyone and is monopolized by a couple of rich individuals from rich countries, so much so that tennis&#8217; &#8220;World Cups&#8221; are always played in the same venues, years after year. This kind of monopolization has, luckily, so far failed to take hold in football, but it not impossible to imagine that it might. Then the Champions&#8217; League final will be always played in the same venue, with more or less the same teams, and the World Cup will forever be held in one or two countries.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence and future of capitalism from a Marxist, and a neoclassical, point of view]]></title><description><![CDATA[What would be the likely effects of massive introduction of artificial intelligence in the economy, from the Marxist point of view?]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/artificial-intelligence-and-future</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/artificial-intelligence-and-future</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 16:55:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d1c29a15-6597-4139-8671-79a0353d18ae_290x177.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png" width="290" height="177" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:177,&quot;width&quot;:290,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:151887,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://branko2f7.substack.com/i/197886913?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!MRlL!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F376ef28d-05ec-410c-a115-1cd6d228e721_290x177.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></div></figure></div><p>What would be the likely effects of massive introduction of artificial intelligence in the economy, from the Marxist point of view? Interestingly, this question, as far as I know, has not been asked.</p><p>At first, the implications for Marx&#8217;s labor theory of value seem bad or in contradiction with the facts or our expectations. AI implies the introduction of extremely capital-intensive techniques of production, or to use Marxist terminology, of processes with a very high organic composition of capital. In other words, AI implies very high <em>c/v</em> ratio. That is the ratio of constant capital (<em>c)</em> to capital engaged to hire labor (<em>v)</em>. If the presence of labor is small, and perhaps in cases of fully automated production, close to zero, the surplus value produced by labor must also be small or close to zero. Regardless of how high the rate of exploitation is, a very small <em>v</em> implies a very small <em>s</em> (surplus value). We thus establish that the rate of profit (<em>s/(c+v</em>)) must also be very small, consistent with one of Marx&#8217;s most famous &#8220;laws of capitalist development&#8221;, namely tendency of the profit rate to fall with the introduction of more capital-intensive processes of production. In the case of almost wholly automated production, the rate of profit must become zero or be near zero. As Marx, Schumpeter and common sense tell us, capitalism with zero profits is an absurdity. Capitalists will not invest if their expected return is zero. Thus, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall spells the doom of capitalism.</p><p>Much before the AI appeared on the scene this was the idea discussed by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Marxist economists like Rosa Luxemburg and Henryk Grossman. They expected precisely what we observe today: that by introducing more capital-intensive processes of production, which for each individual capitalist as he or she introduces them, are more profitable, capitalists as a class, when they all do so, displace living labor, reduce the amount of surplus value, and thus as a result drive their own profit rate (for all capitalists as a whole) down to zero.</p><p>So will the AI bring capitalism to an end? This does not seem to square well with the facts and expectations of not smaller, but higher, rates of profits that would come from the introduction of AI. Was Marx entirely wrong? Perhaps not.</p><p>To see that consider the economy composed of two sectors. First, the sector with very high organic composition of capital, exactly as we have described it. But now allow that total automatization of production in this sector creates a demand for production of goods and services such that only live human labor can do, or where live human labor is superior to AI: think of caring activities, sports, nursing, top cooking skills, coach training, bar tenders, creative writing and multitude of other tasks that, precisely because some of them may be done in a rough way by the AI, will become ever more valuable when done by skilled, real live human labor. Thousands of teachers may be replaced by the AI but the demand for really good teachers, who can beat the AI, will increase.</p><p>Then, a second sector, the very opposite of the fully automated sector, will develop. It would be characterized by low organic composition of capital: constant capital (<em>c</em>) would be small relative to variable capital (i.e., to the amount of engaged capital paid in form of wages). It would, unlike the automated sector, generate a huge amount of surplus value.</p><p>But as we know, in capitalism, commodities and services are not sold at labor values, but at the prices of production which equalize profit rates in capital- and labor-intensive sectors (i.e., in sectors with different organic compositions of capital). This, in turn means, that the amount of profit in the automated sector will, in equilibrium, be proportional to the (huge) amount of capital employed in the automated sector. Therefore, our automated sector&#8217;s profit will not be negligible as it seemed at first when we looked at it in isolation and assumed that the entire economy is composed of it only. On the contrary, the profit rate may go up because replacement of labor in one sector is accompanied by the creation of more labor intensive processes of production elsewhere.</p><p>To put it simply: while one part of the economy will work only with machines (where under the term of machine I include the AI), another part of the economy will be much more labor intensive, probably even more so than today. This in turn means that profits in the AI sector may be high&#8212;but <em>only</em> if the growth of the AI sector is accompanied by rising demand for goods and services produced by live labor and thus by the emergence of that, second, sector. If the AI sector takes the entire economy, then according to Marxist analyses, the profit rate must tend toward zero. And even under the neoclassical analysis that would be the case, because a fully automated production that does not employ labor at all implies total wages of zero or close to zero, and it becomes unclear to whom the bonanza of new production could be sold. Thus, the AI-generated abundance leads, in a neoclassical world too (absent a huge redistribution to people who do not work), to insufficient aggregate demand, and consequently to the profit rate close, or equal, to zero. In the neoclassical world, as in Marxist world, the rise of AI must be accompanied by an equivalent rise in labor intensive activities in order to keep the economy in equilibrium and not to drive the aggregate demand and the profit rate down to zero.</p><p>To summarize: in both Marxist and neoclassical worlds, an economy composed of highly automated sector <em>only</em> is incompatible with the maintenance of capitalism. In one case because the produced surplus value and thus profit is zero; in the other case, because insufficient aggregate demand leads to profits of zero. The situation can be &#8220;saved&#8221; only by an equivalent rise of a labor-intensive sector or by massive redistribution to people who do not work.</p><p>Thus, we see less dismal future for labor that some people argue. Activities where labor cannot be substituted by the AI will blossom. Will AI bring an overall deskilling of labor or not? At first sight, it seems that the AI will lead to deskilling of labor simply because many skills (such as computing, software development, writing, even math) will be redundant as they may be taken over by machines. Yet, this process may be, and is likely to be, counterbalanced by the creation of occupations where labor skills will exceed today&#8217;s level simply because they would have to be superior to the skill levels produced by the AI in order for people to want to purchase such products and services. Therefore, while one part of the labor force may suffer from deskilling, or to call it frankly, from the dumbing-down, another part of the labor force will get more sophisticated and much more skilled. To stay ahead it will have to compete with machines more than with the other humans. But so long as we believe in human adaptation, we can think that there would be always a segment of such labor that would do things that the machines cannot do, or even where the same output is produced by both, it will more appreciated (and hence more valued) if done by live labor rather than by the AI. An AI-generated equally beautiful ice-skater is unlikely to be as much appreciated as a human ice-skater. At least, by the humans.</p><p></p><p>PS. In the piece, I have used the terms of &#8220;increased capital intensity of production&#8221; and &#8220;higher organic composition of capital&#8221; interchangeably. The first is, of course, a neoclassical, the second a Marxist term, but in this context they both express the same thing: machines (including AI) replacing humans.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[99 percent Utopia and money]]></title><description><![CDATA[For full happiness is possible only in stagnation.]]></description><link>https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/99-percent-utopia-and-money</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/99-percent-utopia-and-money</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Branko Milanovic]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 18:34:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d2440bb2-e50a-476e-97f9-7ef280c352cc_271x336.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8Pn3!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F385abe68-32bd-4c5a-ac12-45d12ec4e7b6_271x336.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8Pn3!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F385abe68-32bd-4c5a-ac12-45d12ec4e7b6_271x336.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8Pn3!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F385abe68-32bd-4c5a-ac12-45d12ec4e7b6_271x336.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!8Pn3!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F385abe68-32bd-4c5a-ac12-45d12ec4e7b6_271x336.png 1272w, 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class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>My good friend and<a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-Center/PDF/Centers/LIS/Milanovic/papers/2009/jopp.pdf"> co-author Leif Wenar,</a> in his first tweet, asked this question: &#8220;Friends, a utopia query. Keep human nature fixed. Imagine the best possible world. Does money exist?&#8221; I could not sleep last night so I decided to give it a thought.</p><p>Let&#8217;s start with money. What is its central function? To coordinate plans of individuals and companies and to pull resources in the &#8220;right&#8221; direction. When I go to Starbucks to buy coffee, and have money to pay for it, I know that there will be a person willing to make that coffee for me, and there would be companies delivering coffee grains because they all expect to get money from me. So money enables us to make our plans consistent, starting from the coffee growers all the way to the final consumer.</p><p>Who is then going to do the coordination in Utopia if there is no money? But, before we answer that question, let&#8217;s go back and look at what is Utopia. I will use Marx&#8217;s definition given in the &#8220;Critique of the Gotha program&#8221;: Communism is the situation where &#8220;the productive forces have increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow&#8230;abundantly&#8212;[so that]&#8230;the narrow horizon of bourgeois right [can] be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!&#8221;. Utopia is thus a situation where goods and services are absolutely plentiful, there is no scarcity, and we can take as much of them as we like.</p><p>Now, some may stop me right there: this will never happen, they will say. But let&#8217;s not go that fast. Notice that when I go to my local Starbucks I have already entered a bit the &#8220;coast of Utopia&#8221;. I can get there an unlimited quantity of water, ice cubs, water cups, paper napkins, honey and milk, all for free. They are all laid out for all customers (and even for those who are not customers but just walk in) to take in unlimited amounts. There are other goods that have almost entered this cornucopia in our lifetimes: water, electricity. When I need to recharge my laptop I can count on getting free electricity from practically every store, train, or airport. There are of course other services like museums and open-air concerts that one can enjoy for free but they are a bit different because somebody else has paid for them. But I want to mention it here because we shall find them useful in a moment.</p><p>So, there is, I think, already now a limited, but growing, number of goods and services whose marginal cost of production is so low that they are practically free. (The average cost of production is not zero, but to an individual consumer these goods appear as free.) Consider now the behavior of people. Do they go to Starbucks stores and fill their pockets with free paper napkins or grab free ice cubes? No. Do they go to free open-air concerts day after day and fight for the spots? No. Once you know that such goods will be plentiful and free, you do not keep an unreasonable stock of them, nor do you fight to get them. You know they will be around when you need them.</p><p>So far we have I think made two important conclusions: there are goods that fall into the category of &#8220;Utopian goods&#8221; and behavior that people exhibit towards these goods does not include hoarding, wanton destruction or wastefulness.</p><p>Can we imagine that with economic progress more and more goods begin to fulfil this condition of Utopian goods? I think we can. Surely 40 or 50 years ago, you had to pay for the smallest piece of paper or paper napkin, not get it for free as now. (There is still a difference between the US and Europe in this: European Starbucks stores make it more difficult to get free paper napkins.) You even had to pay for a cup of water in an inn on a dirt road. Not today. So perhaps one day we shall walk into a Starbucks store and be given as much coffee for free as we like in the expectation that we shall buy some other, new fanciful product. But notice that when this happens, coffee will have joined paper napkins and ice cubes on our list of Utopian goods. So the list will be growing.</p><p>Extend this many years forward and assume that lots of the goods that we consume today eventually become Utopian. But who is going to produce them? Will not people have to be given some money-like coupons showing how many hours of work they did, coupons that would entitle them to goods and services? This does not make sense however because all goods, in any quantity, will be free to all, so coupon or no coupon you can get as much as you like. This then means that labor has to be entirely voluntary and free, not &#8220;paid&#8221; in any form. That too is not impossible to imagine. I am writing this blog for free. Of course, I hope to enhance my reputation (or to drive it into the ground) but there is not a single good or service that I will get from this writing. You will also read it out of interest, not for any pecuniary reason. Many activities can be done for free, simply because people like to do them. Many other boring, repetitive or hard jobs that people do today will be done by robots. Controlling robots will require a minimum of work&#8212;perhaps writing a software code about how they (the robots) should do certain tasks, a thing, which I am sure, thousands of smart young people will compete to do for free.</p><p>When I go to a restaurant, who is going to make the food or serve me? Partly robots, and partly people who like to be chefs or to provide good service. Actually, the quality of some goods and services may go up compared to what it is today simply because people do a better job at something which they like rather than at something they are (merely) paid to do.</p><p>But here I think we run into our first problem. There will be always better and worse restaurants simply because the chefs will not be the same. But since the price paid at every restaurant is the same (zero), there will be no mechanism to distribute customers between better and worse restaurants except through queues. So we shall have shortages for certain goods and services. The shortages will be, like in a centrally-planned economy, &#8220;solved&#8221; through queueing.</p><p>The second problem appears at the level of jobs. We may be able to fill 90% of jobs by robots, 9% of jobs by people who simply like to do these jobs, but 1% of jobs that are hard or done under unpleasant conditions and cannot be mechanized will be always difficult to fill. So, we shall have to give something to people who do these jobs: we shall have to attract them to do the work. But how to attract them if everything is free anyway? So, money under the guise of some special coupons would reappear. Perhaps we could give these latter-day Stakhanovites coupons which would allow them to jump the queue in the restaurants. Perhaps something else. But whatever we do, a rationing mechanism, implied by money, will be back in that segment of the system.</p><p>Finally, technological progress. If we assume that technological progress has stopped, I think the idea of moneyless Utopia is ultimately, at least conceptually, almost possible. But if technological progress continues with people inventing new things simply out of curiosity, that is without any material interest, these new goods, always scarce in the beginning, will have to be rationed. So to ration them, we shall need money or quasi money too.</p><p>In a stationary economy, the range of goods that are available for free and in unlimited quantities, and the range of jobs that are performed for free can be very high. We may have a 99% Utopia. But not a hundred percent Utopia.</p><p>But in a growing economy, Utopia becomes much less realistic. The faster we grow the greater the number of Utopian goods and closer we seem to be coming to Utopia; but also, the faster we grow the more we invent new goods that are necessarily short in supply, and simultaneously the further we get from Utopia. Thus the fundamental nature of economic progress reveals itself in Leif&#8217;s question: economic progress is making us richer daily, but leaves us equally unsatisfied. For full happiness is possible only in stagnation.</p><p></p><p>PS. This is the integral text of my <a href="https://glineq.blogspot.com/2015/09/99-percent-utopia-and-money.html">Webpost published in September 2015.</a> But in a recent discussion with my friend Arjun Jayadev who has, together with J.W. Mason, just published a book &#8220;<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Against-Money-J-W-Mason/dp/0226842533">Against Money</a>&#8221;, I was reminded of it and I thought it was worth reposting.  </p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>